RICHARD H. KYLE, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's self-styled Motion entitled "Motion For Relief Pursuant To Federal Rules Civil Procedure 60(b) and Federal Rules Criminal Procedures 52(B) For Non-Harmless Procedural and Plain Error Pursuant To 5K3.1 ("Fast-Track') & U.S.S.G. Amend 739, 740, & 754 (1
In October 2010, an indictment was handed up that accused Defendant (and others) of violating federal controlled substances laws. In May 2011, Defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(C) and 846. As part of the agreement by which Defendant pled guilty, he waived his right to file an appeal, and he waived his right to seek post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, provided that his sentence did not exceed 168 months. On January 11, 2012, Defendant was sentenced to 78 months in federal prison, to be followed by a two-year term of supervised release. Defendant is presently serving his sentence at the CI NE Ohio Correctional Center in Youngstown, Ohio.
Having waived his right to appeal, and his right to seek relief under § 2255, Defendant has not previously challenged his conviction or sentence in this case. However, Defendant now claims that his sentence should be vacated because (a) he was not afforded any "fast-track" benefits under a Department of Justice Memorandum dated January 31, 2012, and (b) he is entitled to a reduced sentence under certain amendments to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, identified as "739, 740, and 754." Defendant's Motion is plainly unsustainable, for several reasons.
Defendant is seeking relief under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). However, the relief that Defendant is seeking cannot be pursued (or granted) under either of those Rules.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) does not provide a procedural mechanism for challenging a federal criminal conviction or sentence; the Rule merely establishes a standard of review for claims that are raised by a procedurally proper means — normally a direct appeal.
Defendant's citation to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is equally unavailing. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that federal prisoners normally must seek post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The Court further finds that it would serve no useful purpose to construe Defendant's current Motion to be a § 2255 motion. As Defendant undoubtedly recognizes, he is barred from seeking collateral relief under § 2255, because he waived his right to do so when he entered into his plea agreement. Under the terms of Defendant's plea agreement, he is barred from seeking relief under § 2255.
Furthermore, if the present Motion were construed to be a § 2255 motion, it would have to be summarily dismissed due to untimeliness. Section 2255 motions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, which normally begins to run when the judgment entered in a criminal case becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
In sum, the Court finds that Defendant's current challenges to his sentence in this case cannot be raised, entertained or decided under either of the two Rules that he has cited — i.e., Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Furthermore, Defendant's Motion cannot be construed to be a § 2255 motion and entertained as such, because (1) Defendant has waived his right to seek relief under § 2255, and (2) Defendant's current Motion was filed after the expiration of the one-year deadline for seeking relief under § 2255. Thus, the Court concludes that Defendant's claims for relief must be summarily denied, because he has not identified (and the Court cannot independently discern) any proper procedure by which those claims can be entertained on the merits.
Even if Defendant's current claims were presented in a procedurally acceptable manner, and could properly be addressed on the merits, those claims still would have to be dismissed, because they are substantively defective.
Defendant contends that his sentence should be reduced pursuant to a "FAST-TRACK Memo issued by [the] Department of Justice... dated January 31, 2012." (Defendant's Motion, [Doc. No. 630], p. 1.) The Government acknowledges the existence of that memo, ("Response of United States to Petitioner's Motion Dated March 11, 2013," [Doc. No. 634], p. 4), but argues that it has no bearing on Defendant's sentence in this case for two reasons.
The Government further contends that, in any event, the "FAST-TRACK memo" does not
Finally, the Court notes that the "FAST-TRACK memo" cited by the parties apparently is dated January 31, 2012, which was approximately three weeks
Finally, as the Court has already indicated, (
In sum, Defendant's current challenge to his sentence is procedurally barred, because the claims he is asserting cannot be brought under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), 28 U.S.C. § 2255, or any other procedure that can properly be used for seeking post-conviction relief. In addition, Defendant's claims are substantively without merit, because (1) he is not entitled to any relief under the "FAST-TRACK memo" cited in his Motion, and (2) he has not cited any applicable
Based upon the foregoing, and all of the files, records and proceedings herein,
The Government's memorandum in opposition to Defendant's Motion erroneously (and unhelpfully) quotes the wrong Rule. The Government has cited Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of