MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROBERT F. ROSSITER, JR., District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on pro se defendant Johnny Ray Butler's ("Butler") "Pleading for Imposition of a Sentence Reduction Due to the Retroactive Application of Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018" (Filing No. 1371). For the reasons stated below, Butler's motion to reduce his sentence is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 17, 1993, a jury found Butler and Christopher Scott ("Scott") guilty of (1) conspiring to distribute or possess with intent to distribute cocaine or cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846; (2) engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE"), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848; and (3) money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). The Court determined the charge of conspiracy was a lesser included offense of CCE and set aside the guilty verdicts on the conspiracy charges.

At sentencing, the Court determined Butler and Scott were subject to mandatory life sentences for their CCE convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) because each was a "principal administrator, organizer, or leader of the enterprise" under § 848(b)(1) and their respective CCE violations involved far more than the 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base required by § 848(b)(2)(A) at that time.1 The Court found Butler and Scott responsible for at least 42.8 grams of cocaine base.

As the Court has previously noted (Filing No. 1322), in the years following his conviction and sentence, Butler has unsuccessfully challenged his sentence on various grounds. In 2011, 2014 and 2017, Butler moved (Filing Nos. 1168, 1190, and 1307) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a modification of his sentence based in part on the FSA and the Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). The Court denied (Filing Nos. 1177, 1224, and 1308) Butler's motions, concluding the FSA and Alleyne did not afford Butler any relief because they were not retroactive as applied to him. The Court further concluded the 42.8 kilograms of cocaine base attributed to Butler still subjected him to a mandatory life sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 848(b).

Butler now moves for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 ("First Step Act"), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). As relevant here, the First Step Act gives retroactive effect to §§ 2 and 3 of the FSA and "grants a district judge limited authority to consider reducing a sentence previously imposed." United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a district judge exercising discretion to reduce a sentence under the First Step Act "decides on a new sentence by placing itself in the time frame of the original sentencing, altering the relevant legal landscape only by the changes mandated by the [FSA]"). The government opposes reducing Butler's sentence on multiple grounds.

II. DISCUSSION

Butler raises several flawed ancillary arguments,2 but the crux of his motion is that he is now "statutorily ineligible" for the life sentence imposed on him under § 848(b) and "is eligible for immediate release." In Butler's view, the Court should hold a resentencing hearing, rely only on the drug quantity for the conspiracy count alleged in the Indictment, and reduce Butler's life sentence or "terminate the period of incarceration" altogether.

In response, the government contends retroactive application of the FSA does not help Butler because he is still subject to a mandatory life sentence under § 848(b) based on the large quantity of cocaine base attributed to him, which "far exceeds the 8.4 kilograms required now to trigger a mandatory life sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)." The government alternatively argues that even if Butler were eligible for a reduction, the Court should "exercise its discretion and decline to grant one" on these facts because reducing Butler's sentence now through retroactive application of the FSA based on the First Step Act would put him in a better position than a similarly situated defendant sentenced after the FSA took effect. As the government sees it, "[s]uch a windfall would" create the type of unwarranted sentencing disparity the Supreme Court warned against in Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 276-79 (2012).

After careful review, the Court finds Butler's motion should be denied. The Court agrees with the government that Butler remains subject to a mandatory life sentence based on the 42.8 kilograms of cocaine base attributed to him and is not entitled to a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. On March 26, 2019, the Court reached the same conclusion (Filing No. 1343) with respect to a similar motion to reduce (Filing No. 1331) filed by Scott, deciding "that—in light of the 42.8 kilograms of cocaine base attributed to Scott—neither the FSA nor the First Step Act" supported a sentence reduction or afforded Scott "any relief from his mandatory life sentence under § 848(b)." The Court's rationale for denying Scott's claims—which was summarily affirmed on appeal (Filing No. 1352)—applies with equal force here with the added benefits of being consistent and treating similarly situated defendants the same.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Johnny Ray Butler's motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act (Filing No. 1371) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.