ROBERT S. BARNEY, Presiding Judge.
Roger T. Allen, John Bennett, C.L. McClure, John Molloy, and Oscar Witte (collectively "Appellants") appeal the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss filed by the City of Greenville, Missouri ("the City"), which disposed of their petition for an injunction, declaratory judgment, and damages in connection with a city ordinance prohibiting Appellants from parking in front of their properties on Maple Street. We affirm.
The record reveals Appellants are residents of the City and that they have owned property on Maple Street in the City for several years. For a number of years Appellants have apparently parked their vehicles along "the edge" of Maple Street in order to have, as they contend, "reasonable access to their properties." Appellants assert it is necessary for them to park on the edge of the street because their properties are situated on low-lying land, which has standing water on it much of the year. While they can connect to their properties by automobile by way of a back alley, they contend they would have to build expensive driveways to access their properties.
On August 11, 2009, the City's Board of Aldermen adopted Ordinance No. 51.090 ("the ordinance"), which made it unlawful to park vehicles within the city limits except where authorized. Pursuant to the ordinance, parking was barred in any place where official signs were located prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking. After the ordinance passed, the City notified its residents in a letter that they were no longer allowed to park along Maple Street
In response to the passage of the ordinance and the prohibition of street parking on Maple Street, Appellants filed a Petition for Temporary Restraining Order, Injunction, Declaratory Judgment and Damages on February 22, 2010. In Count I of their petition, Appellants requested a temporary restraining order and injunction preventing the City from enforcing the ordinance until a trial could be held on the merits. In Count II, Appellants pleaded they had no reasonable access to their property, and the only legal access was by way of an alley behind their properties situated in an area where there is constantly standing water on the land requiring extensive construction and attendant costs to reasonably access their properties. They prayed for a declaratory judgment declaring the ordinance "illegal and void" because the ordinance is "discriminatory, unreasonable and invalid" for several reasons that Appellants enumerated. In Count III, Appellants petitioned the court for damages against the City for "Inverse Condemnation," re-alleging that they had no reasonable access to their property, save for an alley behind their properties in an area of standing water, which would require extensive and expensive construction to reasonably access their properties. They also alleged that the ordinance prohibited them from parking on the public street in front of their homes; that the fair market value of these properties had been reduced; that they otherwise had no access to the properties; and that there was no place for the parking of their motor vehicles thereby constituting a "wrongful appropriation" of their land resulting in damages in excess of $25,000.00.
In response to Appellants' petition, the City filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After hearing oral arguments on the City's motion to dismiss, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Counsel for Appellants and the City submitted memoranda of law in opposition to and in support of the motion to dismiss. Concerning Count II, the City argued that Appellants failed to state a viable claim in that they "failed to allege any violation of the City's police power or of any state statute or a deprivation of any right or privilege guaranteed by the State or Federal Constitution."
In their sole point relied on, Appellants aver that the trial court erred in sustaining the City's motion to dismiss
State ex rel. Henley v. Bickel, 285 S.W.3d 327, 329 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting Bosch v. St. Louis Healthcare Network, 41 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Mo. banc 2001)). "`The ruling on a motion to dismiss is ordinarily confined to the face of the petition, which must be given a liberal construction.'" Solberg v. Graven, 174 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Mo.App. 2005) (quoting Matt v. Burrell, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 796 (Mo.App.1995)). Where, as here, the trial court does not provide a basis for its dismissal, we presume the dismissal was based on the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss, and we will affirm if the dismissal was appropriate on any such grounds. Lueckenotte v. Lueckenotte, 34 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Mo. banc 2001).
In Missouri, a petition must contain "a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Rule 55.05.
First we examine the trial court's dismissal of Count II of Appellants' petition wherein they argued the ordinance was "discriminatory, unreasonable and invalid" for allegedly denying them "reasonable access to their property" and compelling them to construct expensive driveways from an alley through their low-lying lots if they wished to comply with the parking ban. The fatal flaw with Count II as pled is that it is uncertain from the face of the petition which principle of substantive law Appellants are invoking as grounds for declaratory relief. From the Appellants' appeal brief, it is clear they believe that the City's enforcement of the ordinance as
In Count III, Appellants claimed inverse condemnation and asked for damages as a result.
"Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental agency to recover the value of property
In their Count III, Appellants have not set forth any factual allegations to show that the City has limited or denied their right of ingress and egress to their properties. Appellants only allege that they can no longer park on the adjoining public street. Although they summarily claim that enforcement of the ordinance has denied them "reasonable access" to their homes, the City's parking ban on Maple Street does not impinge on Appellants' ability to otherwise reasonably access their properties from that street, and a restriction on parking is not the same as a limit to access. See Schrader, 292 S.W.3d at 458 (holding that "[t]he abutter's easement was created to protect the right of ingress and egress, not to compensate abutting property owners for alterations made to a public roadway that reduces parking, traffic, or visibility"). The Eastern District of this Court held as much in Schrader, 292 S.W.3d at 455. In Schrader, a restaurant owner filed suit against the Missouri Department of Transportation ("MoDOT") after it removed the parking lanes from the street adjoining the restaurant, thus, eliminating parking spots commonly used by restaurant patrons. Id. at 455. In denying that MoDOT interfered with the plaintiffs' right of access to use the adjoining street for ingress and egress, the court expressly declined to "equate the right of vehicular access onto their property with the elimination of parking along a public thoroughfare. . . ." Id. at 457-58. As such, Appellants have not pleaded sufficient facts to establish that the ban on street parking constituted inverse condemnation.
The judgment of the motion court is affirmed.
LYNCH, and BURRELL, JJ., concurs.