U.S. v. Mason, 8:17CR363. (2018)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20180522a07
Visitors: 36
Filed: May 21, 2018
Latest Update: May 21, 2018
Summary: ORDER SUSAN M. BAZIS , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on the Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [24]. Defendant is facing charges in another district and wishes to have the case resolved prior to trial in this matter. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue Trial [24] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for June 4, 2018, is continued to August 6, 2018. 2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the en
Summary: ORDER SUSAN M. BAZIS , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on the Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [24]. Defendant is facing charges in another district and wishes to have the case resolved prior to trial in this matter. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue Trial [24] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for June 4, 2018, is continued to August 6, 2018. 2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the end..
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ORDER
SUSAN M. BAZIS, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on the Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [24]. Defendant is facing charges in another district and wishes to have the case resolved prior to trial in this matter. For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue Trial [24] is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for June 4, 2018, is continued to August 6, 2018.
2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and August 6, 2018, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
