UNPUBLISHED OPINION

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

SCHELLHAS, Judge.

Appellant argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because he was induced to plead guilty with the false promise that he would have a chance at receiving a probationary sentence. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Matthew Bruss with one count of engaging in sex trafficking in the second degree in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(4) (2014). At a plea hearing in July 2015, Bruss's attorney informed the district court that Bruss was pleading guilty so that he would face "no additional charges arising out of this incident . . . involving this victim" and that he would be requesting a "downward departure." The state announced its opposition to "that dispositional departure." The district court advised Bruss of his rights, and Bruss said that he understood his rights and affirmed that he wished to give up his rights. He also affirmed that he had had enough time to speak to his attorney. Bruss then pleaded guilty to committing the offense of sex trafficking on or about March 31, 2015, in the City of St. Paul.

On the record at the plea hearing, Bruss's counsel reviewed the plea petition with him. Bruss affirmed that he and his counsel had discussed the petition and his rights "several times" and that "from day one," Bruss had maintained that he wanted to enter a plea of guilty to the charge. Bruss also affirmed that his counsel had discussed how to interpret the applicable statute and had reviewed the evidence and jury instructions with him. Bruss engaged in the following colloquy with his counsel before he offered his plea petition to the district court:

After the court received the petition, Bruss provided a factual basis to support his plea.

On October 27, 2015, before sentencing, Bruss moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that the plea was not accurate or intelligent because "each and every element was not addressed and he only admitted facts for some of the elements," and "the State must prove each and every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." On October 29, at Bruss's request, his counsel withdrew his plea-withdrawal motion. And, on that day, counsel informed the district court by letter that she intended to file a motion for a downward dispositional sentencing departure on behalf of Bruss and did so on December 3.

At sentencing on December 4, 2015, the district court accepted Bruss's guilty plea, and Bruss requested a downward dispositional departure from the presumptive executed sentence of 76 months, "based upon his amenability to probation and treatment and his acceptance of responsibility and remorse for the instant offense behavior." Bruss's counsel told the district court that a Ramsey County Adult Detention Center official said that Bruss was a great worker and a model inmate, that Bruss had changed, and that he was communicating regularly with his mother. Counsel argued that probation was better for Bruss and society because Bruss would receive the treatment he needed on probation. Bruss acknowledged that his actions were wrong and apologized to the victim.

The district court denied Bruss's request for a downward dispositional departure after determining that Bruss was not particularly amenable to probation and that nothing unusual about the case warranted probation. Regarding Bruss's chemical dependency, the court noted that Bruss failed to take advantage of opportunities to address his chemical dependency while on probation in another matter and that he previously had violated his probation. The court imposed an executed prison sentence of 72 months, four months less than the middle of the presumptive range.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

Bruss argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he was "promised" a downward dispositional departure and, alternatively, that, by being allowed to argue for a downward dispositional departure, the state coerced his guilty plea "with an illusory possibility of sentence outcome."

A defendant does not have an "absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it." State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). A guilty plea can be withdrawn after sentencing only if "withdrawal is necessary to correct a `manifest injustice.'" Id. (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1). "A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid." Id. at 94. "To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent." Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Bruss "bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid." Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. "[A]ssessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law that [this court] review[s] de novo." Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 858 (quotation omitted).

Voluntariness of plea

Bruss argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because the state coerced his guilty plea "with an illusory possibility of sentence outcome." He argues that a defendant must have a reasonable chance at receiving a departure or the state has offered nothing while the defendant forgoes the right to a trial, making the state's promise illusory. Bruss argues that because the record shows that no possibility existed for him to receive a downward dispositional departure, his plea was involuntary. We disagree.

"A guilty plea is involuntary when it rests in any significant degree on an unfulfilled or unfulfillable promise." Uselman v. State, 831 N.W.2d 690, 693 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted); see also Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 1979) ("It is well settled that an unqualified promise which is part of a plea arrangement must be honored or else the guilty plea may be withdrawn.").

When assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, "th[is] court examines what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement." Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 861 (quotation omitted). "`Determining what the parties agreed to in a plea bargain is a factual inquiry for the postconviction court to resolve,' but any interpretation and enforcement of agreements involving issues of law are reviewed de novo." State v. Miller, 754 N.W.2d 686, 707 (Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Minn. 2004)). "The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to improper pressure or coercion." Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 861 (quotation omitted). "Whether a plea is voluntary is determined by considering all relevant circumstances." Id. (quotation omitted).

The state argues that Bruss's claim that his plea was involuntary is unsupported by the record. We agree. The only mention of a downward departure in the plea petition is a notation at paragraph 20 that, "Defense to request downward disposition." The only mention on the record is contained in the plea colloquy as noted above. Nothing in the record supports Bruss's claim that the state promised him that the district court would grant his request for a downward dispositional departure or coerced his guilty plea "with an illusory possibility of sentence outcome." In fact, the record, including Bruss's plea colloquy, lead to an opposite conclusion.

Sentencing decisions are within the district court's discretion. See State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014) ("We afford the trial court great discretion in the imposition of sentences and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of discretion." (quotation omitted)). A court "may depart from the presumptive disposition or duration provided in the guidelines, and stay or impose a sentence that is deemed to be more appropriate than the presumptive sentence." Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2015). District courts can grant a "dispositional departure[] when there is any substantial basis for it." State v. Case, 350 N.W.2d 473, 475 (Minn. App. 1984) (citing State v. Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461, 462-63 (Minn. 1981) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in departing from the presumptive sentence and sentencing defendant to probation upon finding that defendant, convicted of first-degree arson, was "particularly unamenable to incarceration and particularly amenable to individualized treatment in a probationary setting.")). "[A] single mitigating factor, standing alone, may justify a downward durational departure." State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 624-25 (Minn. 2016). But "the district court must find that the relevant single mitigating factor provides a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence." Id. at 625. "Because the guidelines' goal is to create uniformity in sentencing, departures are justified only in exceptional cases." Id. Here, the district court allowed the parties to submit briefs and make oral arguments regarding Bruss's motion for the downward dispositional departure. And the record reflects that the court considered Bruss's arguments before denying his motion. See State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Minn. App. 2011) (noting that if district court considers reasons for departure but chooses not to depart, no explanation is required).

Bruss cites State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2000). In Jumping Eagle, the supreme court reversed the denial of a petition to withdraw a guilty plea to first-degree criminal sexual conduct because Jumping Eagle's sentence exceeded the upper limit of his court-accepted plea petition and therefore violated his plea agreement. 620 N.W.2d at 43-44. Unlike Jumping Eagle, Bruss has not pointed to any agreement in the record about a particular sentence. Jumping Eagle does not support Bruss's argument.

Bruss also cites Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Minn. 1997), in which the supreme court rejected Perkins's argument that his plea was invalid because "he did not understand the difference between a recommendation as to sentence and an agreement as to sentence." Id. at 686. In Perkins, although both attorneys promised not to seek a departure, the plea petition stated in relevant part that "[A]nything in the plea agreement as to sentence (or disposition) by the judge is not a condition of my entering my plea of guilty herein[.] . . . Therefore, I can not withdraw my plea of guilty if the sentencing judge disregards the prosecuting attorney's recommendation on sentence." Id. at 683. Bruss's reliance on Perkins is misguided because, as in Perkins, nothing in Bruss's plea petition constitutes a promise by the state for a particular sentence. See Schwerm v. State, 288 Minn. 488, 491, 181 N.W.2d 867, 868 (1970) ("Although a plea of guilty may be set aside where an unqualified promise is made as a part of a plea bargain, thereafter dishonored, a solemn plea of guilty should not be set aside merely because the accused has not achieved an unwarranted hope.").

Bruss also cites State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. 1983). Trott sought to withdraw his guilty plea, in part, arguing that "defense counsel had promised him probation at the time he entered the plea." 338 N.W.2d at 249. The supreme court concluded that "the trial court was justified in finding that no such promise had been made" even though Trott's former attorney admitted that "he had told defendant that probation was likely with some jail time." Id. at 251-52. In this case, Bruss makes no claim that his attorney told him that his motion for a departure to probation likely would be granted. Trott does not support Bruss's argument that he is entitled to withdraw his plea.

Because the state made no promise to Bruss about the probability of the district court granting his request for a downward dispositional departure, the state did not breach a promise made to Bruss as part of his plea agreement. Nor does the record reflect that the state in any way coerced Bruss's guilty plea. Bruss has failed to meet his burden of proving that his plea was involuntary, and he is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.

Pro se arguments

Bruss seems to challenge the accuracy and intelligence of his plea by arguing that the factual basis for his plea was inadequate regarding each and every element of Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(4), beyond a reasonable doubt. Courts must "make certain that facts exist from which the defendant's guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred" before accepting a guilty plea. Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 861 (quotation omitted). "To be accurate, a plea must be established on a proper factual basis." Id. at 859 (quotation omitted). A proper factual basis for a plea is provided "if the record contains a showing that there is credible evidence available which would support a jury verdict that defendant is guilty of at least as great a crime as that to which he pled guilty." Id. (quotation omitted). A plea lacks adequate factual support when "the defendant makes statements that negate an essential element of the charged crime because such statements are inconsistent with a plea of guilty." Id. (quotation omitted).

Bruss appears to argue that his guilty plea is invalid because the facts fail to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he received, recruited, enticed, harbored, provided, and obtained by any means an individual to aid in the prostitution of the individual. See Minn. Stat. § 609.321, subd. 7a(1) (2014) (defining "sex trafficking"). We disagree. The plain language of the statute requires only that Bruss engaged in at least one of those activities. Id. (using the conjunction "or," not "and"). Bruss's plea need not be supported by facts that prove that he solicited, received, recruited, enticed, harbored, provided, and obtained by means any individual to aid in the prostitution of the individual. We conclude that the facts that Bruss offered at his plea hearing are sufficient to support his guilty plea.

Bruss admitted the following facts. He met the victim, A.L., through the Date Hookup website, and communicated with her through the website, text messages, Facebook, and instant messaging, that the communications were mostly sexual in nature, and that he used the identities of Rae and Maxwell to intentionally hide from A.L. his true identity. As Rae, Bruss arranged for A.L. to have sex with him in exchange for money (although he did not pay her) and offered to pay A.L. thousands of dollars to have sex with other men. As Maxwell, Bruss communicated with A.L. and men through Craigslist to arrange sex between A.L. and the men. In November 2014, as Maxwell, Bruss threatened to expose A.L. online if she did not have sex with three men whom he found on Craigslist. As Rae, he told A.L. that she would be paid $2,000 per man to have sex with the three men. Bruss knew that A.L. had financial problems and worked for several weeks to induce A.L. to agree to have sex with the three men. A.L. eventually agreed to have sex with the three men, which was captured on video by one of the men, at Bruss's request, and sent to him. A.L. was paid nothing.

The record reflects that Bruss continued communicating with A.L., as Rae and Maxwell, asking her to have sex with another group of men. A.L. said no several times and "begged [Bruss] to stay out of her life," but Bruss refused to leave A.L. alone, insisting that she have sex with another group of men and continuing to threaten to expose her. To gain A.L.'s sympathy, Bruss told A.L. that he had to film the second video because he was being blackmailed. Bruss admitted that A.L. probably did not know that he was the person who set up both videos. In April 2015, Bruss arranged for A.L. to have sex with two more men while Bruss would shoot the video, but A.L. and the men never met. Bruss later told A.L. that she had one more chance to "prostitute herself" to different men.

Bruss's pro se argument fails.

Affirmed.