NANCY G. EDMUNDS, District Judge.
This is a civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On June 2, 2014, Plaintiff David Gavitt filed a complaint against numerous Defendants, including Defendants City of Ionia, Randall Klein, a former Sergeant with the Ionia Police Department, and Kenneth Voet, the former Chief of Police for the Ionia Police Department. (Compl., ¶¶ 19-22.) Plaintiff Gavitt (hereinafter "Gavitt")'s § 1983 claims arise from a house fire that occurred in March 1985 and tragically took the lives of Gavitt's wife and two daughters. Gavitt survived. Gavitt was charged, convicted, and sentenced in 1986 to life in prison on state criminal charges of arson and felony murder. See People v. David Lee Gavitt, Ionia County Circuit Court Case No. 85-007555.
In September 2011, a motion for relief from judgment was filed on Gavitt's behalf by the University of Michigan Law School's Innocence Clinic, arguing that there was newlydiscovered evidence of Gavitt's innocence, i.e., newly discovered scientific analysis of the origin and cause of the fire establishing that there was no arson. (Defs.' Fatchett and Kalman Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A, Gavitt Mot. for Relief, Supporting Brief at 16-37.) On June 6, 2012, the People of the State of Michigan and Gavitt stipulated that Gavitt's motion for relief from judgment be granted; and that same day, the Ionia County Circuit Court issued an Order granting Gavitt's motion, dismissing all the charges against him, and ordering his immediate release. (Defs.' Ionia County, Gabry, Voet, Schaefer, and Benda Mot. for Sum. Judg., Ex. 15, 6/6/12 Stip., 6/6/12 Order.)
This matter is now before the Court on Defendants City of Ionia's, Randall Klein's, and Kenneth Voet's motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative motion for summary judgment [44], brought pursuant to Rule 12(c), or in the alternative Rule 56, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.
Gavitt survived a March 9, 1985 house fire. His wife and two daughters tragically did not. (Compl., ¶¶ 61-67.) An investigation was initiated by the City of Ionia Police Department and the Michigan State Police Arson Task Force. (Id. at ¶¶ 71-101.)
On the morning of March 10, 1985, Defendants Kalman and Fatchett, then-Michigan State Police ("MSP") officers assigned to the MSP Arson Strike Force Unit ("Det./Sgt. Kalman" and "Det./Sgt. Fatchett" respectively), were dispatched to the scene of the house fire to investigate its cause and origin and inspected the home. Based on their initial review of the evidence, they concluded that the fire was incendiary in nature. (Id. at ¶¶ 48-49, 101-103.) At 2:30 in the afternoon that same day, Det./Sgts. Kalman and Fatchett summoned Defendant Klein, then-Sergeant with the Ionia Police Department ("Sgt. Klein"), to the burned home, walked him through the evidence at the fire scene that led them to their initial conclusion that the fire was incendiary in nature, and collected evidence that Sgt. Klein then placed in an Ionia Police Department evidence locker. (Id. at ¶¶ 21, 108-115.) Sgt. Klein then continued his investigation by obtaining evidence from and interrogating Gavitt, and obtaining more evidence from the burned home. (Id. at ¶¶ 116-121, 125-129.)
On March 12, 1985, as reported in Det./Sgt. Kalman's March 1985 Report, a meeting was held "for the purpose of reviewing the evidence and determining the course of the investigation." (Defs. Fatchett's and Kalman's Mot., Ex. C, Kalman Rpt. at 10.) Det./Sgt. Kalman reported that he presented evidence, a discussion was held, and a conclusion reached that Gavitt may have set the fire himself and was unable to save his family once the fire started:
(Id.) Sgt. Klein's March 20, 1985 Report also discussed the March 12th meeting and calls it a "`skull session' starting at/around 8:30 am, ending a short time later." (Ionia Cnty. Defs.' Mot., Ex. 2, 3/20/85 Rpt. at 1, "Journal Entry.") Sgt. Klein lists Defendant Voet as being present. He reports:
On June 10, 1985, a felony complaint was issued, and state criminal charges were brought against Gavitt — three counts of murder, three counts of felony murder, arson, and arson insured property — and he was subsequently arrested. (Ionia Cnty. Defs.' Mot., Ex. 4, 6/10/85 criminal complaint and information.) Sgt. Klein was the complaining witness on the criminal complaint. (Id.)
On June 21, 1985, a preliminary examination hearing was held on the criminal charges brought against Gavitt. District Court Judge James Ward was the presiding judge and Defendant Gabry was the prosecutor. The District Court found that probable cause existed on the charged offenses — murder, felony murder, and arson — but dismissed the insurance fraud charge. (Compl., ¶¶ 177-178.)
A jury trial was held in the Circuit Court for the County of Ionia. See People v. David Lee Gavitt, Ionia County Circuit Court Case No. 85-007555. On February 14, 1986, a jury convicted Gavitt on three counts of murder committed in the perpetration of arson (first degree felony murder) and one count of arson to a dwelling place. (Ionia Cnty. Defs.' Mot., Ex. 6, 2/14/86 Verdict.) The one count of arson was dismissed by the Court at sentencing. (Id., Ex. 7, 4/18/86 Sent. Tr. at 2-3.)
On April 18, 1986, Gavitt was sentenced to "imprisonment for life on each of the three counts of murder, to be served concurrently with each other." (Ionia Cnty. Defs.' Mot, Ex. 5, 5/1/86 Judg. of Sentence.)
In September 2011, a motion for relief from judgment was filed on Gavitt's behalf by the University of Michigan Law School's Innocence Clinic, arguing that there was newlydiscovered evidence of Gavitt's innocence, i.e., newly discovered scientific analysis of the origin and cause of the March 1985 fire establishing that there was no arson. (Defs. Fatchett's and Kalman's Mot., Ex. A, Gavitt Mot. for Relief, Brief at 16-37.) That motion explained that evidence of actual innocence was only recently discovered because, beginning in 1992, there has been a complete revolution in the field of fire investigation:
(Id., Mot. at 3 (emphasis added).)
The supporting brief relied heavily on John Lentini's Affidavit and similarly argued that, because of "significant advancements in the field of fire science and arson investigation," there is newly-discovered evidence that undermines the prosecution's case against Gavitt:
(Id., Br. at 7, 13, 36-37 respectively (emphasis added).)
As Mr. Lentini admitted in his Affidavit that, at the time that Sgt. Fatchett and the Ionia County Prosecutor's expert, Dr. Edwards, considered the impact of flashover, they had no way of knowing that their generally accepted interpretations of burn patterns would be refuted years later:
(Defs. Fatchett's and Kalman's Mot., Ex. A, Gavitt Mot. for Relief, Appendix B, Lentini Aff. at ¶¶ 66, 70, 100 (emphasis added).)
An affidavit from an experienced fire investigator that Gavitt's defense attorney consulted with in 1985 in connection with Gavitt's criminal charges also provided an affidavit which was attached as an exhibit to Gavitt's motion for relief. (Defs. Fatchett's and Kalman's Mot., Ex. A, Lentini Aff., Appendix R, Churchwell Aff. at ¶¶ 1-5.) Mr. Churchwell, like Mr. Lentini, stressed that "the world of fire science is vastly different today than it was in 1985;" that the way he "would have viewed the fire scene in 1985 is completely different from the way" he "would view the same scene today;" and "the advancements in fire science would enable [him] to have far better insights and be wary of false findings today." (Id. at ¶ 6.) Mr. Churchwell, like Mr. Lentini, stated that he subscribed to the same beliefs that science has now proven to be false; that he can say now that Gavitt was falsely convicted; but could not have reached that conclusion in 1985-86 when he was consulting with defense counsel:
(Id. at ¶ 10 (emphasis added).)
Mr. Churchwell also admitted that he "would likely have made the same mistake" as those investigating the Gavitt home fire by failing to give adequate consideration to possible accidental causes of that fire:
(Id. at ¶ 12 (emphasis added).)
The parties stipulated to a stay of Gavitt's motion, allowing the Ionia Prosecutor's Office time for scientific review of Gavitt's claims. (Ionia Ctny. Defs.' Mot., Ex. 12, 9/15/11 Stip.) On June 6, 2012, after a thorough investigation, current Ionia County Prosecutor Ronald Schafer, on behalf of the People of the State of Michigan, responded to Gavitt's motion.
Prosecutor Schafer acknowledged that, although "fire investigators" involved in the original investigation "held to a common understanding within fire investigation," it is now known that that "was inaccurate, specifically regarding the recognition and identification of unusual burn patterns in the floor as definitive evidence of ignitable liquid pour patterns. Unfortunately, during that time period many fire investigators did not understand the phenomena of flashover and post-flashover and their effects on the production of unusual burn patterns in floors within compartments." (Defs. Fatchett's and Kalman's Mot., Ex. B, People's Resp. at 16.) Prosecutor Schafer also acknowledged that Gavitt had satisfied the requirements for a new trial.
(Id.)
Despite an admission that "three independent analyses of the evidence suggest there was likely no gasoline on the carpet samples taken out of the Gavitt house in 1985," Prosecutor Schafer emphasized that "there are still a great deal of questions surrounding this case which raise significant questions." (Id. at 18.) "Still today, these unanswered questions linger when looking at the case on the whole, even in light of the acknowledged findings in this response. In fact, this is the exact type of case that would have remained open had it not been prosecuted earlier; the type of case where justice would demand that it stay open." (Id. at 19.) Nonetheless, Prosecutor Schafer acknowledged, "it does not change the fact that fire investigation has advanced in the twenty-seven years since this fire." (Id. at 19-20.)
Prosecutor Schafer identified some of those fire investigation advances and explained why, in light of those advances, Gavitt cannot be retried.
(Id. at 20 (emphasis added).)
On June 6, 2012, the People of the State of Michigan and Gavitt stipulated that Gavitt's motion for relief from judgment be granted, that all charges against Gavitt be immediately dismissed, and that the Court order his immediate release from the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections. (Ionia Ctny. Defs.'s Mot, Ex. 15, 6/6/12 Stip.) That same day, the Ionia County Circuit Court issued an Order granting Gavitt's motion, dismissing all the charges against him, and ordering his immediate release. (Id. at Ex. 15, 6/6/12 Order.)
On June 2, 2014, Gavitt filed this civil rights action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983, against numerous Defendants, including Defendants Ionia City, former Ionia Chief of Police Kenneth Voet, and former Ionia Police Sgt. Randall Klein (hereinafter "City of Ionia Defendants").
A Rule 12(c) motion on the pleadings is reviewed in the same manner as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. "To survive the Rule 12(c) motion, `a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
The Sixth Circuit recently noted that under the United States Supreme Court's heightened pleading standard laid out in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), "a complaint only survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Estate of Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 714 F.3d 920, 924-25 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court in Estate of Barney goes on to state that under Iqbal, "[a] claim is plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, "[w]hile the plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' the plausibility standard does ask for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Finally, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not `show[n]'—`that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). If the plaintiffs do "not nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The Court begins its analysis with Gavitt's argument that City of Ionia Defendants' Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings must be treated as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Gavitt's argument is rejected. As stated above, Rule 12(c) motions are decided by the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court "may consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to the defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and central to the claims contained therein." Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Accord, In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 466 (6th Cir. 2014) (observing that the Sixth Circuit has "recognized that if a plaintiff references or quotes certain documents, or if public records refute a plaintiff's claim, a defendant may attach those documents to its motion to dismiss, and a court can then consider them in resolving the Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment."); Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007) (observing that "when a document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment."); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th Cir. 1980) (observing that "[f]ederal courts may take judicial notice of the proceedings in other courts of record") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Gavitt's Complaint references public records filed in Gavitt's criminal case and also references the following exhibits attached to Defendants' motion that are central to Gavitt's claims: Gavitt's motion for relief from judgment and supporting brief (with attached Lentini and Churchwell Affidavits), the People's response to Gavitt's motion, the court order granting Gavitt's motion, his preliminary examination hearing, and Defendants Klein's, Kalman's and Fatchett's reports (see, e.g., Compl., ¶¶ 101-126, 177-79, 183-188, 194.) Defendants' motion is properly considered under Rule 12(c), which requires the same analysis as under Rule 12(b)(6).
The only claims Gavitt alleges against Defendants Klein and Voet in their individual capacity are contained in Count III of his Complaint, alleging a § 1983 conspiracy. The Court now considers those claims.
"A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action." Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To prevail on a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the existence of "a single plan," (2) the defendant "shared in the general conspiratorial objective to deprive [the plaintiff] of his constitutional (or federal statutory) rights, and (3) an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to [the plaintiff]." Id. (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). Mere speculation and conjecture are insufficient to establish the existence of an agreement, an essential element of a § 1983 conspiracy claim. See Moore v. City of Paducah, 890 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirming the district court's decision to direct a verdict for the defendant on a § 1983 conspiracy claim because there was "no evidence beyond mere conjecture and speculation that an agreement existed, thus, precluding a finding of a conspiracy.").
Defendant Kenneth Voet, the former Ionia Chief of Police, is alleged to have taken part in the Gavitt fire investigation, including his attendance a March 12, 1985 "skull session" where Defendant Kalman, a former Michigan State Police Sgt./Det. who was investigating the March 9, 1985 Gavitt house fire, reviewed and explained the burn patterns in the house and on Gavitt himself and expressed his conclusions "of very `strong evidence pointing to the fact that MR. DAVID GAVITT may have indeed set the fire himself and was unable to save his family once the fire started.'" (Id. at ¶¶ 81-82, 122-123.) Defendant Klein is alleged to have investigated the March 1985 house fire to determine whether any criminal activity was involved (Compl., ¶¶ 21, 75-100, 108-131, 133, 136-137, 139), to have attended the March 12, 1985 "skull session," and was the complaining witness on Gavitt's June 10, 1986 felony complaint (id. at ¶¶ 122-123, 175).
In Count III of Gavitt's Complaint, a § 1983 conspiracy claim is asserted against former Sgt. Klein and former Ionia Chief of Police Kenneth Voet, in their individual capacity, alleging that they conspired with former Prosecutor Gabry, and former Det./Sgts. Kalman and Fatchett, beginning on March 12, 1985 and continuing to the present date, to violate Gavitt's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by (1) agreeing, without adequate investigation, that the March 1985 fire was incendiary in nature and set by Gavitt (Compl., ¶¶ 234-235; Resp. at 9-11)
The Court addresses item (2) above first. Construing the allegations in Count III in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Gavitt, the only reasonable inference to draw from these allegations is that Prosecutor Gabry was made aware of the alleged exculpatory evidence about problems occurring in the MSP crime laboratory; and that Prosecutor Gabry, along with Defendants Klein, Voet, Kalman and Fatchett all agreed to use DeVries's testing results and testimony as evidence during Gavitt's prosecution without disclosing the exculpatory MSP laboratory evidence. As pled by Gavitt, he cannot establish a § 1983 conspiracy claim asserting that these Defendants violated any constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence; their Brady obligation is fulfilled by disclosure of exculpatory evidence to Prosecutor Gabry, not to Gavitt or his defense counsel.
The Sixth Circuit recently addressed the issue presented here. See D'Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2014). In D'Ambrosio, the court discussed a police officer's Brady obligations, examined the allegations in the § 1983 plaintiff's complaint, and concluded that the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant detective was privy to exculpatory evidence but withheld it from the defense was insufficient to state a Brady violation.
Id. at 389 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Gavitt's Complaint here, like the plaintiff's complaint in D'Ambrosio, does not allege that Defendants Klein or Voet withheld the allegedly exculpatory MSP laboratory evidence from Prosecutor Gabry. There is no allegation that these Defendants "knew about any obviously exculpatory evidence of which the prosecutors were ignorant and failed to apprise them of it." Id. at 390. In fact, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from Gavitt's alleged facts is the opposite.
To the extent Gavitt's § 1983 conspiracy claim is based on Defendant Klein's and Voet's approval of Prosecutor Gabry's use of MSP laboratory technician DeVries as a witness in judicial proceedings to testify about his testing and findings but not disclose exculpatory evidence about false positives in the MSP laboratory and contamination of fire debris samples, that conduct (as discussed in the Court's opinion granting the Ionia County Defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment) is entitled to absolute immunity. "[P]rosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for the non-disclosure of exculpatory information at trial." Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010). And, as the Sixth Circuit has long held, "[t]he doctrine enunciated in Briscoe v. Lahue[, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)] also shields from liability alleged conspiracies to give false and incomplete testimony at judicial proceedings." Alioto v. City of Shively, Ky., 835 F.2d 1173, 1174 (6th Cir. 1987).
Gavitt's § 1983 conspiracy claim also alleges that his constitutional due process rights were violated when Defendants Klein and Voet and all the other participants at a March 12, 1985 "skull session" agreed, even though their fire investigation was incomplete and inadequate, that the Gavitt house fire was incendiary in nature and continued their investigation with that conclusion in mind. (Compl., ¶¶ 234-235.) These allegations also fail to state a claim for relief.
As the Sixth Circuit observed in Yancey v. Carroll County, Ky., 876 F.2d 1238, 1245 (6th Cir. 1989), "[i]nvestigation, without more, simply does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Accord, Buchanan v. Metz, 6 F.Supp.3d 730, 757-58 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (Rosen, J.) (rejecting the plaintiff's § 1983 claim alleging that he had a due process right "in the way the investigation against him was initiated, planned, and executed" because "[t]he Sixth Circuit has not recognized such a claim" and declining "to do so" in that case).
Even if a constitutional violation were found to exist under the alleged facts, Defendants Klein's and Voet's investigative conduct would be completely shielded from liability by qualified immunity. As the Koubriti court recognized, qualified immunity shields a defendant's conduct from liability "unless 1) he committed a constitutional violation, and 2) the right that was violated was a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known." Koubriti, 593 F.3d at 471. "In determining whether a right is clearly established," the court "may rely on decisions of the Supreme Court, decisions of [the Sixth Circuit] and courts within this circuit, and in limited circumstances, on decisions of other circuits." Id. at 471 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "When evaluating whether the specific right has been recognized, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. In other words, the unlawfulness must be apparent." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, just as in Koubriti, the Court "can find no case law to support the conclusion that a reasonable official [here Defendants Klein and Voet] would have understood that the complained of action," i.e., conducting a more complete investigation before concluding that the Gavitt house fire was incendiary in nature, violated Gavitt's due process rights.
Finally, there is no ongoing constitutional due process obligation post-conviction to provide exculpatory evidence (Brady materials) except where state post-conviction procedures are inadequate. See Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68-69 (2009). Gavitt does not and cannot allege that Michigan's post-conviction procedures were inadequate. He successfully used Michigan's postconviction relief procedures, i.e., filing a motion for relief from judgment under Mich. Ct. Rule 6.502(G)(2), based upon newly-discovered evidence, and obtained his release from prison and the dismissal of the arson and felony murder charges on which he was previously convicted. Gavitt, therefore, cannot state a § 1983 conspiracy claim against Defendants Klein or Voet for their alleged failure to disclose any exculpatory evidence postconviction.
As the Supreme Court observed in Osborne, although a convicted defendant does "have a liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with new evidence under state law," and that "state-created right can, in some circumstances, beget yet other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent right," the "Due Process Clause" does not require "that certain familiar preconviction trial rights," specifically, the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, "be extended to protect [the defendant]'s postconviction liberty interest." Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68.
In Osborne, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision and explained that there is no ongoing obligation under the Due Process Clause to provide Brady materials after a defendant's conviction:
Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
So, any § 1983 claims asserted by Gavitt against Defendants Klein and Voet in their individual capacity based upon an alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence postconviction fail to state a claim for relief.
"To establish municipal liability pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must allege an unconstitutional action that implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers or a constitutional deprivation [ ] visited pursuant to governmental custom even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels." Bright v. Gallia Cnty., Ohio, 753 F.3d 639, 660 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "`[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.'" Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). "Accordingly, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must adequately plead (1) that a violation of a federal right took place, (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law, and (3) that a municipality's policy or custom caused that violation to happen." Id.
As to Defendant City of Ionia, Gavitt alleges that the City has state authority to operate and did operate the City's Police Department from 1985 to the present (Compl., ¶¶ 19-20), and that both Defendant City and Defendant Voet (former Ionia Chief of Police), in his official capacity: (1) prior to March 12, 1985, "developed and maintained policies or customs which exhibited a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons within the constituent's jurisdiction" by allowing political and non-law enforcement City personnel to participate in police investigation meetings" (id. at ¶ 281); (2) failed to adequately train and supervise police officers to discover and disclose exculpatory evidence "to the accused" (id. at ¶ 282); (3) failed to adequately train and supervise police officers on how to protect evidence gathered in a fire investigation from contamination prior to it being submitted to a crime laboratory for scientific testing for accelerants (id. at ¶¶ 280, 284.a); (4) failed to create a custom, policy, or practice detailing adequate evidence preservation protocols and Brady obligations to disclose exculpatory evidence to the Ionia County Prosecutor's Office if protocols are not followed (id. at ¶¶ 284.b, 284.c); and (5) failed to adequately train and supervise police officers as to their "duty to disclose evidence which was exculpatory to those individuals
Ionia City Defendants' arguments for dismissal contend that Gavitt has not adequately pled that Defendant City of Ionia's policy or custom caused a violation of Gavitt's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. This Court agrees with Defendants.
First, Gavitt fails to allege any facts establishing a plausible causal link between the alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and Defendants' alleged policy, practice or custom to allow political and non-law enforcement City personnel to participate in police investigation meetings. As the Sixth Circuit observed in Bright, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must adequately plead (1) that a violation of a federal right took place, (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law, and (3) that a municipality's policy or custom caused that violation to happen." Bright, 753 F.3d at 660. Gavitt has not alleged any facts that plausibly explain how Defendants' policy, practice, or custom of allowing political and non-law enforcement City personnel to participate in police investigative meetings caused a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to happen. Thus, he fails to state a claim for municipal liability based upon that alleged policy, practice, or custom.
Second, Gavitt cannot state a claim for municipal liability based upon an alleged failure to adequately train and supervise police officers regarding to their "duty to disclose evidence which was exculpatory to those individuals
Third, as to Gavitt's claim that Defendants failed to adequately train and supervise police officers to discover and disclose exculpatory evidence "to the accused" (Compl., ¶ 282), a police officer's Brady obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence is fulfilled when that evidence is disclosed to the prosecutor, not the accused. See D'Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 389 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussed above). Applying the rationale and result in D'Ambrosio here, Gavitt cannot state a claim for municipal liability based upon an alleged failure to train police officers to disclose exculpatory evidence "to the accused."
Finally, Gavitt fails to allege any facts establishing a plausible causal link between the alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights — deprivation of fair trial due to Defendants' failure to disclose Brady materials pre- and post-conviction (Compl., ¶¶ 201-204) and deprivation of liberty (wrongful incarceration and imprisonment) due to prosecution and conviction without probable cause (id. at ¶ 196.a) — and Ionia City Defendants' challenged conduct, i.e.,
In his Complaint, Gavitt does not allege that Defendant Klein failed to follow established evidence protocols. He does not allege that Klein, Voet, or any Ionia City Defendant mishandled seized evidence or would have better preserved that evidence if more adequate protocols or training were in place. (See, e.g., Compl., ¶¶ 115, 119, 124, 128-133, 138, 141.) In fact, Gavitt alleges the opposite; that Defendant Klein preserved evidence submitted to the Michigan State Police crime laboratory for gas chromatographic analysis in accordance with evidence preservation protocol but it was Michigan State Police crime laboratory technician DeVries's failure to follow known and established operating protocols for performing gas chromatographic analysis of fire debris and inadequate policies and procedures in the Michigan State Police crime laboratory that led Michigan State Police Defendants Kalman and Fatchett to erroneously conclude that the Gavitt home fire was incendiary in nature:
(Compl., ¶¶ 119, 128-133.) Rather than Defendant Klein failing to follow evidence preservation protocol with regard to this "control sample" of carpeting, Gavitt alleges in his Complaint that it was Michigan State Police crime laboratory technician DeVries who did so. (Id. at ¶¶ 134-135.) Gavitt makes similar allegations regarding other evidence that Defendant Klein seized from the Gavitt home fire, i.e., wooden floor tiles and additional samples of living room carpet:
(Id. at ¶¶ 138, 141 (emphasis added).)
Construing the allegations in Gavitt's Complaint in the light most favorable to him, it is apparent that it is not Ionia City Defendants' policies, practices, or customs regarding evidence preservation protocol that he challenges. Rather it is the policies, practices, and customs of the Michigan State Police and its crime laboratory technician DeVries's handling of evidence. This paragraph from Gavitt's Complaint makes this apparent:
the presence of gasoline or other known accelerants. (Id. at ¶ 156.) Gavitt's Complaint does not assert a Monell-type claim against the Michigan State Police Defendants because any such claims for money damages would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Gavitt acknowledges this fact in his Response to the MSP Directors' motion to dismiss (Resp. at 15-16) and in his Response to Defendants Kalman and Fatchett, former Michigan State Police Detective/Sergeants assigned to the Arson Strike Force Unit that investigated suspected arson at the Gavitt home (Resp. at 4 n.2). Gavitt's Monell-type claims against Ionia City Defendants are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. They nonetheless fail for another reason — Gavitt's failure to allege facts showing the required causal link between his alleged constitution violation and Defendant City's challenged policy, custom, or practice. See Bright, 753 F.3d at 660 (observing that, to survive a motion to dismiss, a § 1983 plaintiff must adequately plead "that a municipality's policy or custom caused [the plaintiff's alleged] violation to happen.").
In Count VIII, Gavitt asserts a claim for injunctive relief against Defendant City of Ionia for "develop[ing] policies and procedures of not enforcing their police powers conferred upon them by State statute and constitution pursuant to MCL 117.1, but rather to intentionally or with deliberate indifference overlook enforcement of evidence protocols and/or failing to train and educate their officers as it relates to the need to adhere to evidence protocols and/or to fulfill their duties to inform and advise the Prosecutor's office of any and all exculpatory evidence known to them in a pending
City of Ionia Defendants argue that because Gavitt fails to allege that he is currently suffering or will in the future suffer from a continuing constitutional harm, he lacks standing to state a claim for the injunctive relief he seeks. These Defendants further argue that Gavitt lacks standing to assert a § 1983 claim for injunctive relief on behalf of others who are not a party to this lawsuit. This Court agrees with both arguments.
Gavitt concedes that "[s]tanding requires plaintiff to demonstrate actual present harm or a significant possibility of future harm." Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Daubenmire v. City of Columbus, 507 F.3d 383, 388 (6th Cir. 2007) (same). "[A]llegation of past injury is not sufficient to confer standing for . . . injunctive relief." Cohn v. Brown, 161 F. App'x 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2005). Accord, Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 252 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983), "`past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.'"). The Supreme Court's decision in Lyons illustrates this point.
In Lyons, the respondent sought an injunction against the City of Los Angeles barring the "use of chokeholds absent the threat of immediate use of deadly force." Lyons, 461 U.S. at 98. The Supreme Court held that Lyons failed to satisfy the prerequisites for injunctive relief. It explained why past conduct is insufficient to supply standing:
Id. at 105.
The Lyons Court then addressed and rejected the respondent's claim that he had standing to obtain the injunctive relief he sought because "the police in Los Angeles routinely apply chokeholds in situations where they are not threatened by the use of deadly force." Id. It explained:
Id. at 106. As the Court observed, Lyons made no such allegations nor could he credibly do so.
Id. at 108. The Lyons Court thus held that "[a]bsent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way, Lyons is no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles; and a federal court may not entertain a claim by and or all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional." Id. at 111. Gavitt's claim for injunctive relief against Defendant City of Ionia fails for the same reasons.
Here, Gavitt's claim for injunctive relief does not allege either actual present harm or a significant possibility of future harm to him. Rather, he attempts to obtain discovery on behalf of third parties who may wish to assert claims similar to those rejected here. Gavitt lacks standing to assert any claim for injunctive relief on behalf of unnamed third parties. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tanner, 543 U.S. 125, 130, 134 (2004) (holding that "attorneys do not have third-party standing to assert the rights of Michigan indigent defendants denied appellate counsel" and observing that third-party standing has been limited only to those circumstances where (1) the party seeking third-party standing "has a `close' relationship with the person who possess the right;" and (2) "there is a `hinderance' to the possessor's ability to protect his own interests.").
For all these reasons, Gavitt fails to state a claim for the injunctive relief he seeks.
For the above-stated reasons, Defendants City of Ionia's, Kenneth Voet's, and Randall Klein's motion for judgment on the pleadings [44] is GRANTED; and Gavitt's claims against these Defendants are DISMISSED.
