ORDER DENYING MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY DEADLINES

(Docket No. 25)

NANCY J. KOPPE, Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's emergency motion to extend various discovery deadlines. Docket No. 25. The Court shortened the briefing schedule so that the motion could be decided on an expedited schedule. Docket No. 27. Defendant filed a response in opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket Nos. 28, 29. The Court finds the matter properly resolved without oral argument. See Local Rule 78-2. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is hereby DENIED.

I. STANDARDS

"A scheduling order is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril. The district court's decision to honor the terms of its binding scheduling order does not simply exalt procedural technicalities over the merits of [the parties'] case. Disregard of the order would undermine the court's ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the litigation, and reward the indolent and the cavalier." Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

A motion to extend deadlines in the Court's scheduling order must be supported by a showing of "good cause" for the extension. Local Rule 26-4; see also Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608-09.1 The good cause inquiry focuses primarily on the movant's diligence. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 2000). Good cause to extend a discovery deadline exists "if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. While prejudice to the opposing party may also be considered, where the movant "fail[s] to show diligence, `the inquiry should end.'" Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609). The Court has broad discretion in supervising the pretrial phase of litigation. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002).

In addition, requests to extend a discovery deadline filed less than 21 days before the expiration of that particular deadline must be supported by a showing of excusable neglect. See Local Rule 26-4.2 The Ninth Circuit has held that "the determination of whether neglect is excusable is an equitable one that depends on at least four factors: (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith." Bateman v. U.S. Postal Service, 231 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff filed the pending motion to extend on July 25, 2013. Plaintiff seeks to extend, inter alia, the following deadlines: (1) to amend pleadings, which expired on May 2, 2013; (2) to disclose experts, which expired on May 31, 2013; (3) to disclose rebuttal experts, which expired on July 1, 2013; and (4) the discovery cut-off, which is set to expire on July 31, 2013. See, e.g., Mot. at 13. As noted above, the Court's initial inquiry into whether these deadlines should be extended is the diligence of the movant.

It is clear that Plaintiff has not been diligently conducting discovery. The only discovery completed by Plaintiff to date is serving initial disclosures and supplemental disclosures, as well as responding to two discovery requests from Defendant. See Mot. at 10 (listing discovery completed). Plaintiff candidly explains the situation by stating that attorneys at the law firm representing her were not diligent in pursuing discovery. See, e.g., Reply at 5 (acknowledging "shortcomings caused by a lack of diligence from [the firm's] prior attorney's lack of work").3 Having reviewed the materials submitted, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown the diligence required for a finding of "good cause." This ends the Court's inquiry into whether an extension should be granted. See Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1295.

Plaintiff attempts to avoid this conclusion by asserting that "good cause" exists because Plaintiff herself should not be prejudiced by the failings of her attorneys. See Reply at 4-5. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected that contention. See, e.g., Toth v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 862 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1988) ("There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of [a party's] claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client. [The party] voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in this action, and he cannot now avoid the consequence of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent." (quoting Link v. Wabash RR Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)).4

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed more fully above, Plaintiff's motion to extend discovery deadlines is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.