REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

HILDY BOWBEER, Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge on petitioner Ernest Carter's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1.] The petition has been referred to this Court for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1. This Court has conducted a preliminary review of Carter's petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Based on that review, this Court recommends dismissal without prejudice of the petition.

Carter attests that he was convicted and sentenced in 2016 on charges of unlawful possession of firearm and ammunition and possession of marijuana. (Pet. at 1 [Doc. No. 1].) Carter does not challenge the legality of that conviction or sentence. Instead, Carter alleges that prison officials have, in essence, been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs through denial of appropriate medical care.

Generally, habeas corpus relief is reserved for prisoners challenging the legality of the fact or duration of their confinement. "If the prisoner is not challenging the validity of his conviction or the length of his detention, such as loss of good time, then a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy." Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). By contrast, a prisoner challenging the conditions of his confinement, as Carter is doing here, must usually proceed through a traditional civil lawsuit.1 See Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 470-71 (8th Cir. 2014). Simply put, Carter has chosen the incorrect procedural vehicle through which to pursue his claims. Those claims must be brought in a traditional civil action, not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Pro se pleadings are entitled to a liberal interpretation, and in some circumstances, a court may reinterpret a document filed as a habeas corpus petition to be a civil complaint and allow the matter to proceed accordingly. Id. at 471. Such a reinterpretation is unnecessary here, however, because Carter already has pending in the District of Minnesota civil litigation brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to the same events and actions giving rise to the claims raised in his habeas petition. See Carter v. St. Cloud Corr. Ctr., No. 16-CV-2979 (DWF/HB) (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2016). Because this habeas action is duplicative of Carter's other pending litigation, reinterpreting Carter's habeas petition as a civil complaint is therefore unlikely to do him any good. In fact, reinterpreting Carter's habeas corpus petition is likely to be to his detriment, because, if the Court were to regard this matter as a new civil action, Carter would then be responsible for another $350.00 filing fee under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) ("[I]f a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee."). That result is entirely unnecessary. Carter may proceed with all of his § 1983 claims in the earlier-filed action and pay the required filing fee only once, rather than twice.2

Because Carter has sought relief through the incorrect procedural vehicle, it is hereby recommended that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied without prejudice. This recommendation of dismissal does not go to the merits of Carter's claims, which have yet to be adjudicated in the earlier-filed matter.3

Only one issue merits further comment. A § 2254 habeas corpus petitioner cannot appeal an adverse ruling on his petition unless he is granted a certificate of appealability ("COA"). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). A COA cannot be granted unless the petitioner "has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In this case, it is highly unlikely that any other court, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, would treat Carter's current habeas corpus petition differently than it is being treated here. It is therefore recommended that Carter should not be granted a COA in this matter.

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT: