U.S. v. LIPOVSKY, 4:15CR3013. (2015)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20150311c31
Visitors: 13
Filed: Mar. 10, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 10, 2015
Summary: ORDER CHERYL R. ZWART , Magistrate Judge . Defendant has moved to continue the pretrial motion deadline, (filing no. 16), because the defendant and defense counsel need additional time to fully review the discovery received before deciding if pretrial motions should be filed. The motion to continue is unopposed. Based on the showing set forth in the motion, the court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 1) Defendant's motion to continue, (filing no. 16), is gran
Summary: ORDER CHERYL R. ZWART , Magistrate Judge . Defendant has moved to continue the pretrial motion deadline, (filing no. 16), because the defendant and defense counsel need additional time to fully review the discovery received before deciding if pretrial motions should be filed. The motion to continue is unopposed. Based on the showing set forth in the motion, the court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 1) Defendant's motion to continue, (filing no. 16), is grant..
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ORDER
CHERYL R. ZWART, Magistrate Judge.
Defendant has moved to continue the pretrial motion deadline, (filing no. 16), because the defendant and defense counsel need additional time to fully review the discovery received before deciding if pretrial motions should be filed. The motion to continue is unopposed. Based on the showing set forth in the motion, the court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1) Defendant's motion to continue, (filing no. 16), is granted.
2) Pretrial motions and briefs shall be filed on or before March 16, 2015.
3) Trial of this case remains scheduled to commence on April 6, 2015.
4) The ends of justice served by granting the motion to continue outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, and the additional time arising as a result of the granting of the motion, the time between today's date and April 6, 2015, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, because despite counsel's due diligence, additional time is needed to adequately prepare this case for trial and failing to grant additional time might result in a miscarriage of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B).
Source: Leagle
