ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, District Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff's appeal brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of Defendant Social Security Administration's ("SSA") denial of disability benefits as rendered in a decision by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). For the reasons below, the decision of the ALJ is
The Court's review of the ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits is limited to determining if the decision "complies with the relevant legal requirements and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2008)). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but is `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would find adequate to support the [ALJ's] conclusion.'" Grable v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1196, 1201 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001)). In determining whether existing evidence is substantial, the Court takes into account "evidence that detracts from the [ALJ's] decision as well as evidence that supports it." Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). "If the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, [the Court] may not reverse even if substantial evidence would support the opposite outcome or [the Court] would have decided differently." Smith v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001)). The Court does not "re-weigh the evidence presented to the ALJ." Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003)). The Court must "defer heavily to the findings and conclusions of the [ALJ]." Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
By way of overview, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following servere impairments in combination: asthma; obesity; cervicalgia; right knee edema and cartilage loss; bipolar affective disorder; major depressive disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; cannabisinduced anxiety disorder; cannabis use, severe; panic disorder with agoraphobia; and avoidant, depressive, dependent, aggressive, self-defeating, passive-aggressive, paranoid and borderline personality traits; cannabis-induced anxiety and cannabis abuse, severe. However, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff's impairments, whether considered alone or in combination, meet or medically equal the criteria of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Pt. 404. Subpt. P, App. 1 ("Listing"). Additionally, the ALJ found that despite his impairments, Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work with a number of limitations.
In his sole argument on appeal, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion of his treating psychiatrist. The ALJ accorded little weight to the opinion of Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Paddolkar, because (1) the treating relationship was very recent with infrequent treatment and (2) the absence of full disclosure from the claimant reagarding substancerelated issues, specifically tobacco and cannabis use. The Court finds the ALJ did not err in discussing, reviewing, or giving less weight to the medical opinion of Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Paddolkar. See Bernard v. Colvin, 774 F.3d 482, 487 (8th Cir. 2014) (the ALJ must evaluate the records as a whole; therefore, the opinions of treating physicians do not automatically control); Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 965 (8th Cir. 2015) (In weighing a medical opinion, "an ALJ must [] consider the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examinations.") (citation omitted).
Having carefully reviewed the record before the Court and the parties' submissions on appeal, the Court concludes that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the ALJ's decision.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ is