U.S. v. VELASQUEZ-LOPEZ, 8:13CR381. (2014)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20140717b14
Visitors: 23
Filed: Jul. 16, 2014
Latest Update: Jul. 16, 2014
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [59] as counsel need additional time to explore plea negotiations. The defendant has previously complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). Barring extraordinary circumstances, there will be no further continuances of this matter. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [59] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for July 22, 2014 is continued to
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [59] as counsel need additional time to explore plea negotiations. The defendant has previously complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). Barring extraordinary circumstances, there will be no further continuances of this matter. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [59] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for July 22, 2014 is continued to S..
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ORDER
F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [59] as counsel need additional time to explore plea negotiations. The defendant has previously complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). Barring extraordinary circumstances, there will be no further continuances of this matter. For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [59] is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for July 22, 2014 is continued to September 9, 2014.
2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and September 9, 2014, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
