DIETZEN, Justice.
This appeal presents the issues of whether the postconviction court erred when it summarily denied appellant Adrian Dominic Riley's second postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing, and whether the postconviction court erred when it denied Riley's motion for additional fingerprint and forensic DNA testing. Riley was found guilty by a Carver County jury of three counts of first-degree murder and three counts of second-degree murder arising out of the 1995 shooting deaths of Troy Tholkes, James M. Walters, and Treesa Woods. The district court entered convictions on the three counts of first-degree murder and imposed three consecutive life sentences. We affirmed Riley's convictions on direct appeal. State v. Riley (Riley I), 568 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn. 1997). Because we conclude that Riley's petition was time-barred as a matter of law and that the motion was not supported by adequate proof, we affirm the postconviction court.
On the afternoon of May 23, 1995, Troy Tholkes, James M. Walters, and Treesa Woods
When Greenwood arrived at the farmhouse that evening, he discovered Woods' body in Walters' upstairs bedroom, and called 911. Id. After arriving at the scene, police found the bodies of Walters and Tholkes outside the house. Id. All three had died from gunshot wounds. Id.
The police investigated the area near where the bodies were located. They found a target attached to a tree near the bodies of Walters and Tholkes that was riddled with bullets. Id. The police also found recently discharged 9 mm shell casings nearby. Id. Inside the farmhouse, the police found a box for a Smith & Wesson 9 mm handgun on the floor of the bedroom where the police discovered Woods' body. Id. The box had been opened and the gun was missing. Id. Police eventually concluded that at least four people had been alive at the farmhouse on the morning of the murder — Greenwood, Walters, Tholkes, and an unidentified black man. Id. Of the four, Greenwood had been interrogated, and Walters and Tholkes were dead. Therefore, the police focused their investigation on the unidentified black man. Id.
Subsequently, Sherri Murphy told police that she had seen Riley and others in her kitchen on the morning of the murders. Id. When police arrested Riley 2 days later at the house where Riley was staying, they recovered a Smith & Wesson 9 mm handgun at the house. Id.
Ultimately, a grand jury indicted Riley on three counts of first-degree murder and three counts of second-degree murder. Riley pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial.
At trial, the State presented evidence consistent with the facts outlined above. Additionally, the State presented forensic testimony that a gunshot residue test of Greenwood's hands was inconclusive, but Riley's test was positive. Id. at 523. Riley's fingerprints were found at the crime scene on a red plastic cup from the kitchen, the stereo cabinet in the living room, and a beer bottle recovered from the yard near the bodies of Tholkes and Walters. Id. A BCA forensic scientist testified that the prints on the glass of the stereo cabinet might have been left within a "period of days" before they were lifted by the police. Id. Another expert testified that two latent fingerprints recovered from the pistol came from Riley. Id. A ballistics expert testified that shell casings recovered at the scene were fired from the 9 mm Smith & Wesson pistol that was recovered at the house where Riley was staying. Id. The expert could not, however, determine whether bullet fragments recovered from the bodies of Tholkes, Woods, and Walters came from the alleged murder weapon. Id.
The jury found Riley guilty on all six counts. The district court entered convictions on the three counts of first-degree murder and imposed three consecutive life sentences. We affirmed Riley's convictions on direct appeal.
In 2011, Riley filed his second petition for postconviction relief, claiming that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing or a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Riley also brought a motion for additional fingerprint and forensic DNA testing. To support his petition and motion, Riley relied on affidavits from Joel Demond White, Landry Scott Goodwin, and himself. Riley asserted that Joseph Papasodora, who is now deceased, confessed to shooting the three victims. The postconviction court summarily denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the petition was time-barred by Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4. Further, the court concluded that the motion for fingerprint and forensic DNA testing did not satisfy the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1a (2010).
On appeal, Riley argues that the postconviction court erred in two ways when it summarily denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing. First, he argues that the court erred in concluding that his petition was time-barred under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2010), or if the petition was time-barred, that it failed to satisfy either the newly discovered evidence exception under subdivision 4(b)(2), or the interests of justice exception under subdivision 4(b)(5).
Generally, a person convicted of a crime who claims the conviction violates his rights under the constitution or laws of the United States or Minnesota may file a petition for postconviction relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2010). Moreover, a petitioner is entitled to a hearing on the petition "[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief." Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2010).
We review a denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well as a request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn.2010); Doppler v. State, 771 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn.2009). A postconviction court "abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley II, 792 N.W.2d at 833. We review a postconviction court's factual determinations under a clearly erroneous standard, and do not reverse those determinations unless they are not factually supported by the record. Scherf v. State, 788 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Minn.2010). But we review the court's legal conclusions de novo. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn.2007).
An evidentiary hearing on a petition is mandated whenever "material facts are in dispute which have not been resolved in the proceedings resulting in conviction and which must be resolved in order to determine the issues raised on the merits." State ex rel. Roy v. Tahash, 277 Minn. 238, 244, 152 N.W.2d 301, 305 (1967). A court abuses its discretion when it does not order an evidentiary hearing in such a circumstance. Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 423-24 (Minn.2004) (concluding that the postconviction court abused its discretion when it misapplied Minn.Stat. § 590.04 "[b]y concluding that the recantations were unreliable without first evaluating the credibility of the witnesses at an evidentiary hearing"). When an evidentiary hearing on the petition is not mandated under Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1, the court may order such a hearing if it deems it appropriate. State ex rel. Roy, 277 Minn. at 244, 152 N.W.2d at 305. A decision to hold or not hold such a hearing in such a circumstance is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Doppler, 771 N.W.2d at 871.
Essentially, Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 contemplates a two-step analysis. Id. Under the first step, the postconviction court must determine whether the facts considered in the light most favorable to the petition, together with the arguments presented by the parties, "conclusively show" that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Id. If the court concludes there are no material facts in dispute that preclude dismissal, and the State is entitled to dismissal of the petition as a matter of law, the court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Riley filed his second petition in 2011; however, the two-year time-bar to file a petition expired on August 1, 2007. See Riley II, 792 N.W.2d at 833-34 (holding Riley's petition time-barred on August 1, 2007). Consequently, Riley's second petition is time-barred under subdivision 4(a), and he is not entitled to relief, or an evidentiary hearing under section 590.04, unless he can show that he satisfies one of the exceptions of subdivision 4(b), and that application of the exception is not time-barred by subdivision 4(c). Riley argues that he satisfies the newly discovered evidence and interests of justice exceptions in subdivision 4(b)(2) and (5). We will address each argument in turn.
Riley argues that the facts alleged in his petition and affidavits present material questions of fact regarding whether he is entitled to postconviction relief under the newly discovered evidence exception to the 2-year time-bar. Under the "newly discovered evidence" exception to the 2-year time-bar, a court may hear a petition if the petitioner alleges:
Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2); see Scott v. State, 788 N.W.2d 497, 501-02 (Minn.2010). Essentially, this exception requires that the petitioner show that the evidence (1) is newly discovered; (2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or the petitioner's attorney within the 2-year time-bar for filing a petition; (3) is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial; (4) is not for impeachment purposes; and (5) establishes by the clear and convincing standard that petitioner is innocent of the offenses for which he was convicted. Scott, 788 N.W.2d at 502. All five criteria must be satisfied to obtain relief. See id.
Riley submitted affidavits from Joel Demond White, Landry Scott Goodwin, and himself to support the petition. Riley states in his affidavit that both White and Goodwin were in prison at MCF-Rush City with him, and separately approached him and offered to help him pursue his appeal. White states in his affidavit that Joseph Papasodora told him on the evening of May 24, 1995, that "he had shot three people in the process of [a] robbery." White paged Riley that night, and they later met, and White told Riley what Papasodora had told him. White stated that he did not testify at Riley's trial because he was afraid and left town.
Goodwin states in his affidavit that Papasodora, who he lived with for a long time, "came home and told me to help him get rid of some clothes" that had "bloodstains on them, so we burned them in our back yard," and then explained that he had done a robbery for James Greenwood. Later when he saw a television story involving the murders of Tholkes, Walters, and Woods, Papasodora "admitted to me that he was the person who killed all three
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to Riley, the alleged facts fail as a matter of law to satisfy the newly discovered evidence exception to the 2-year time-bar for several reasons. First, the alleged facts do not satisfy the first prong of the newly discovered evidence exception, which requires that the evidence be "newly discovered." When a defendant has knowledge of the expected testimony at the time of trial, the testimony fails the legal test for newly discovered evidence. State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 675-76 (Minn.2011). In his affidavit, White alleges that on the night of the murders he informed Riley that Papasodora told White that "he had shot three people in the process of [a] robbery." Admittedly, the truth of White's allegation presents a question of fact that necessarily involves a credibility determination. Nevertheless, this question of fact is not material in Riley's case. Even if the fact question is resolved in Riley's favor, he is legally entitled to no relief under the newly discovered evidence exception to the 2-year time-bar because he knew of White's expected testimony at the time of trial and therefore White's allegation is, as a matter of law, not "newly discovered."
Second, testimony by White and Goodwin regarding the Papasodora confessions alleged in their affidavits is inadmissible hearsay. We acknowledge that the submission of "an affidavit containing hearsay does not preclude a postconviction court from granting an evidentiary hearing" because the declarant might personally appear at the evidentiary hearing or the postconviction court might conclude that the testimony is admissible under a hearsay exception. Dobbins v. State, 788 N.W.2d 719, 736-37 (Minn.2010). Nevertheless, a postconviction court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when the declarant is deceased and the petitioner as a matter of law cannot establish a hearsay exception. Roby v. State, 808 N.W.2d 20, 28 (Minn.2011).
Here, Papasodora is deceased and the only possible hearsay exception in this case is the statement against interest exception. Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
Rule 804(b)(3) provides:
Id. The purpose of the corroborating evidence requirement is to protect against the possibility that a statement will be fabricated to exculpate the accused. State v. Hurd, 763 N.W.2d 17, 35 (Minn.2009); accord United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1301 (1st Cir.1997) ("[T]he corroboration requirement `should be construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.'") (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3), advisory committee's note). We have observed "[it is] our long-standing, clear rule that the statement-against-interest exception applies to exculpatory statements only where there is evidence corroborating the statement." Hurd, 763 N.W.2d at 35. Thus, our inquiry must examine whether there is independent corroborating evidence that "clearly
The facts alleged do not provide independent corroborating evidence that clearly indicates the trustworthiness of Papasodora's alleged confessions. The supporting affidavits do not allege any facts that independently connect Papasodora to the victims, farmhouse, or handgun.
Third, the alleged facts do not legally satisfy the fifth prong of the newly discovered evidence exception, which requires Riley to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he "is innocent of the offense or offenses for which [he] was convicted," Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2). "[T]o prove a claim by clear and convincing evidence, a party's evidence should be unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties." Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 583 (Minn.2010). Actual innocence is more than an uncertainty about guilt. Instead, establishing actual innocence requires evidence that renders it more likely than not that no reasonable jury would convict. Accord Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998); cf. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 418-19, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (explaining that affidavits filed 10 years after the event did not satisfy the high threshold of actual innocence test).
Riley has failed to present evidence that establishes by clear and convincing evidence his actual innocence of the offenses for which he was convicted. The proposed testimony of White and Goodwin is not sufficient to counter the extensive evidence establishing Riley's presence at the scene of the crime and participation in the murder. As discussed above, there is no other evidence corroborating Papasodora's involvement in the murders. The consistent eyewitness testimony was that the perpetrator was a black male. In addition, Riley's fingerprints were discovered at the scene of the murder and on the Smith & Wesson 9 mm handgun. Thus, the alleged facts do not legally establish by clear and convincing evidence that Riley is innocent of the murders of which he was convicted.
Riley next argues that the facts alleged in his petition and affidavits satisfy the interests of justice exception to the 2-year time-bar. Under the "interests of justice" exception to the 2-year time-bar, a court may hear a petition if the petitioner alleges "that the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice." Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5). To consider a petition in the interests of justice, "the defendant must not have deliberately and inexcusably failed to raise the issue on direct appeal." Gassler, 787 N.W.2d at 586. Moreover, the interests of justice exception is reserved for exceptional cases. Id.
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to Riley, the alleged facts fail as a matter of law to satisfy the interests of justice exception to the 2-year time-bar.
Riley next argues that the postconviction court erred in denying his motion for fingerprint and forensic testing pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1a. According to Riley, the DNA testing of certain items at the crime scene could indicate other perpetrators, and DNA testing techniques have significantly advanced since his conviction such that new testing could exonerate him.
In State v. Gisege, we considered, among other things, whether postconviction relief was available for a claim for independent DNA retesting of blood evidence connected to a murder. 582 N.W.2d 229, 230 (Minn.1998). We rejected the claim, concluding that the State's DNA evidence was known at the time of trial, that the question of independent retesting was not raised either at trial or on direct appeal, and therefore the claim was barred because it did not meet the requirements of Minn.Stat. §§ 590.01-.06. Gisege, 582 N.W.2d at 231.
The Legislature later amended Minn. Stat. § 590.01 to add subdivision 1a and new subdivision 1(2). Act of May 25, 1999, ch. 216, art. 3, §§ 2, 3, 1999 Minn. Laws 1271, 1312-13. Those changes are consistent with our decision in Gisege. Subdivision 1a provides that a person convicted of a crime may bring a motion for fingerprint or forensic DNA testing to demonstrate the person's "actual innocence" if two conditions are met. Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1a(a)(1)-(2). First, the testing is to be conducted on "evidence secured in relation to the trial which resulted in the conviction." Id., subd. 1a(a)(1). Second, the evidence "was not subject to the testing because either the technology for the testing was not available at the time of the trial or the testing was not available as evidence at the time of the trial." Id., subd. 1a(a)(2).
The State argues that Riley does not satisfy the requirements of subdivision 1a(a)(2). We agree. Riley's motion addresses three types of evidence: the hair sample, the drinking vessels, and the fingerprint evidence, each of which we discuss in turn.
First, Riley seeks DNA testing of a hair sample from a comforter that was on a couch in the living room of the farmhouse. A BCA expert testified at a pretrial hearing that the hair sample consisted of five animal hairs, some kinky-curly synthetic fibers, and one human hair that was medium in color that had fallen from the head of a Caucasian. Riley's motion regarding
Second, Riley seeks DNA testing of several drinking vessels found at the scene. These items were previously subjected to fingerprint but not DNA testing. The police found two red plastic cups, one of which contained a usable print of Riley, and the other of Greenwood. Walter's fingerprint was discovered on a ceramic cup. Three Miller beer bottles found in the kitchen and near a tree west of the house contained no prints suitable for testing. A Michelob beer container had one usable print belonging to Riley. Two Coke cans found near the target tree contained one print belonging to Greenwood, one unidentified print, and two prints unsuitable for comparison. An unidentified beer bottle contained no prints suitable for matching. These vessels were tested for fingerprints at the time of trial, and the reason for the lack of DNA testing was neither because the "technology for the testing was not available" nor because "the testing was not available as evidence." Riley's motion regarding the drinking vessels fails to satisfy the requirements of subdivision 1a(a)(2) because Riley has not established any change in fingerprint or forensic testing in the time since his trial that would materially change the types of testing available or testing available as evidence.
Third, Riley asks the court to release "unidentified fingerprints" so that a "well-known and well-respected" fingerprint examiner can examine them. Riley, however, does not identify a qualified scientific expert. Riley requests that we allow him to retest fingerprints found on the Chevrolet Beretta, which was the getaway car. But the only usable print found on the car belonged to Tholkes, the car's owner. Riley has not established that either new technology would allow more usable prints to be uncovered, or that the prints were not tested at trial because the technology was not available with which to test them. Because Riley failed to establish that his motion for fingerprint or forensic testing met the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1a(a)(2), the postconviction court did not err in denying the motion.
Affirmed.
