GEORGE J. HAZEL, District Judge.
Pro se plaintiff Yvonne R. Alston's complaint originally alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act ("MCDCA"), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-201 et seq., and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-101 et seq. against Defendants Branch Banking and Trust Company ("BB&T"). Equifax Information Services. LLC ("Equifax"). Experian Information Solutions. Inc. ("Experian"). Trans Union. LLC ("Trans Union"), and Midland Credit Management, Inc. ("Midland") (collectively. "Defendants"). ECF No. 27.
Alston's complaint stems from an initial dispute with BB&T whereby Alston, on May 31, 2014, requested a payoff statement from BB&T for the mortgage refinance loan on her primary residence (the "Note"). ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 8-9. BB&T acquired the loan in June 2013 from Virginia Heritage Bank. ECF No. 27 ¶ 10. On June 4. 2014. BB&T sent Alston a payoff statement, a notice of transfer of servicing, and a copy of the Note. Id. ¶ 12. According to Alston, the Note sent in that correspondence "was not certified as a true and accurate copy." Id. ¶ 13. Following additional rounds of correspondence, Alston stated that BB&T failed to verify that it was the holder of the Note and, therefore, should have ceased assessing interest on her loan after June 2014. Alston demanded that BB&T apply her mortgage payments submitted from June 2014 through December 2014 to her principal balance only. Id. ¶ 22. On January 4. 2015. BB&T ultimately provided Alston with a payoff statement which, contrary to Alston's demand, directed a portion of her monthly payments to the interest due on the Note. Id.¶ 23.
Alston then sent a dispute letter to three consumer reporting agencies ("CRAs"), Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union, in which she stated that the balance on her mortgage account was incorrect. According to Alston, rather than a balance of $131.809, her report should have shown a balance of $129,463.40 to reflect application of her June 2014 through December 2014 mortgage payments to her principal balance only. Id. ¶ 24. Alston asked that the CRAs "investigate whether [Alston] attempted to pay the debt in lull and whether BB&T provided the necessary documentation" for her to complete the payoff. Id. Alston alleges that "[u]pon information and belief," Experian and Trans Union forwarded notice of her dispute to BB&T. but Equifax did not Id. ¶¶ 26. 31.
On January 9, 2015. Trans Union provided Alston with the result of its investigation of her dispute, and, like Experian, continued to report Alston's mortgage balance as $131.809. Id. ¶ 29. Alston alleges that Trans Union, like Experian did not independently investigate her dispute but instead relied on BB&T's purportedly inadequate investigation, Id. Trans Union provided Alston with a copy of her credit file, which revealed that Midland, a debt collection and information management company, id. ¶ 4, had obtained a copy of her consumer report from Trans Union on August 22, 2014. Id. ¶ 30. Alston alleges that she contacted Midland and spoke with an employee who "acknowledge[d] that Midland did not have a reason to obtain her report." Id. Alston contends that Midland obtain her report as part of its scheme to pull individuals' consumer reports in order to identify potential creditors to solicit and offer its debt collection services, Id. According to Alston. Trans Union is aware that Midland improperly pulls consumer reports for these purposes and yet has not established any procedures to verify that Midland is obtaining credit reports for permissible purposes. Id. Finally, on November 4, 2015. Alston sent another set of dispute letters to the CRAs, indicating that the balance of her mortgage account was still inaccurate and should be reported as $121.643.91. Id. ¶ 42.
Alston initiated this action in State Court on September 8, 2015 alleging various claims against BB&T, Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union. ECF No. 2. Trans Union removed the case to this Court on October 13, 2015. ECF No. 1. On August 26. 2016, following tiling of Alston's Amended Complaint. ECF No. 27, this Court ruled on a number of motions, including. BB&T's Motion to Dismiss Alston's Amended Complaint. ECF No. 32, and Trans Union's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. ECF No. 44. See ECF No. 50. In resolving the motions, the Court:
Following this Order, on October 11. 2016, the Court issued a Scheduling Order, setting a deadline to serve initial disclosures on or before October 25, 2016, complete discovery by February 13, 2017, and submit summary judgment motions by February 11. 2017. ECF No. 62. Alston filed her Motion to Alter or Amend on October 21. 2016. ECF No. 67, and Trans Union filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on February 10. 2017. ECF No. 71.
Alston moves to alter or amend the August 26, 2016 Order regarding Count V pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). ECF No. 67. Trans Union moves for summary judgment regarding Count III. ECF No. 71-1. "A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be tiled no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). However, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), an order that "adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities."
Summary judgment is proper when "a party . . . fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317. 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment must "show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the party opposing the motion "must come forward with Specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574. 587 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). "A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial" and warrants summary judgment. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
Alston alleges that the Court's August 26. 2016 Order "contains a clear error of law" with respect to Trans Union and Experian's duties under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) to provide information regarding Alston's December 29, 2014 dispute to BB&T and resolve the alleged errors in her credit file. ECF No. 67. Alston filed her Motion to Alter or Amend. ECF No. 67, on October 21, 2016-56 days after this Court issued its August 26. 2016 Order. For the reasons that follow, Alston's motion is thus time-barred.
As an initial matter, the Court's August 26. 2016 Order was not a final judgment: therefore. Alston's motion is improperly styled as a motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e). Rather, Alston's motion is a motion to reconsider, which, under Local Rule 105.10, must be filed within fourteen days of the underlying Order. See Loc. R. 105.10 (D. Md. 2016) ("[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, 52, 59, or 60, any motion to reconsider any order issued by the Court shall be Hied with the Clerk not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the order").
See Letren, No. 8:14-cv-03957-TDC at *3.
Similar to Letren, this Court's August 26, 2016 Order, ECF No. 50, resolved some but not all of the claims and was not ripe for appeal. The Court did not dismiss Counts I and 111 against BB&T and Trans Union, respectively, and invited Alston to amend her claim with regards to her November 4. 2015 credit dispute in Count V. Therefore, Alston cannot move to alter or amend that Order pursuant to Rule 59(e) because it was not a judgment as defined by Rule 54. Instead. "Alston's only procedural mechanism to seek reconsideration of that Order is Local Rule 105.10." Letren, No. 8:14-cv-03957-TDC at *4. Per the local rule. Alston had fourteen days to seek reconsideration but failed to do so. Alston has not provided an explanation for her late filing or a response to defendants' opposition raising the issue of timelines. ECF Nos. 69. 70. See Awah v. Midland Credit Mgmt. of Am., No. 10-cv-885, 2011 WL 3821600. at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 26. 2011) ("although pleadings prepared by pro se litigants are to be liberally construed, the same cannot be said for the interpretation of procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation").
Alston's motion also included a Second Amended Complaint as an attachment. ECF No. 67-2. Though Alston does not mention these attachments in her substantive motion. ECF No. 67, the Court construes the attachment as a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, and the motion is denied. Per this Court's August 26. 2016 Order. Alston was granted fourteen days to amend her complaint. See ECF No. 50 at 20.
In Count III. Alston alleges that Trans Union violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) because it failed to establish or follow reasonable procedures to prevent the disclosure of credit information for impermissible purposes. ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 59-65. The Court previously set forth the standard for a claim under § 1681e(a) as follows:
Alston alleges that Midland obtained her consumer report from Trans Union for an impermissible purpose on August 22, 2014. Trans Union knew that Midland often obtains consumer reports for impermissible purposes, and Trans Union has not established procedures to verify if Midland had a permissible purpose. ECF No. 27 ¶ 30. In denying Trans Union's motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 44, the Court stated that the facts alleged by Alston support an inference that 1) Midland obtained her report in violation of the FCRA and 2) Trans Union's requirement that Midland certify it was obtaining the report for a proper purpose, alone, was insufficient to establish that Trans Union maintained reasonable procedures to protect against such activity. See ECF No. 50 at 16-17 (construing facts in the light most favorable to Alston).
Trans Union now argues that Alston, having wholly failed to follow the Court's Discovery Order. ECF No. 62, has as a matter of law, admitted that Trans Union did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a). Trans Union states that it served Alston with its First Set of Interrogatories. First Set of Requests for Production of Documents, and First Set of Requests for Admission (Discovery Requests) on October 24. 2016. See Declaration of Justin T. Walton, Esq., ECF No. 71-5 ¶ 2. However. Alston has refused to serve her initial disclosures, respond to Trans Union's Discovery Requests, id. ¶ 6, 7, or provide input for the parties' Joint Status Report. See ECF No. 73 at n.1.
Because Alston elected not to participate in discovery, the Court deems the facts presented by Trans Union in its Requests for Admission to be admitted. See Fed. Civ. P. R. 36(a)(3) ("[a] matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objections"): see also Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., 285 F.R.D. 350. 363 (D. Md. 2012) ("A matter is deemed admitted if the responding party fails to timely provide a written answer or objection to the request for admission."). By not responding to Trans Union's Request for Admission. Alston concedes that Trans Union never furnished inaccurate information about her in a credit report to a third party, ECF No. 71-9 at 8, followed reasonable procedures designed to limit the furnishing of consumer reports for permissible purposes, id. at 11, did not furnish her consumer report to any person it had reasonable grounds to believe would not use the consumer report for a permissible purpose, including Midland, id. at 12, and that she was not damaged as a result of any act or omission on the part of Trans Union, id at 8, following these admissions. Alston cannot show that Trans Union released her consumer report in violation of § 1681 b—a prerequisite in order to state a claim for violation of the "reasonable procedures" requirement of § 1681e(a). Thus, summary judgment in favor of Trans Union is appropriate. Donovan v. Porter, 584 F.Supp. 202. 207-08 (D. Md. 1984) ("It is clear that unanswered requests for admissions may properly serve as a basis for summary judgment and with a failure to make a timely response, the truth of the matter contained in the request for admission is conclusively established and may serve as the basis for the court's consideration of a motion for summary judgment.").
Even without these admissions. Alston's claim rests only on the allegations in her Amended Complaint. ECF No. 27, and she points to no evidence supporting her claim in her bare-bones opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Williams v. G4S Secure Sols. (USA), Inc., No. 10-3476. 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66249. at *24 (D. Md. May 11. 2012) (quoting Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514. 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (a "party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleadings, but instead must set forth specific facts showing that there is a dispute of material facts") (internal quotations omitted).
In opposition. Alston does not explain her complete failure to participate in discovery and instead argues that Trans Union's motion should be denied because Trans Union failed to comply with Local Rule 105.2(c). Local Rule 105.2(c) provides:
See Loc. R. 105.2(c) (D. Md. 2016). Alston states that Local Rule 105.2(c) is "clearly designed to facilitate the Court's efficient administration of justice, and thus should not be ignored. Trans Union, however, has chosen to disregard both the Local Rule and Scheduling Order, as it did not contact Plaintiff prior to filing its Motion." ECF No. 74 at 1-2. Alston further alleges that had Trans Union notified her about its intent to submit a motion for summary judgment, she would have filed her own motion.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. ECF No. 67. is denied. Defendant Trans Union's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 71. is granted. A separate Order follows.
