LAURIE SMITH CAMP, Chief District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Supplement Pending § 3582(c)(2) in Light of Recent Supreme Court Decision in Johnson v. Untied States (Filing No. 113), submitted by Defendant Diablo S. William ("William"), which references William's previously filed Motion to Reduce Sentence (Filing No. 111) pursuant USSC Amendment 782. William was not eligible for a reduction pursuant to Amendment 782 because of his career offender status, and Filing No. 111 was denied by this Court's Order at Filing No. 118. The Court now liberally construes Filing No. 113 as a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody
Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts requires initial review of a defendant's § 2255 motion. Rule 4(b) states:
In William's pending § 2255 Motion, he asserts that his sentence should be reversed and his case remanded for resentencing pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). In Johnson, the Supreme Court determined that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (the "Act") was unconstitutionally vague, and therefore void. Recently, the Supreme Court held in Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2016 WL 1551144 (April 18, 2016), the rule announced in Johnson was a new substantive rule with retroactive effect in cases on collateral review. Therefore, the Court will now conduct its initial review of William's § 2255 Motion.
A review of the Defendant's Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") ("Filing No. 51) reveals that William was determined to be a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines, due to two prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses and/or crimes of violence, i.e., delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine) and robbery. Filing No. 51 at ¶¶ 43, 46. Assuming, without deciding, that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), and that such application has retroactive effect, William's argument is still without merit. The void-for-vagueness principle articulated by the Supreme Court in Johnson has no application to drug trafficking offenses, and William's conviction for robbery under Nebraska law was pursuant to the "force" clause of the Guideline, § 4B.1.2(a)(1).
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: