ORDER

JOAN N. ERICKSEN, District Judge.

Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs' objections to an order issued on December 19, 2013, by the Honorable Tony N. Leung, United States Magistrate Judge, and three motions filed by individual Defendants. The order to which Plaintiffs object denied their motion for leave to amend the First Amended Complaint. The Defendants' motions are a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the City of Minneapolis, a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the County of St. Louis, and a motion to dismiss filed by the City of Edina.

1. Plaintiffs' objections to the Magistrate Judge's order

Having reviewed the record, the Court affirms the Magistrate Judge's order because it is neither "clearly erroneous" nor "contrary to law." See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); D. Minn. LR 72.2(a). The Magistrate Judge denied the Plaintiffs' motion to amend on the basis of the futility of the proposed amendments. See Docket No. 241 at 8-17. Futility of amendment is a proper basis for denying leave to amend a complaint. Hammer v. City of Osage Beach, 318 F.3d 832, 844 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Hintz v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 686 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a denial of leave to amend on futility grounds means that "the district court has reached the legal conclusion that the amended complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure").

As the Magistrate Judge concluded, none of the proposed amendments would change the ability of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss by the Defendants that opposed Plaintiffs' motion to amend or that have pending motions for judgment on the pleadings.1 Count I of the current complaint and proposed Second Amended Complaint asserts violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725, based on retrievals of Plaintiffs' driver's license data. A detailed description of Plaintiffs' DPPA claims is available in the Court's prior orders in this case. The Court previously determined that DPPA claims based on retrievals of Plaintiffs' data occurring prior to four years from the filing of the initial complaint are time-barred. See Kost v. Hunt, Civ. No. 13-583, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162897, at *11-26 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2013). The proposed amendments would not affect the outcome of a dismissal motion as to such claims. For the claims not barred by the statute of limitations, the complaint with the proposed amendments also fails to adequately allege a DPPA claim.

This Court has previously discussed the standards applicable in assessing whether a complaint adequately states a DPPA claim based on a particular retrieval of personal information by a government actor whose job provides general access to the protected data, i.e. a defendant who implicates the exception of 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1) for permissible uses of protected driver's license data. See Mitchell v. Aitkin County, Civ. No. 13-2167, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27089, at *15-31 (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 2014). In relevant part, a claim against such a defendant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a), must adequately allege an impermissible purpose for the retrieval of the plaintiff's personal information, which generally entails pointing to an external manifestation of the alleged improper purpose. See id. at *27-28 (collecting prior DPPA cases in which "the facts allowed for an external basis—in the form of the officer's subsequent actions—to probe the propriety of the prior retrieval of information"). Plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended Complaint continues to rely on speculation about the purpose of the identified data retrievals and fails to point to any external manifestation of the alleged improper purpose. Therefore, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's determination that the proposed amendments would not change the viability of Plaintiffs' DPPA claims against the relevant Defendants.

Counts II, III, and V of the proposed Second Amended Complaint assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has previously held that Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a viable § 1983 claim. Kost v. Hunt, Civ. No. 13-583, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145148, at *15-16 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2013). The proposed amendments do not alter the unavailability of a § 1983 claim to Plaintiffs. See Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27089, at *31-32 (citing cases dismissing § 1983 claims on materially indistinguishable facts). Count IV of the proposed Second Amended Complaint asserts a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED"). The Court previously found that Plaintiffs had failed to state an NIED claim because they failed to adequately allege any breach to support the basic negligence claim that must be established as part of an NIED claim. See Kost, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145148, at *16-17 (discussing Plaintiffs' NIED claim and citing Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn. 2005), for the elements of an NIED claim under Minnesota law). As the Magistrate Judge noted, the proposed amendments would not alter that outcome. Moreover, an NIED claim includes elements beyond those of a basic negligence claim,2 which Plaintiffs' complaint clearly does not allege.

2. Defendants' motions

The three motions before the Court seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint,3 pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or 12(c). Plaintiffs' allegations as to the City of Edina, City of Minneapolis, and St. Louis County do not differ materially from Plaintiffs' allegations against the city and county Defendants previously dismissed. The Court's prior determinations on Plaintiffs' § 1983 and NIED counts apply to their claims against these three Defendants. See id. at *15-17. Plaintiffs' DPPA claim against the City of Edina is time-barred and the complaint against it will be dismissed with prejudice. For the City of Minneapolis and St. Louis County, Plaintiffs' DPPA claims rely on at least one data retrieval within four years of the filing of the complaint, such that their DPPA claims are not time-barred. Nonetheless, the complaint fails to point to any external manifestation of an impermissible purpose with regard to the data retrievals by Minneapolis and St. Louis.4 See Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27089, at *15-31. The DPPA claims against those Defendants will consequently be dismissed without prejudice.

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED THAT: