LEWIS M. BLANTON, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on the Complaint of Scott Eckert alleging excessive use of force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case has been assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act and is being heard by consent of the parties.
Plaintiff was incarcerated at Southeast Correctional Center ("SECC") in Charleston, Missouri, at the time of the allegations asserted in his Complaint. Defendant Bowen was a Correctional Officer I employed by the Missouri Department of Corrections ("MDOC"), and assigned to work at SECC.
Plaintiff alleges that, on December 2, 2010, he was standing with his head and neck in between the door and door frame of the cook's office door at SECC, speaking with a cook employed by the MDOC. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Bowen approached plaintiff from behind and shoved him against the door, with knowledge that plaintiff's head was in between the door and door frame. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the actions of Defendant Bowen, he received injuries to his head, neck and shoulder, blurred vision in his left eye, loss of hearing in his left ear, and general pain and suffering.
In Count I of his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bowen subjected plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment by smashing his head between the door and door frame, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff brings his claim against Defendant Bowen in his individual capacity, and seeks monetary damages, including punitive damages.
In Count II of his Complaint, plaintiff asserts state law assault and battery claims against Defendant Bowen.
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
A moving party always bears the burden of informing the court of the basis of its motion.
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, defendant contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant also argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff cannot demonstrate defendant used excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, defendant contends that plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that he sustained a sufficiently serious constitutional violation because his injuries are de minimis and the force defendant applied, if any, was de minimis. Defendant also argues that plaintiff failed to show any evidence of malicious intent.
To prove an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy two requirements, one objective and one subjective.
"The Eighth Amendment bars correctional officers from imposing unnecessary and wanton pain on inmates, regardless of whether there is evidence of any significant injury."
As an initial matter, plaintiff objects to defendant's Exhibit B, plaintiff's institutional medical records, as hearsay. Defendant contends that plaintiff's medical records qualify as business records and are an exception to the hearsay rule. Defendant further argues that statements made in plaintiff's medical records are for the purposes of medical treatment. Defendant has submitted Exhibit F, a Medical Records Affidavit for Exhibit B, in which Kimberly Randolph, Medical Records Custodian of Potosi Correctional Center, certifies that the medical records contained in Exhibit B have been maintained in the regular and ordinary course of the business at that facility. The undersigned finds that plaintiff's medical records are properly authenticated and are admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
Plaintiff also objects to defendant's Exhibit E, a handwritten, signed statement of plaintiff filed under seal, as hearsay. Plaintiff contends that Exhibit E is not a sworn statement under oath, nor is it certified as a business record. Defendant argues that Exhibit E is admissible as an admission by a party opponent. The court agrees that plaintiff's handwritten, signed statement dated December 2, 2010, is admissible as an admission of a party opponent pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).
It is undisputed that, at approximately 1:00 p.m. on December 2, 2010, plaintiff was standing in the doorway from the kitchen to the cook's office with his head through the doorway, with the left side of his neck resting on the door jam and the door resting on his right shoulder. Defendant Bowen opened the cook's office door and walked into the office. Plaintiff alleges that defendant slammed the door for no reason on plaintiff, pinning his neck between the door and the door frame, causing him injuries to his head, neck, ear, and eye which persist to this day. Defendant contends that he did not intentionally shut the door on plaintiff's head. Defendant also claims that there is no evidence that the door shut on plaintiff's neck, pinning the sides of his neck between the door and the door jam.
Even if the court accepts that the door made contact with plaintiff's neck, plaintiff cannot support an excessive force claim because his injuries and the force applied were de minimis. The Supreme Court has admonished the district courts to heed "
Here, plaintiff was examined by a nurse approximately one hour after the incident, at which time plaintiff complained of only a headache.
On the day after the incident, December 3, 2010, plaintiff returned to the medical unit and complained of a headache.
Plaintiff's alleged injuries of headaches and aggravation of pre-existing conditions are insufficient to support a finding of a constitutional violation.
Plaintiff also claims that he experienced ringing in his left ear and blurred vision in his left eye as a result of the incident. First, despite plaintiff's claim that he had no issues with blurred vision in his left eye prior to the December 2010 incident, it was noted in December 2009 when plaintiff entered the custody of the MDOC that plaintiff had a history of eye strain and wore glasses.
Plaintiff has offered no evidence to support his claim that contact between the door and the right side of his neck would cause injuries to his left eye and ear. Plaintiff admits he has not seen an eye doctor or undergone a hearing test since December 2010. Def's Ex. A at 52-53. Plaintiff has also failed to support his claims that the incident at issue aggravated his pre-existing injuries. In his Response to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff cites only to his own deposition testimony regarding his injuries. Plaintiff's own self-serving allegations do not create a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment.
Similarly, plaintiff has failed to establish that the force allegedly used by Defendant Bowen was more than de minimis. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Bowen shut the door so hard and so fast on plaintiff's head that plaintiff "did not realize what was happening." Doc. No. 62 at 8. Plaintiff's statements do not provide any indication as to the amount of force applied. Plaintiff's actions immediately following the incident, however, belie his claim that Defendant Bowen used more than de minimis force. Plaintiff admits that he did not report the incident, finished his shift, and returned to his cell.
Plaintiff's lack of injuries are also indicative of the amount of force applied.
In support of his claim that more than de minimis force was applied, plaintiff notes that there was no need to use force on plaintiff, and that Defendant Bowen did not fill out a use of force report regarding the incident. Defendant Bowen, however, has maintained that he did not intentionally apply force by slamming the door on plaintiff's head. Rather, Defendant Bowen claims that he simply opened the door. Defendant Bowen's failure to complete a use of force report is consistent with Defendant Bowen's claim that no force was applied.
Plaintiff's claim that there were no cameras in the area in which the incident occurred and that this demonstrates more than de minimis force was applied is also unavailing. Even if Defendant Bowen were aware that there were no cameras in the area at issue, this fact is not indicative as to the amount of force applied. Further, while no video footage is available, the incident occurred in the presence of the cook and other inmates were nearby in the kitchen.
Finally, plaintiff points to the facts that the MDOC conducted an investigation, Defendant Bowen refused to submit to a lie detector test, criminal charges were issued, and Defendant Bowen was placed on administrative leave after he was arrested, in support of his claim that his injuries and the force applied were more than de minimis. To the extent this evidence would be admissible, it does not support plaintiff's claim. The criminal charges against Defendant Bowen were ultimately dismissed, and Defendant Bowen was only placed on leave while the charges were pending.
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As defendant maintains, even assuming plaintiff's neck was shut in the door, plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant Bowen intentionally caused this contact. Plaintiff claims that the incident was not an accident because Defendant Bowen stated "guess you had your head stuck in the wrong door this time." Doc. No. 62 at 11, Def's Ex. A at 11. Defendant Bowen testified that he told plaintiff that "he was in the wrong door" because the door was marked out of bounds. Pl's Ex. 2 at 34-36. The fact that Defendant Bowen told plaintiff that he was in an area marked out of bounds for offenders, a fact that plaintiff does not dispute, does not establish that defendant shut plaintiff's neck in the door "maliciously and sadistically" to cause harm.
In support of his claim that Defendant Bowen acted with malice, plaintiff argues that, if it were an accident, Defendant Bowen's response would have been "sorry," or "I didn't see you in the door." Doc. No. 62 at 10-11. Plaintiff, however, has not demonstrated that the door even made contact with his body. Defendant Bowen has admitted that he saw plaintiff in the doorway, and that he pulled the door open, away from plaintiff, to walk through it. Def's Ex. D at 21-22. There is no evidence that plaintiff sustained any injuries if contact between the door and his body occurred, or that Defendant Bowen was aware of these injuries if they did occur. Consequently, the fact that Defendant Bowen did not apologize after the alleged incident does not establish malice.
The undisputed facts reveal that plaintiff and Defendant Bowen barely knew each other prior to the incident at issue, and that they had a normal working relationship. Def's Ex. A at 76-78. There had been no incidents between plaintiff and Defendant Bowen prior to December 2, 2010.
As the Supreme Court has explained, "[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c)," as defendant has done here, his "opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'"
Having found that Defendant Bowen is entitled to summary judgment on the merits of plaintiff's § 1983 claims, it is unnecessary to determine whether qualified immunity also applies.
As noted above, plaintiff asserts state law assault and battery claims against Defendant Bowen in Count II of his Complaint.
District courts "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over" a state law claim if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because Defendant Bowen's motion for summary judgment has been granted, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims, and will dismiss those claims without prejudice.
Accordingly,