TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN, District Judge.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts three claims against Defendants: "Unlawful Removal of Reasonable Accommodations" under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("Count I"), "Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process" pursuant to the ADA ("Count II"), and "Discrimination Against A Qualified Handicapped Persons" by "unlawfully removing her accommodations without a legitimate business purpose for doing so" and because she received a written warning for a work absence. ("Count III").
On May 18, 2018, this Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgement on Count II, but denied the motion on Counts I and III. With respect to Count I this Court explained:
(Docket No. 60). And with respect to Count III:
Id.
With trial approaching, Plaintiff submitted a proposed verdict form. (Docket No. 87). The first question Plaintiff proposed to the jury reads: "Do you find that Plaintiff Cheryl Rodriguez has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Charter Communications discriminated against her for using her reasonable accommodation?" Id. at 2. Defendants subsequently filed this motion objecting to Plaintiff's proposed verdict form because Plaintiff attempts "to argue a completely new claim to the jury." (Docket No. 90, at 1). Further, Defendants argue it would be unfair to force them to litigate an entirely new claim on the eve of trial. See Ruiz-Sulsona v. University of Puerto Rico, 334 F.3d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[P]laintiff should not be able to idle and then produce arguments that the defendant had no cause to rebut and the district judge had no cause to examine.").
Defendants are correct, Plaintiff's formulation of her claims in the verdict form is a claim that she has yet to raise in this litigation. As for Count I, the issue for the jury is whether Defendants unlawfully removed Plaintiff's accommodation. With respect to Count III, the issue is whether Plaintiff has suffered adverse employment action against her because of, in whole or in part, her protected disability. See McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973).
Accordingly, Defendants' motion to strike (Docket No. 89) is