U.S. v. LUGO-GAMBOA, 8:15CR136. (2015)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20150622855
Visitors: 16
Filed: Jun. 19, 2015
Latest Update: Jun. 19, 2015
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on defendant's unopposed motion to continue trial [24] as counsel was recently appointed and needs additional time to investigate and prepare for trial. The defendant shall comply with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [24] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for June 30, 2015 is continued to September 29, 2015. 2. Defendant shall file a waiver of
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on defendant's unopposed motion to continue trial [24] as counsel was recently appointed and needs additional time to investigate and prepare for trial. The defendant shall comply with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [24] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for June 30, 2015 is continued to September 29, 2015. 2. Defendant shall file a waiver of s..
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ORDER
F.A. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on defendant's unopposed motion to continue trial [24] as counsel was recently appointed and needs additional time to investigate and prepare for trial. The defendant shall comply with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [24] is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for June 30, 2015 is continued to September 29, 2015.
2. Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial as soon as practical.
3. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and September 29, 2015, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel for the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
