JULIE A. ROBINSON, District Judge.
Plaintiff Marlon Watson filed this action pro se and in forma pauperis alleging federal constitutional and state law tort claims associated with Missouri state administrative child support and health insurance orders entered against him, and subsequent attempts by state agencies and officials to enforce those orders, including through garnishment. Plaintiff names the following Defendants in this matter: the State of Missouri, the Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services, Family Support Division ("FSD"), Technician Christine Brown, Missouri Department of Legal Services, Hearing Officer Amber L. Daugherty, and Latisha Nichole Knighten. This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6), Plaintiff's Motions for Entry of Judgment by Default (Docs. 8, 9), and Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 10). The motions are fully briefed and the Court is prepared to rule. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motions for judgment are denied and Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.
The following facts are alleged in the Complaint and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. In December 2013, following an administrative hearing, the Missouri Department of Social Services, Division of Legal Services ("DLS"), issued an administrative child support order that FSD docketed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, ordering Plaintiff to provide health insurance and pay child support of $512.00 per month to Defendant Latisha Knighten for Plaintiff and Knighten's children, O.W. and L.W. FSD then issued to Plaintiff's employer an income withholding order to enforce the child support order and an order to enroll to enforce the health insurance order.
Plaintiff alleges that FSD and Brown submitted false allegations that resulted in the administrative decisions and therefore garnishment of his wages. He claims that the state agencies colluded with Knighten to obtain relief and that false information was provided to obtain the orders entered against him. He complains that the hearing officer unfairly found Knighten's and FSD's version of events more credible than his. Plaintiff complains further that Knighten exploited their children to punish him through the administrative process, and that she withheld the children from him in order to obtain child support benefits. Plaintiff claims that the administrative decisions constitute harassment and discrimination, and that they divulged private information about him. Plaintiff complains that the administrative orders diminished his parental role with the children, and defamed him. Plaintiff complains that the orders infringed upon his religious liberties. Plaintiff claims that FSD has no jurisdiction or authority to garnish his wages, or other property to satisfy child support obligations. He claims that DLS misrepresented itself as neutral in trying to negotiate an agreement between himself and Knighten. Plaintiff claims that the orders constitute cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines. He complains that the administrative orders unfairly required him to provide medical care for the children, failing to recognize Knighten's obligations to provide medical care.
Plaintiff seeks damages, orders declaring that the garnishment orders were excessive and vacating or setting aside the administrative decisions complained of, an order restricting the State and its agencies from using his personal data and private medical records, a declaratory judgment that Knighten obtained the administrative orders through fraud, and a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff suffered defamation and loss of property. Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate the payments required by the administrative orders, and vacate the garnishment orders.
Plaintiff moves for default against Defendants, pointing to the fact that they have not yet answered the Complaint. Plaintiff is correct that as a general rule, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty-one days after service of the Complaint.
Defendants move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, as such, must have a statutory or constitutional basis to exercise jurisdiction.
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, some additional considerations frame the Court's analysis. The Court must construe his pleadings liberally and apply a less stringent standard than that which is applicable to attorneys.
First, Defendants argue that this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. But the Court need not reach this issue because liberally construing the Complaint, the Court has federal question jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, district courts "have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." A case "arises under" federal law where: "a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law."
Notwithstanding the presence of a federal question, the State of Missouri and its agencies are entitled to immunity from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
To the extent plaintiff asserts official-capacity claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the State officials, the bulk of these claims are also barred because they do not fall within the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Ex Parte Young doctrine permits suit against state officials for prospective injunctive relief.
Defendants ask the Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the domestic relations exception or the Younger abstention doctrine. "[T]he domestic relations exception . . . divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees,"
Although the domestic relations exception is generally considered an exception to diversity jurisdiction, it may also be applied in federal question cases.
Because Plaintiff's requested relief would require this Court to modify or declare void a child support and health insurance decision concerning Plaintiff's minor children—domestic relations matters that traditionally look to state law for their resolution—these claims are outside this Court's jurisdiction.
Even if the domestic relations exception did not apply, the Court would abstain in this case under the Younger abstention doctrine. "In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the Younger doctrine directs federal courts to refrain from interfering in ongoing state civil proceedings."
It appears that the state administrative proceeding challenged by Plaintiff is ongoing.
The Court notes that it may decline to abstain under Younger when extraordinary circumstances are present, such as "in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown."
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has "dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."
"[A] pro se litigant bringing suit in forma pauperis is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome any deficiency unless it is clear that no amendment can cure the defect."
