Filed: Oct. 29, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-3529 Hysaj v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A208 752 131 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA
Summary: 17-3529 Hysaj v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A208 752 131 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTAT..
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17-3529
Hysaj v. Barr
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A208 752 131
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 29th day of October, two thousand nineteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 GUIDO CALABRESI,
8 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
9 MICHAEL H. PARK,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 EMANUEL HYSAJ,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 17-3529
17 NAC
18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Oleh R. Tustaniwsky, Esq.,
24 Brooklyn, NY.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Acting Assistant
27 Attorney General; Anthony P.
28 Nicastro, Assistant Director;
29 Patricia E. Bruckner, Trial
30 Attorney, Office of Immigration
31 Litigation, United States
32 Department of Justice, Washington,
33 DC.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Emanuel Hysaj, a native and citizen of
6 Albania, seeks review of an October 12, 2017 decision of the
7 BIA affirming a December 5, 2016 decision of an Immigration
8 Judge (“IJ”) denying Hysaj’s application for asylum,
9 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
10 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Emanuel Hysaj, No. A 208 752
11 131 (B.I.A. Oct. 12, 2017), aff’g No. A 208 752 131 (Immig.
12 Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 5, 2016). We assume the parties’
13 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
14 in this case.
15 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
16 the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen
17 v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the
18 agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its
19 legal conclusions de novo. See Niang v. Holder,
762 F.3d
20 251, 253 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,
21
891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility
22 determination under a substantial evidence standard).
2
1 Frivolous Finding
2 “A person who makes an application for asylum determined
3 to be ‘frivolous,’ or deliberately and materially false, is
4 subject to a grave penalty: permanent ineligibility for most
5 forms of relief under the immigration laws.” Mei Juan Zheng
6 v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2008); see also 8
7 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (“If the Attorney General determines that
8 an alien has knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum
9 and the alien has received the notice [of the consequences of
10 filing a frivolous application], the alien shall be
11 permanently ineligible for any benefits under this chapter,
12 effective as of the date of a final determination on such
13 application.”). Before being subject to this permanent bar,
14 Hysaj was entitled to procedural safeguards: “(1) notice . .
15 . of the consequences of filing a frivolous application; (2) a
16 specific finding . . . that [he] knowingly filed a frivolous
17 application; (3) sufficient evidence in the record to support
18 the finding that a material element of the asylum application
19 was deliberately fabricated; and (4) . . . sufficient
20 opportunity to account for any discrepancies or implausible
21 aspects of the claim.” In re Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151, 155
3
1 (BIA 2007). Hysaj disputes only that the third requirement
2 was met.
3 The record supports the agency’s conclusion that Hysaj
4 deliberately fabricated a material part of his claim.
5 Hysaj’s testimony was internally inconsistent regarding
6 whether he was frightened by June 2015 threatening phone call
7 or calls and whether as a result he took any steps to protect
8 himself or left the country, and he omitted from his written
9 statement and direct testimony that he left Albania for two
10 weeks in the summer of 2015 to try to come to the United
11 States. Although Hysaj argues that he never testified that
12 he remained in Albania during the relevant period, the agency
13 could reasonably expect that, when he was asked about his
14 activities in July 2015, Hysaj would disclose that he left
15 Albania for two weeks. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78–79
16 (“[I]n assessing the probative value of the omission of
17 certain facts, an IJ should consider whether those facts are
18 ones that a credible petitioner would reasonably have been
19 expected to disclose under the relevant circumstances.”); see
20 also In re Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 158 (“[P]roof that conduct
21 was knowing or deliberate may be demonstrated by
22 circumstantial evidence.”). Furthermore, Hysaj gave
4
1 “dramatically different” accounts of what happened in June
2 and July 2015. Cf. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d
3 Cir. 2005) (determining that a petitioner’s “dramatically
4 different” accounts of an incident provides substantial
5 evidence for adverse credibility determination). Hysaj
6 changed his testimony from reporting that he was not
7 frightened by the June 2015 threat or threats and took no
8 steps to protect himself to stating that he was so frightened
9 by the call or calls that he left Albania and tried to come
10 to the United States. His admission that he fled Albania in
11 June 2015 also contradicts his written statement—that he and
12 his family concluded that he needed to leave for the United
13 States after he was assaulted in November 2015. These
14 conflicting versions of events support the agency’s
15 conclusion that he fabricated his claim of political
16 persecution. Cf.
Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. Given these
17 contradictions, which implicated the harm he suffered and
18 feared and the extent of his political activities, the agency
19 did not err in finding that he fabricated a material aspect
20 of his asylum claim. See In re Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 155.
21 Adverse Credibility Determination
5
1 The governing credibility standard under the REAL ID Act
2 is as follows:
3 Considering the totality of the circumstances, and
4 all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a
5 credibility determination on . . . the consistency
6 between the applicant’s or witness’s written and
7 oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of
8 each such statement, the consistency of such
9 statements with other evidence of record . . . , and
10 any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,
11 . . . or any other relevant factor.
12
13 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
14 credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no
15 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
16 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.
17 2008); accord Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial
18 evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility
19 determination.
20 First, as discussed above, there were inconsistencies in
21 Hysaj’s written and oral statements regarding whether he was
22 frightened by June 2015 threatening phone call or calls and
23 whether he took steps to protect himself or left the country
24 as a result. The IJ could reasonably expect that Hysaj would
25 disclose a previous attempt to escape persecution in his
26 asylum application and that he would mention that attempt
6
1 when asked about his activities during the period he was
2 outside Albania. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78–79.
3 Second, additional findings bolster the adverse
4 credibility determination. Hysaj concedes that his testimony
5 was inconsistent regarding whether he reported the June 2015
6 threat or threats to the police and whether Democratic Party
7 leaders told him to contact the police. The agency was not
8 required to credit his correction to conform with his
9 application. See
Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80 (“A petitioner must
10 do more than offer a plausible explanation for his
11 inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate
12 that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit
13 his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
14 Furthermore, whether Hysaj contacted the police regarding the
15 threats is significant because it implicates whether “the
16 government is unable or unwilling” to control his alleged
17 persecutors. See Pan v. Holder,
777 F.3d 540, 543 (2d Cir.
18 2015). The agency also reasonably relied on Hysaj’s omission
19 from his direct testimony that he was threatened with a knife
20 because he was asked twice about the problems he experienced
21 and only generally stated in response that he “had many
22 threats.” See Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 78–79.
7
1 Given these inconsistencies and omissions, substantial
2 evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility
3 determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
4 Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Because Hysaj’s claims were all based
5 on the same factual predicate, the adverse credibility
6 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of
7 removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148,
8 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
10 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
11 stays VACATED.
12 FOR THE COURT:
13 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
14 Clerk of Court
8
