ROBERT C. JONES, District Judge.
Before the court is a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, submitted by Kenneth McClelland, a Nevada state prisoner (ECF No. 1-1). He has now paid the filing fee (see ECF No. 4).
Petitioner has also submitted a motion for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 1-2). There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel for a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir.1993). The decision to appoint counsel is generally discretionary. Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984). However, counsel must be appointed if the complexities of the case are such that denial of counsel would amount to a denial of due process, and where the petitioner is a person of such limited education as to be incapable of fairly presenting his claims. See Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196; see also Hawkins v. Bennett, 423 F.2d 948 (8th Cir.1970). The petition on file in this action appears sufficiently clear in presenting the issues that petitioner wishes to raise. Counsel is not justified at this time.
Next, it appears from the petition that it was submitted outside the applicable limitations period and may be subject to dismissal on that basis.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year time limitation can run from the date on which a petitioner's judgment became final by conclusion of direct review, or the expiration of the time for seeking direct review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Further, a properly filed petition for state postconviction relief can toll the period of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
According to the habeas petition, petitioner's judgment of conviction was entered on January 12, 2010. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on July 7, 2010. McClelland states that the district court denied his first state habeas petition on December 6, 2011 and that his counsel inadvertently failed to file an appeal. McClelland attaches a Nevada Supreme Court order affirming the denial of his second state postconviction petition, which he filed pro se. The order is dated January 15, 2015 and indicates that McClelland filed the second state petition on May 14, 2014. As it was filed nearly four years after the issuance of remitter on direct appeal, the state supreme court concluded that the second petition was untimely. Remittitur issued February 10, 2015. The instant federal habeas petition was handed to a correctional officer for mailing on August 25, 2015. Thus the federal petition was filed well beyond the one-year time limitation contained in the statute, which would have run from the expiration of McClelland's time to appeal his first state petition.
Petitioner may be entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period if he can establish that he diligently pursued his right and some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. See Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds, Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The petitioner will be given the opportunity to show that either the instant petition was not filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations, or that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the time limitation.