RICHARD D. BENNETT, District Judge.
On March 24, 2015, counsel filed a Motion to Vacate Conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on behalf of Sean Victor Sterling ("Sterling"), who is currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution at Fairton, New Jersey. The Motion is premised on the Supreme Court's March 5, 2014 decision in Rosemond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1240 (2014).
The facts and testimony from cooperating witnesses in the underlying criminal case showed that Sterling participated in the May 28, 2001 murder of Kenyatta Harris and the June 26, 2001 murder of Angelo Stringfellow. Sterling and his accomplices, including Corey Smith, Perry Austin, and William DeShields, carried out the murders as part of a "contract" put on the lives of the victims by Jermaine Bell, a Baltimore drug dealer affiliated with the R & G drug organization, because of a "battle over some drug territory." The testimony of Corey Smith, Perry Austin, Linwood Smith, Detective Coleman, and William DeShields presented evidence that Sterling discussed the murder plan in advance of the crime, drove the shooters and the firearms to the murder scenes, helped locate Harris and Stringfellow, provided transportation away from the crime scene after the shootings, allowed the murder weapons to be stored in the sunroof of his silver Pathfinder truck before and after the crimes, and helped to dispose of the murder weapon after the Stringfellow murder.
On February 7, 2008, Sean Victor Sterling was indicted under a sealed superseding indictment. See United States v. Sterling, Criminal No. RDB-06-179 (D. Md.) at Paper No. 146. After an eight-day jury trial on December 3, 2008, he was convicted of two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). On February 19, 2009, he was sentenced to a cumulative term of 265 months of confinement and a total of 5 years of supervised release. Id. at ECF No. 264. In addition, the Court imposed a special assessment of $200.00. Id. Judgment was entered on February 23, 2009. On November 12, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment. Id. at ECF No. 335; see also United States v. Sterling, 401 Fed. Appx. 775 (4th Cir. 2010).
On November 9, 2011, a counseled Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was filed on Sterling's behalf, raising grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, lack of a fair trial due to the prejudicial and hostile courtroom environment, absence of government jurisdiction and violations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Id. at ECF No. 372; see also Sterling v. United States, Civil Action No. RDB-11-3209 (D. Md.). After briefing by the parties, the Court denied the Motion on February 13, 2013. Id., ECF Nos. 403 & 404.
Sterling seeks habeas corpus relief under § 2241, seeking vacatur of his conviction. An inmate may file a motion under § 2255 to collaterally attack the legality of his conviction or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). But generally, a prisoner may file a petition under § 2241 only to challenge the manner in which a sentence is executed. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). A prisoner must challenge the legality of his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 unless "the remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 806-08 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e); see also Farrow v. Revell, 541 Fed. Appx. 327, 328 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) ("A federal prisoner who seeks to challenge the legality of his conviction or sentence generally must proceed pursuant to § 2255, while § 2241 petitions are reserved for challenges to the execution of the prisoner's sentence.") (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4
Section 2255 is not inadequate merely because the inmate is unable to obtain relief under § 2255. In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n.5. Thus, § 2255 is not rendered inadequate because of a limitation bar, the prohibition against successive petitions, or a procedural bar due to failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. Id. (citing Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988)). Rather, § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a conviction when:
In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34.
The Government concedes that Rosemond announced a substantive rule that is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, "because it defines aiding and abetting . . . in a manner that creates the risk that individuals convicted prior to Rosemond were convicted of a non-existent offense."
Habeas counsel argues that Sterling's Rosemond claim meets all requirements under § 2255(e). This Court disagrees. Sterling does not satisfy the Savings Clause requirements of § 2255(e) as set out in In re Jones. The evidence as culled from the transcripts provided by the Government show that Sterling knew that a gun would be used in the Harris and Stringfellow murders. His conduct proven during the jury trial establishes his guilt under Rosemond. Clearly, he aided and abetted the murder of two people and had "advanced knowledge" that firearms would be used during the crime. He remains guilty of the crimes committed in this case and this Court concludes that Sterling's conduct was illegal at the time of his conviction.
In light of the rulings of the Court, the instant Petition for habeas corpus relief will be denied, and this case will be dismissed by separate Order. When a district court dismisses a habeas petition, a Certificate of Appealability may issue Aonly if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38, (2003). Sterling does not satisfy this standard, and the Court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. A separate Order follows.
Further, nearly every district court to consider this issue has concluded that Rosemond did not create a "new rule." See Cooper v. O'Brien, 14cv112 (STAMP), 2015 WL 6085717 (N. D. W. Va. 2015); Smith v. Warden, No. 15-CV-515, 2015 WL 3827236, *3 (W.D. La. June 18, 2015) (noting that "the Supreme Court was clear that its Rosemond holding was directed by established precedent" (emphasis in original)); Woods v. Wilson, No. 15-623ADM/HB, 2015 WL 2454066, *5 (D. Minn. May 22, 2015) (concluding that "the holding in Rosemond does not represent a new rule of law"); Nix v. United States, No. 1:15-cv-79-LG, 2015 WL 2137296, *2-3 (S.D. Miss. May 7, 2015) (concluding that Rosemond is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review); Moreno v. Snyder-Morse, Civil Action No. 144-cv-106-HRW, 201 WL 82418 at *4 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2015) (same); Montana v. Cross, No. 3:14-cv-01019, 2014 WL 5091708, *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2014) (collecting cases that refuse to apply Rosemond retroactively). But see United States v. Greene, Nos. 14-C-431, 08-CR-124, 2015 WL 347833, *2 (E.D. Wisc. Jan. 23, 2015) (concluding that Rosemond applied retroactively to a § 2255 motion attacking a § 924(c) conviction).