U.S. v. SCHULZ, 8:13CR347. (2014)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20140527e42
Visitors: 24
Filed: May 23, 2014
Latest Update: May 23, 2014
Summary: ORDER THOMAS D. THALKEN, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the motion to continue by defendant Dewayne K. Long (Long) (Filing No. 56). Long seeks a continuance of the trial scheduled for June 9, 2014. Long has submitted an affidavit in accordance with paragraph 9 of the progression order whereby Long consents to the motion and acknowledges he understands the additional time may be excludable time for the purposes of the Speedy Trial Act (Filing No. 57). Long's counsel repres
Summary: ORDER THOMAS D. THALKEN, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the motion to continue by defendant Dewayne K. Long (Long) (Filing No. 56). Long seeks a continuance of the trial scheduled for June 9, 2014. Long has submitted an affidavit in accordance with paragraph 9 of the progression order whereby Long consents to the motion and acknowledges he understands the additional time may be excludable time for the purposes of the Speedy Trial Act (Filing No. 57). Long's counsel represe..
More
ORDER
THOMAS D. THALKEN, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on the motion to continue by defendant Dewayne K. Long (Long) (Filing No. 56). Long seeks a continuance of the trial scheduled for June 9, 2014. Long has submitted an affidavit in accordance with paragraph 9 of the progression order whereby Long consents to the motion and acknowledges he understands the additional time may be excludable time for the purposes of the Speedy Trial Act (Filing No. 57). Long's counsel represents that government's counsel has no objection to the motion. Upon consideration, the motion will be granted as to both defendants.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Long's motion to continue trial (Filing No. 56) is granted.
2. Trial of this matter as to both defendants is re-scheduled for October 6, 2014, before Judge Joseph F. Bataillon and a jury. The ends of justice have been served by granting such motion and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. The additional time arising as a result of the granting of the motion, i.e., the time between May 23, 2014, and October 6, 2014, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act for the reason that defendants' counsel require additional time to adequately prepare the case. The failure to grant additional time might result in a miscarriage of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B).
Source: Leagle
