Filed: Jul. 30, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 18-13 Singh v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A206 462 579 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATI
Summary: 18-13 Singh v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A206 462 579 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATIO..
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18-13
Singh v. Barr
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A206 462 579
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 30th day of July, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
MOHABAT PAL SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 18-13
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Eric Hisey, Dalbir Singh &
Associates, PC, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Holly M. Smith,
Senior Litigation Counsel;
Christin M. Whitacre, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Mohabat Pal Singh, a native and citizen of
India, seeks review of a December 4, 2017, decision of the
BIA affirming a March 8, 2017, decision of an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mohabat Pal Singh, No. A 206
462 579 (B.I.A. Dec. 4, 2017), aff’g No. A 206 462 579 (Immig.
Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 8, 2017). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales,
432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). We review adverse
credibility determinations under the substantial evidence
standard. Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,
891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir.
2018). The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances,” base a credibility finding on inconsistencies
in an applicant’s statements or between his statements and
other evidence, “without regard to whether an inconsistency
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. . . goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility
determination unless . . . it is plain that no reasonable
fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008);
accord Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence
supports the agency’s determination that Singh was not
credible as to his claim that Shiromani Akali Dal Badal and
Bharatiya Janata Party (“Badal/BJP”) members twice attacked
him and killed his father because they were members of the
Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar Party (“SADA”).
First, the agency reasonably relied on Singh’s
inconsistent descriptions of the events surrounding the first
attack that he reported suffering. In his written statement,
Singh asserted that he stood outside the police station for
“hours” before he was arrested, but he testified that he
waited only “half an hour.” The agency was not required to
accept Singh’s explanation for this inconsistency. See
Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A
petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation
for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must
demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled
3
to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Second, the agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies
regarding Singh’s educational and work history. Singh’s
initial application asserted that he stopped attending school
in 2011 and worked in 2012 and 2013; his amended application
asserted that he attended school through March 2013 and did
not work; and his testimony was internally inconsistent and
contradicted both written accounts. Singh offered no
explanation for these discrepancies, and although he now
argues that the agency should not have relied on
inconsistencies arising from his initial application because
he submitted an amended application prior to the hearing, the
agency is entitled to consider the entire record in assessing
credibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
Third, the agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies
and omissions in the record concerning harassment of Singh’s
mother and break-ins at her home after Singh left India.
Singh testified that his mother did not have many problems
after he left the country, although Badal/BJP members
sometimes asked about him, and denied that she had “any
problems at the house.” His mother’s letter also did not
mention break-ins or continued harassment. However, a letter
4
from the SADA Party asserted that Badal/BJP members
repeatedly broke into Singh’s former home and harassed his
family.
Singh now argues that his testimony was consistent with
the SADA letter and that he was not in a position to explain
his mother’s omission of the break-ins. But Singh’s
testimony that his mother did not have problems at her house
contradicted his later testimony that she did and the SADA
letter. Given this inconsistency, the agency did not err in
also relying on the omission of the information from Singh’s
mother’s letter. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (upholding
agency’s reliance on omission from letters submitted to
corroborate persecution); cf. Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 77-
79, 81 (cautioning that third party omission is less probative
where there is no inconsistency).
Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency
reasonably relied on his failure to rehabilitate his
testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An
applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may
bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in
general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v.
Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency
5
reasonably declined to afford weight to letters from Singh’s
relatives and acquaintances because the authors were
interested parties or were unavailable for cross-examination
and, as discussed above, some of the documents were
inconsistent with Singh’s statements. See Matter of H-L-H-
& Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (finding that
letters from the applicant’s friends and family did not
provide substantial support for the applicant’s claims
because they were from interested witnesses not subject to
cross-examination), overruled on other grounds by Hui Lin
Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 133–38 (2d Cir. 2012); see
also Y.C. v. Holder,
741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013).
Singh’s additional documentary evidence, which included a
medical record, his father’s death certificate, and
identification documents, does not resolve or explain the
inconsistencies that formed the basis of the agency’s adverse
credibility determination.
Given the multiple inconsistencies and lack of reliable
corroboration, the adverse credibility determination is
supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165–67; Biao
Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. Because Singh’s claims were all based
on the same factual predicate, the adverse credibility
6
determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148,
156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
7
