ARTHUR J. TARNOW, Senior District Judge.
On October 6, 2010, a jury convicted Movant of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). On January 25, 2011, this Court sentenced Movant to seventeen years (204 months) of imprisonment and five years of supervised release.
On appeal from Movant's conviction, the Sixth Circuit summarized the background of this case, in part, as follows:
United States v. McGee, 510 F. App'x 377, 379-80 (6th Cir. 2013).
To succeed on a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence, a movant must allege "(1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid." Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Movant argues that his conviction was unlawful because there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Movant claims that the evidence was insufficient because it showed only that he agreed to play the role of a "gun man" who would facilitate the robbery, but would be uninvolved in possessing or selling the drugs. Movant also argues that he never entered the location where the arrest took place, and therefore took no step towards the underlying offense of robbery, "which would set the course of a true possession with the intent to distribute cocaine." Relatedly, Movant suggests that there could be no attempted robbery because the "stash house" to be robbed was of an unknown location and was, in fact, fictitious.
The Sixth Circuit held on direct appeal that sufficient evidence supported Movant's conviction. McGee, 510 F. App'x at 382. Movant's present challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence therefore fails.
Movant alleges a violation of his constitutional right to counsel, "an error of constitutional magnitude." See Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2003)). This claim is exempted from the general rule barring a court from considering, on a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C.§ 2255, arguments not raised on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). In any event, Movant raised an argument based in the ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; the Sixth Circuit held that the arguments should be addressed in collateral proceedings such as these. McGee, 510 F. App'x at 382.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Movant must show that his counsel rendered deficient performance and thereby prejudiced Movant's defense so as to render the outcome of the proceedings unreliable. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Movant identifies many alleged deficiencies in his counsel's performance. The Court will address them in turn.
Movant claims that his counsel told him he would face no more than ten years of imprisonment, thereby failing to inform him of a seventeen-year mandatory minimum sentence. However, Movant is mistaken; though Movant was sentenced to seventeen years of imprisonment, the mandatory minimum was only ten years. In essence, then, Movant's claim is that his counsel was deficient for portraying his minimum ten-year sentence as a maximum ten-year sentence.
This argument fails. On the first day of trial, and before the trial began, both government counsel and Movant's counsel stated on the record that the charge carried a ten-year mandatory minimum. The Court asked Movant to confirm that he understood the minimum sentence and that he faced the possibility of a sentence of life imprisonment. Movant confirmed that he understood both and that he nevertheless chose to proceed to trial. Thus, Movant cannot show that his counsel failed to inform him of the ten-year mandatory minimum or that he was prejudiced by such a failure.
Movant argues that his counsel did not effectively contest the admission of evidence concerning an uncharged robbery, which the Court—after initially ruling otherwise—admitted into evidence because it was intrinsic to the charged conspiracy. However, Movant's counsel did challenge the admission of this evidence. The Court simply rejected counsel's argument. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Court's admission of the evidence on appeal, holding that it was not an abuse of discretion. McGee, 510 F. App'x at 381. Movant does not specify any way in which his counsel's challenge to the evidence was deficient. This argument therefore fails.
Movant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert Movant's right of allocution at sentencing, and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the denial of this right as an issue on direct appeal. Movant appears to be invoking Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)'s requirement that the Court, before imposing sentence, give the defendant's attorney a chance to speak on the defendant's behalf and personally address the defendant to allow him to speak in favor of mitigating his sentence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A). However, Movant does not explain how the Court failed to meet this requirement. Movant's counsel argued on his behalf at the sentencing hearing. The Court personally addressed Movant at the sentencing hearing to ask what he had to say on his own behalf, and he responded that he had nothing to say. Since Movant was afforded his right to allocution, he has not established that his counsel was ineffective for failing to enforce that right.
Movant faults his counsel for failing to argue the affirmative defense of withdrawal from the alleged conspiracy. However, in the process of holding that sufficient evidence supported Movant's conviction, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Movant's act of driving away from the robbery (after the police announced themselves) was a "mere cessation" of criminal activity rather than an affirmative withdrawal. McGee, 510 F. App'x at 382 (citing United States v. Cox, 565 F.3d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir. 2009)). Movant therefore cannot establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to argue that driving away constituted withdrawal.
Movant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to determine Movant's competency to stand trial. "A defendant is competent to stand trial if he has `a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him' and `has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.'" United States v. Heard, 762 F.3d 538, 541 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam)). Aside from a passing reference to his "low mental capacity," Movant does not suggest that he was incompetent to stand trial, let alone that he exhibited signs of incompetence sufficient to render his counsel's performance deficient for failure to request a competency hearing. Moreover, even in the absence of a motion by Movant's counsel, the Court was required to hold a competency hearing on its own motion if faced with reasonable cause to believe that Movant was incompetent to stand trial. Id. The Court did not order a competency hearing because it did not discern reasonable cause to doubt Movant's competency—suggesting that even if counsel had requested a competency hearing, it would not have changed the outcome. This argument fails.
Movant asserts that his counsel should have objected to the admission of unspecified out-of-court statements by his co-defendants without cross examination and challenged Defendant Porter's competency as a witness. Movant does not explain why his counsel should have done these things. He has therefore forfeited these arguments for failure to develop their substance. E.g., Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601, 618 n.9 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Movant faults his counsel for failing to argue that government agent Nether induced Movant's participation in a conspiracy that he had no predisposition to join, entitling him to an entrapment instruction. Movant's reasoning seems to be that the evidence supported his predisposition to commit home invasion only, because the government's confidential informant informed Nether only of Movant's involvement in home invasions. Thus, the argument goes, Movant could have proved he was not predisposed to join the conspiracy proposed by Nether, since it involved a target crime other than the only crime Movant was known to have committed on his own initiative. However, "the ready commission of the criminal act amply demonstrates the defendant's predisposition." United States v. Hammadi, 737 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1993)). Regardless of whether Movant had committed a robbery tied to drug trafficking before, he showed a predisposition to do so by agreeing to Nether's proposed conspiracy, and attempting to carry it out, without hesitation. Because the entrapment defense that Movant envisions is meritless, he cannot show that his counsel was deficient for failing to press it.
Movant argues that his counsel should have objected at sentencing to the Court's consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors on the grounds that the Court considered "just one or two" of the factors and not all of them. On direct appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the Court followed the factors and reached a sentence that was not substantively unreasonable. McGee, 510 Fed. App'x at 383. Accordingly, Movant has not shown that his counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to object to the Court's consideration of the factors, or that such an objection might have changed the outcome.
Under the doctrine of procedural default, a defendant who has failed to raise an issue on direct appeal is generally barred from raising the issue via a motion under § 2255 unless he can demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse his failure to raise it on direct appeal. Huff v. United States, 734 F.3d 600, 605-06 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Elzy v. United States, 205 F.3d 882, 884 (6th Cir. 2000)). Movant attempts to raise several issues that he did not raise on direct appeal. He argues that the Court should have provided additional jury instructions; that the Court erred by failing to make a specific finding that Movant, rather than the conspiracy, was accountable for a particular quantity of drugs; and that the Court erroneously applied a firearm enhancement at sentencing. He does not attempt to show cause for his failure to raise these issues on direct appeal. Accordingly, the Court holds that these arguments are barred by the doctrine of procedural default.
For the reasons stated above, the Court will deny Movant's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Movant's current 151-month sentence will remain intact. Further, Movant has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Thus, the Court will not grant Movant a certificate of appealability. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Accordingly,