C.W. HOFFMAN, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is a request for extradition under 18 U.S.C § 3184 brought by the Government of Germany ("Germany") against Mohammed Safdar Gohir ("Gohir"). Germany seeks the extradition of Gohir for his alleged participation in a tax fraud scheme involving value added taxes ("VAT"). Pursuant to the extradition treaty between the United States (or "the Government") and Germany, the United States acts on behalf of Germany in this matter. See Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Germany.
On May 4, 2014, the United States submitted a complaint for provisional arrest with a view towards the extradition of Gohir, at the request of Germany to fulfill the United States' treaty obligation to Germany. See Compl. at ¶ 1. The complaint indicates that the treaty "provides in article 16 for the provisional arrest and detention of alleged fugitives pending the submission of a formal request for extradition and supporting documents[.]" Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. The complaint also indicates that "the Government of Germany has asked the United States for the provisional arrest of [Gohir] with a view towards his extradition[.]" Id. ¶ 4. The complaint alleges that, based on "the information provided by the requesting state," an arrest warrant was issued in Germany on May 4, 2014 "by the District Court of Frankfurt, at Frankfurt, Germany[.]" Id. ¶ 5. The complaint states that Gohir "was charged with jointly-committed tax evasion . . . in violation of Fiscal Code of Germany, Section 370, subsection 1 no. 1, subsection 3 nos. 2 and 5, Sections 149 and 150, subsection 2, and 34, involving tax evasion; and in violation of Sections 25 subsection 2, and 53 of the German Criminal Code, for offenses committed within the jurisdiction of Germany[.]" Id. The complaint sets forth extensive factual allegations (approximately 11 pages) underlying the issuance of the warrant in Germany. Id ¶ 6, at 2-12. The complaint also references the evidence in this case, which includes: (1) accounting documents, (2) confessed statements of others convicted on similar charges implicating Gohir, (3) positive photographic identification of Gohir by witnesses, (4) seized communications between the persons accused and others, and (5) witness statements. Id. at 11:19-12:10. The complaint notes that the charges are extraditable under Article 2 of the extradition treaty, and that Germany "has represented that it will submit a formal request for extradition, supported by the documents specified in the treaty, within the time required under the treaty[.]" Id. ¶¶ 7, 9. After reviewing the complaint, this Court determined the terms of the extradition treaty between the United States and Germany, and because provisional arrest had been met, an arrest warrant was issued.
On May 4, 2014, the U. S. Marshal Service arrested Gohir at McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas. Following a requested continuance, on May 6, 2014, Gohir was arraigned on the complaint, and counsel moved for bail. The Court announced its intent to release Gohir on his own recognizance and the government requested a stay, which was granted, to May 12, 2014. The issues regarding bail and compliance with treaty obligations were extensively addressed in Gohir's Brief on Bail and Detention (#8), filed May 9, 2014; the Government's Response and Memorandum in Opposition to Bail (#9), filed May 9, 2014; and Gohir's Reply Brief (#11), filed May 12, 2014. After considering the briefs, along with the parties' arguments raised at the hearings in this matter, the Court ordered Gohir detained pending further proceedings. On May 13, 2014, Gohir's counsel appealed the May 12, 2014 detention order to the district judge, which was denied on May 14, 2014. (Gohir v. United States, Case no. 2:14-cv-748 JCM-CWH, Doc. 1).
Having received the extradition documents, this Court now determines whether it is "sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention." 18 U.S.C. § 3184. If the Court finds the evidence sufficient, it must "certify the same" to the U.S. Secretary of State, who decides whether to surrender the fugitive "according to the treaty." Id. The Court conducted a hearing under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 on January 26, 2015. No testimony or other evidence was offered other than Court Exhibit 1, but Gohir presented extensive arguments regarding the matter.
Extradition from the United States is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3184, which confers jurisdiction on "any justice or judge of the United States," or any authorized magistrate judge, to conduct an extradition hearing under the relevant extradition treaty between the United States and the requesting nation. The purpose of the extradition hearing is to determine whether a person arrested pursuant to a complaint in the United States on behalf of a foreign government is subject to surrender to the requesting country under the terms of the pertinent treaty and relevant law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184; In re Extradition Lanzani, No. CV 09-07166-GAF (MLG), 2010 WL 625351, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2010).
To surrender the person to the requesting country, the Court must determine that each of the following requirements have been met: (1) the extradition magistrate has jurisdiction to conduct the extradition proceedings; (2) the extradition magistrate has jurisdiction over the fugitive; (3) an extradition treaty is in full force and effect; (4) the crime is extraditable; (5) there is probable cause to believe that the individual appearing before the magistrate judge has committed the crimes alleged by the requesting nation; and (6) there are no applicable treaty provisions that bar the extradition for any of the charged offenses. See Lanzani, 2010 WL 625351, at *4; see also Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925).
If the requirements are met, the extradition magistrate judge must certify the individual as extraditable to the U.S. Secretary of State and issue a warrant of commitment. See Blaxland v. Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 323 F.3d 1198, 1208 (9th Cir. 2003). Once such a certification has been made, "it is the Secretary of State, representing the executive branch, who determines whether to surrender the fugitive." Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Extradition is a matter of foreign policy entirely within the discretion of the executive branch, and "the executive branch's ultimate decision on extradition may be based on a variety of grounds, ranging from individual circumstances, to foreign policy concerns, to political exigencies." Blaxland, 323 F.3d at 1208. Thus, the authority of the extradition magistrate is limited to the judicial determination required by § 3184. In other words, the magistrate judge "has no discretionary decision to make." Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997).
In the present case, the parties do not dispute the following: the existence of an extradition treaty, that Gohir is the person sought by Germany, that the offense charged is extraditable, that documents were properly presented, and there are no treaty bars to extradition. According to Gohir, the issues in dispute are whether: (1) the offense charged satisfies the requirement of "double criminality," (2) there is sufficient and credible evidence to support probable cause to believe the relator committed the offenses charged, and (3) treaty requirements and statutory procedures were observed. The Court now determines whether the present case satisfies the Lanzani factors while also taking into account the issues in dispute.
Section 3184 provides that extradition proceedings may be conducted by, among others, any magistrate judge authorized by a court of the United States. Nevada Local Rule 1B 1-9(u) also provides that a magistrate judge is authorized to perform any additional duties not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. In light of this authority, and given that Gohir does not dispute this Court's jurisdiction over the present matter, the Court finds it has jurisdiction to conduct extradition proceedings in the instant case.
It is well settled that a court has jurisdiction over a fugitive found within its jurisdictional boundaries. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (A court may, upon complaint made under oath charging any person found within that court's jurisdiction, issue a warrant for the apprehension of the person charged). Because Gohir is found within this Court's boundaries, and Gohir admits he is the person sought by Germany, this Court has jurisdiction over Gohir.
The Government has produced an affidavit from the Office of the Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of State attesting that there is a treaty between the United States and the Republic of Germany in full force and effect. Gohir makes no argument to the contrary. As such, the U.S. Department of State's determination is entitled to deference from this Court. See Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902); Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1996); Court Exhibit 1.
Article 1 of the Treaty provides for the return of fugitives charged with or convicted of an "extraditable offense," as that term is defined in Article 2 of the Treaty. Under the Appendix to the Treaty, TIAS 9785, item 27, "Offenses relating to willful evasion of taxes and duties" are extraditable. Under Article 2(2), "Extradition shall be granted in respect of an extraditable offense (a) For prosecution, if the offense is punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period exceeding one year. . ." In other words, the offense must be a felony in the United States.
"[U]nder the doctrine of `dual criminality,' an accused person can be extradited only if the conduct complained of is considered criminal by the jurisprudence or the laws of both the requesting and requested nations." Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 1986). The dual criminality principle is incorporated into Article 2(1) of the Treaty, as amended, which states that:
Consequently, the Court examines the description of criminal conduct provided by Germany to determine whether that conduct would be criminal under U.S. law.
A requesting country is neither obligated to produce evidence of all elements of a criminal offense, nor required to establish that its crimes are identical to those found in the United States. Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 613, 615 (1916). Rather, an adequate extradition proceeding must include in its record a specific delineation, as to each charge, of the legal theories under the requesting country's laws by which the accused's conduct is alleged to constitute an extraditable offense, together with an identification of the corresponding offenses in this country relied on to show that the "dual criminality" requirement has been met. See Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Clarey v. Gregg, 138 F.3d 764, 765 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[D]ifferences between statutes aimed at the same category of conduct do not defeat dual criminality."). "[I]t is enough that the conduct involved is criminal in both countries." Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1988).
The documents submitted by Germany
The German government has also provided the text of Section 25, subsection 2, and Section 53, of the German Criminal Code, which explains the criminal liability of actors and co-actors. Section 25 of the German Criminal Code, Principals, provides:
Similar to the German statute, 18 U.S.C § 2 provides:
Section 25 of the German Criminal Code therefore establishes criminal liability for principals, as does United States law under 18 U.S.C. § 2.
The basis for the allegation of tax evasion against Gohir is the violation of Section 370 of the German Tax Code, Tax Evasion which provides, in pertinent part:
The German Tax Code thereby imposes a criminal penalty on one who "Furnishes the revenue authorities or other authorities with incorrect or incomplete particulars concerning matters of substantial significance for taxation." As set forth below, United States law similarly imposes a criminal penalty on one who "willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax," or fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay over such tax." Specifically, 26 U.S.C. § 7201 provides:
Moreover, 26 U.S.C. § 7202 provides:
The Court finds that the allegation of a violation of Section 370 subsection 1, no.1 of the German Tax Code, Tax Evasion, meets the "dual criminality" requirement because it is an offense punishable under the law of Germany, and is also a felony offense punishable under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 and 7202 of the laws of the United States. The elements of the offenses under the laws of both countries appear to be similar and need not be identical for the duality analysis. See Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U.S., at 615. It is enough that the conduct involved is criminal in both countries." In re Russell, 789 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1986). Dual criminality exists if the "essential character" of the acts criminalized by the laws of each country are the same and if the laws are "substantially analogous." Theron v. United States Marshal, 832 F.2d 492, 496 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). The Court so finds.
Additionally, section 150 of the German Tax Code, Format and Contents of Tax Returns provides, in pertinent part:
The Court notes that 26 U.S.C. § 7206 also provides in pertinent part that it is a felony to willfully make and subscribe a return which one does not believe is true:
Section 370, subsections 3, nos. 2 and 5, further describe certain types of tax evasion which are alleged in this case, and provide the potential penalty for tax evasion "in particularly serious circumstances," that is, if a person abuses his authority as a public official,
Sections 149, 150, Section 34, of the Fiscal Code of Germany and sections 13, 15, and 18 of the German VAT Act
Germany alleges that Gohir violated its tax evasion laws during the period October 2009 to April 2010. Gohir agrees that he is the person sought by Germany, but contends that extradition should be denied because Germany has failed to present competent evidence establishing probable cause that he committed the alleged crime.
An extradition magistrate "does not weigh conflicting evidence and make factual determinations." Quinn, 783 F.2d at 815. The extradition proceeding "is designed only to trigger the start of criminal proceedings against an accused; guilt remains to be determined in the courts of the demanding country." Valencia v. Limbs, 655 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir. 1981). The Court must base a finding of probable cause on competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922). The committing Court's function is merely to determine whether there is "any evidence warranting the finding that there was a reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty." Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); see also Mirchandani v. United States, 836 F.2d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1988). Probable cause exists when evidence is sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested. United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). "The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances." Rodis v. City & County of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
The rules of evidence, other than with respect to privilege, do not apply in extradition proceedings. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3); Emami v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., `834 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1987) ("In the Ninth Circuit it has been repeatedly held that hearsay evidence that would be inadmissable for other purposes is admissible in extradition proceedings."). The extradition court's "findings" are based almost entirely on affidavits, depositions, and other documentary evidence supplied by the requesting government. See 18 U.S.C. § 3190 ("Depositions, warrants, or other papers or copies thereof shall be received and admitted as evidence"). To support a finding of probable cause, an affidavit must contain factual support for the affiant's conclusions and either an assertion that the affiant speaks from personal knowledge or a statement of the sources for the affiant's belief, along with the circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the sources were reliable and credible. In re Petition of France for Extradition of Sauvage, 819 F.Supp. 896, 903 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
The basis for Germany's case is through a sworn statement by Public Prosecutor Konstantinos Passialis ("Prosecutor Passialis"), who is responsible for the prosecution of extensive and serious tax offenses, particularly in the areas of organized VAT crimes. Gohir has not challenged the authenticity of Prosecutor Passialis' affidavit.
Article 29(a) of the Treaty sets forth the authentication requirements. Documents emanating from Germany are authenticated if they "are signed by a [German] judge or competent officer, are authenticated by the official seal of the Federal Minister of Justice, and are certified by the competent diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in the Federal Republic of Germany." Article 29(a). Prosecutor Passialis provided a summary of statements of witnesses allegedly involved in the crime, along with analysis and reports regarding documentary evidence seized in this matter. Law enforcement summaries of statements of witnesses and the results of the investigation are competent evidence in extradition proceedings. Zanazanian v. United States, 729 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1984). The information contained in Prosecutor Passialis's statements, as summarized below, form the basis for this Court's findings.
Prosecutor Passilis indicated that on April 28, 2010, searches, seizures and arrests took place in twelve countries across Europe, based on approximately 400 search warrants issued by the local court of Frankfurt am Main, and resulting in seven arrest warrants and numerous assets being seized. Five persons were detained in Germany and other parts of Europe. A review of the transaction data collected by the emission registries and the booking documents seized by tax investigation officers showed that all allowances traded by MP Solutions FZE were traded by German "missing traders" to the companies Tageslicht Umweltssysteme GmbH, Energie Intelligenz GmbH, Roter Stern GmbH, and Vektor Energie GmbH, with the allowances later sold almost exclusively to DeutcheBank, AG.
Germany collects revenue from VAT. Every time a business buys a good, it is charged an input tax, and every time it sells a good, it charges the customer an output tax. Businesses are expected to pass the net VAT they collect (output tax minus the input tax) to the German government. Exports of goods are tax free, and exporters are able to reclaim any input tax charged by the buyer abroad from the German government because there is no output tax on exports within the European Union.
Prosecutor Passialis's sworn testimony alleges that a "VAT fraud chain" is a scheme by which individuals illicitly recover VAT from the German government as "loot," and then divide the proceeds among members of the gang. Between approximately August 2009 and May 2010, Gohir was the leader of a gang, along with co-defendants Asraf Muhammad ("Muhammad") and Mobeel Iqbal ("Iqbal") participating as members of that gang. The gang was formed for the purpose of establishing a VAT carousel fraud scheme by means of companies systematically connected by a network trading in carbon dioxide emission allowances. Using these companies, Gohir and his co-defendants evaded turnover taxes totaling EUR 136,563,336. Gohir and his co-defendants were allegedly responsible for the companies named Vektor Energie, Roter Stern, Tageslicht Umweltssysteme, and Energie Intelligenz.
According to Prosecutor Passialis, while Gohir led the gang, Mohammad and Iqbal were his closest confidants within that gang. The gang initiated the VAT chain fraud scheme by creating the fraud chains and steering the companies within this fraud chain. Records indicate that emission allowances were sometimes traded through VAT fraud chains extremely quickly with a view to evading taxes. At the beginning of such a chain, the carbon dioxide emission allowances were bought by natural persons or companies abroad via companies in Germany without any VAT paid. The companies that imported the emission allowances to Germany and resold them to domestic companies (i.e., "missing traders") failed to comply with their obligations by not filing advance turnover tax returns, or filing incorrect turnover tax returns and issuing invoices with openly listed turnover taxes to the domestic buyers of the allowances (i.e., "buffers") who were meant to use the turnover taxes when claiming input taxes.
Records indicate the companies named 7 Days Import & Export UG, AK Weltweit Handel GmbH, Bauelemente Hansa GmbH, Bavaria Finanzvermittlungs AG, Blue Pearl Trading GmbH, DCS Diamond Communications Systems GmbH, DGU Unternehmensberatung GmbH, and STARTEAK GmbH were the first domestic companies involved in the invoice chain as "missing traders," and issued invoices for the transfer of emission allowances with turnover taxes listed therein. These companies neither filed advance turnover tax returns, nor paid turnover taxes.
In accordance with the alleged joint criminal plan pursued by the perpetrators cooperating in a chain of services, the buffers included within the trade chain concealed the turnover tax fraud chain. Inconspicuous companies from a tax-related point of view were usually involved, which apparently complied with their obligations to declare and pay taxes. The advance turnover tax returns filed by these companies usually stated low turnover taxes for payment as far as sales and purchase prices were concerned. The buffers sold the emission allowances within this fraud chain to companies that, in turn, at the end of the fraud chain, exported the emission allowances to other European countries (i.e., "distributors").
The companies Vektor Energie, Roter Stern, Tageslicht Umweltssysteme, and Energie Intelligenz acted as buffers within the invoice chain. In this context, the companies Tageslicht Umweltssysteme and Energie Intelligenz neither acted as first buffers within the invoice chain, i.e., directly after the missing traders, nor as final buffers, i.e., immediately before the distributors. Rather, they acted between other buffers. However, the companies Vektor Energie and Roter Stern acted as final buffers within the invoice chain and immediately supplied the distributor.
According to Prosecutor Passialis, the distributor in the present case, almost exclusively DeutcheBank AG, in turn received from these business transactions legal and high input tax refund claims without turnover taxes having to be paid to tax authorities, and these claims, through payment of turnover tax to the final buffer before the distributor, were obtained by the organizers of the trade chain as profits or used for the new acquisition of emission allowances abroad. DeutcheBank transferred the emissions allowances acquired from the VAT fraud chains to DeutcheBank, London, which in turn sold the allowances to companies with registered offices outside Germany. It was from these sales transactions that DeutcheBank, Frankfurt claimed input tax refunds from the tax authorities of Hessen within the three-digit million range.
Prosecutor Passialis indicated that each time the emission allowances went through the trade chains, the trade chains served no other economic purpose than to allow participants in the trade chain to evade turnover taxes by unjustly claiming input taxes based on the invoices issued to them. The companies Vektor Energie, Roter Stern, Tageslicht Umweltssysteme, and Energie Intelligenz were formed only for this purpose.
Gohir and his co-defendants were allegedly acting as the top hierarchy of a professionally organized gang. Gohir was alleged to be the boss of the gang, and the person behind and in control of the VAT scheme. Through his co-defendants Muhammad and Iqbal, Gohir controlled the central office in Dubai, which consisted of MP Solutions FZE and Vision Marketing & Management FZCO. It was in Dubai that Gohir controlled the entire VAT fraud chain, along with the other four companies.
Prosecutor Passialis alleges that the company named MP Solutions served to feed emission allowances in the trade chain to the companies Vektor Energie, Roter Stern, Tageslicht Umweltssysteme, and Energie Intelligenz. In agreement with Gohir, Muhammad, who was also managing director of MP Solutions, and Iqbal, director of IT, controlled the entire trade volume and flow of emission allowances within the entire trade chain through MP Solutions. Gohir acted behind the scenes and made strategic decisions, but sometimes involved himself in daily decisions.
Together with Iqbal and Muhammad, Gohir controlled the payment transactions within the trade chain using bank accounts at First Bancorp Ltd. Gohir and his co-defendants created a payment platform in an offshore state where they had access to funds obtained from the VAT chain fraud because payments by the companies involved were usually transferred to the offshore accounts at First Bancorp Ltd.
Gohir, acting jointly with Muhammad and Iqbal, also used other persons for subordinate activities, such as Mudasser Rafiz ("Mad"), who acted upon their orders and recruited persons to serve as managing directors of the companies involved in Germany.
All emission certificates acquired during the period of the offenses by Gohir, Muhammad, and Iqbal originated in this chain of invoices from one of the missing traders, which means that the input tax claimed based on the respective purchase invoices was claimed illegitimately. Because Gohir's co-defendants were aware that the companies Vektor Energie, Roter Stern, Tageslicht Umweltssysteme, and Energie Intelligenz were involved in the VAT fraud chains, they did not claim input taxes based on the purchase invoices received by these companies.
Prosecutor Passialis' statements indicate that accounting documents of the four companies, specifically, outgoing invoices, incoming invoices, credit notes in connection with transactions in the emissions trade, and overviews of the emission trade accounts of Energie Intelligenz and Danish Emission Trading Registry, which were analyzed by the officers of tax investigation authorities, showed that Energie Intelligenz, Vektor Energie, Tageslicht Umweltssysteme, and Roter Stern evaded taxes in the amounts described. This Court notes that such evidence is hearsay, but nevertheless may be considered. Zanazanian v. United States, 729 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1984) (To eliminate hearsay from extradition proceedings would run counter to one of the primary objectives of bilateral extradition treaties, namely, "to obviate the necessity of confronting the accused with the witnesses against him; . . . [Requiring] the demanding government to send its citizens to another country to institute legal proceedings would defeat the whole object of the treaty."). Prosecutor Passialis also indicated that in three separate trials, the Frankfurt Court found that the claim fraud existed, and entered judgments on December 21, 2011, April 15, 2014, and April 24, 2014. Eight individuals have been convicted in these trials. The Frankfurt Court purportedly made findings regarding the roles of co-actors Muhammad and Iqbal. In particular, the Frankfurt Court found that Muhammad and Iqbal controlled the trading volume and channels of the allowances via MP Solutions within the fraudulent trading scheme.
This Court now considers evidence provided by Prosecutor Passialis regarding each of the four companies controlled by Gohir.
The Court reviewed examples, provided by Prosecutor Passialis, of numerous Skype communications and the wiretapped conversations of Gohir and others. Of particular note are the conversations on April 10, 2014 regarding information that Ijaz provided to the authorities about Gohir, which confirms Gohir's knowledge about the relationship between Ijaz and the tax evasion gang, and Gohir's concern about what Ijaz might have told the authorities about his role in that gang.
The Court finds there is probable cause to believe that Gohir has committed the offense of tax evasion, in violation of Section 370 of the German Tax Code, subsection (1). The primary evidence of tax evasion lies in the documents seized, reviewed, and summarized by German and other law enforcement officers, and presented by Prosecutor Passialis to this Court. The summaries include the date of the returns, the amount of turnover, input tax, payable VAT amounts, the amounts evaded, and statements that the documents which supported the returns were false.
At the hearing, Gohir's counsel argued extensively that the computations provided to the Court did not add up, but counsel also conceded that he did not have the returns or the invoices to verify his calculations. See e.g., Hearing transcript at 108-09 (#79). Of course, argument is not evidence, and the Court may not interpret German law. At an extradition hearing, Gohir could only have offered evidence that tends to explain the Government's case of probable cause. Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978).
The Court finds competent the evidence described by Prosecutor Passialis, specifically, that the tax authorities studied the seized documents and provided the analysis upon which Prosecutor Passialis relies. Germany, the country seeking extradition, is not required to produce all of its evidence at an extradition hearing, and it is not this Court's role to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Gohir. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 815 (The magistrate judge does not weigh conflicting evidence and make factual determinations; rather, the judge determines only whether there is competent evidence to support the belief that the accused has committed the charged offense.).
Prosecutor Passialis presented evidence of self-incriminating statements by Mir, Khan, Ijaz, and Ali indicating that Gohir, by himself and jointly with others, including Muhammad and Iqbal, in violation of Section 370 of the German Tax Code, furnished "the revenue authorities or other authorities with incorrect or incomplete particulars concerning matters of substantial significance for taxation." Self-incriminating statements of accomplices are sufficient to establish probable cause in an extradition hearing. Curreri v. Vice, 77 F.2d 130, 132 (9th Cir. 1935).
Counsel for Gohir argued the evidence fails to demonstrate that tax evasion acts alleged against Gohir were wilful, and therefore Gohir may not be extradited under the dual criminality requirement. This Court disagrees. There is probable cause to believe that Gohir and his co-actors knowingly submitted false invoices to claim input taxes as part of the VAT fraud scheme, and therefore wilfulness is sufficiently demonstrated by Gohir and his co-actors. To knowingly submit false returns would violate a known legal duty to submit truthful and accurate returns. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933) (Simple failure to maintain adequate records is not sufficient to sustain criminality); United States v. DeTar, 822 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1987) (For a felony conviction, there must be proof of willfulness in the sense of a specific intent to evade or defeat the tax or its payment.")
There is probable cause to believe that Sections 149, 150(2), and 34 were violated because the returns that were filed for the four companies reportedly were based upon knowingly false information. The submission of returns is presumably the responsibility of the managing directors, who were placed into their positions by, and under the control of, Gohir and his co-defendants. The Court further finds that there is probable cause to believe that the combined and repeated actions of the co-defendants were undertaken with the intent to evade VAT reporting and payment obligations. The evasion was wilful because the documentary evidence indicated that the input tax amounts from the invoices were falsely claimed, and the managing directors were put into place by Gohir and his co-defendants for that purpose. Because of the individual roles and close interrelationships of the various actors, the Court further finds there is probable cause to believe that Gohir committed the particularly more serious offense, under subsection (3), subsection 5, of acting "as a member of a group formed [and leading that group] for the purpose of repeatedly committing acts pursuant to subsection (1) above, [by] understating value-added taxes or excise duties or deriv[ing] unwarranted VAT or excise duty advantages," in violation of Section 370(1)(3)5.
Article 22(1) provides that a "a person who has been extradited under this Treaty shall not be proceeded against, sentenced, or detained with a view to carrying out a sentence or detention for any offense committed prior to his surrender other than that for which he was extradited." The Rule of Specialty is a doctrine based on international comity that prevents the country requesting the extradition of a fugitive from prosecuting the fugitive for crimes other than those for which he was extradited unless the country from which the fugitive was extradited consents to the prosecution. United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986).
Here, as discussed above, the Court has found that there is probable cause to believe that Gohir has committed the particularly serious offense of tax evasion of the VAT as part of a gang. The Court was unable, however, to identify any evidence regarding the aggravated offense of tax evasion by a public official who abuses his authority, in violation of Section 370, subsection 1(3) subsection 2, because it does not appear that Gohir, or any of his co-actors, is a public official. Accordingly, under the Rule of Specialty, the Court will not certify the prosecution of that aggravating factor.
Gohir challenged whether the U.S. Government had official authorization to request a provisional arrest warrant on May 4, 2014, and whether this Court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue a provisional arrest warrant. The Court previously analyzed these issues and found both that the arrest was appropriate and that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction. (#22). At the extradition hearing, Gohir again argued that the arrest warrant issued in Frankfurt, Germany, and used to support the complaint for provisional arrest, cannot form the basis for a provisional arrest warrant under the Treaty or 18 U.S.C. § 3184 because the request for a provisional arrest warrant was not made between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, as required under Article 16 of the treaty. Article 16(1) of the extradition treaty between the United States and Germany provides:
There is no dispute that this subsection authorizes provisional arrest
The requirements for provisional arrest are expressly set forth in Article 16(2) of the Treaty, which states:
Gohir's objection is directed toward the arrest warrant identified within the complaint and whether it issued from an appropriate source, not whether the complaint provides the requisite information as identified in Article 16(2). Article 16 clearly contemplates the viability of the arrest warrant identified within a complaint for provisional arrest, which is evaluated by reference to "paragraph 3(a) of Article 14[,]" and provides:
See Extradition Treaty, Article 14(3)(a). All that is required under Article 16 for provisional arrest is an application that a "warrant of arrest as mentioned in paragraph 14(3)(a)" exists. The term "warrant of arrest issued by a judge of the Requesting State" is not defined within the treaty, but Gohir concedes that the arrest warrant identified in the complaint was issued by a German judge. Gohir simply does not believe it was a judge with requisite authority. The issuing judge was, in Gohir's counsel's terms, a "low-level" judge. The treaty does not identify at what "level" of the judicial hierarchy within Germany the issuing judge must reside. It simply states that "a warrant of arrest issued by a judge of the Requesting State." There is no requirement anywhere within Article 16 or Article 14(3)(a) that the arrest warrant be issued by the Minister of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is sufficient that the arrest warrant exists, that it issued from a German judge, and that it is intended to make a request for extradition. The extradition papers indicate that a magistrate judge in Frankfurt issued an arrest warrant on May 2, 2014. The Court finds that the complaint for provisional arrest adequately sets forth the requirements for provisional arrest under Article 16 of the Treaty.
Gohir also objected that the request for provisional arrest was not made either through diplomatic channels or directly between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany. At a hearing on May 6, 2014, the Assistant United States Attorney representing the United States indicated that, based upon his discussions with the Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs, the provisional arrest had been made by officials in the German government. The Court found that the requirements of the Treaty had been met. Gohir continued to object at subsequent hearings that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this matter because no evidence had been provided of the official communication between the Republic of Germany and the United States.
At the extradition hearing on January 26, 2015, the Court was provided, for the first time, with an affidavit of Assistant United States Attorney Marcus Busch ("AUSA Busch"). See Court Exhibit 1. The affidavit had been referred to in the previously filed Writ of Habeas Corpus case before Chief Judge Navarro (Gohir v. Hoye, Case no. 2:14-cv-760 GMN-VCF, Doc. 26, "Government's Response to Fugitives Request for Rule 60 Relief). Apparently, through clerical error, the affidavit was not attached to the Government's Response in that case, and upon discovering that error, Gohir and this Court were provided the document in open court during the January 26, 2015 hearing on this matter.
AUSA Busch's affidavit states that, on May 4, 2014, the German Ministry of Justice through its Federal Office of Justice, requested Gohir's provisional arrest to the U.S. Central Authority by electronic mail from Dr. Karitzky, the head of Germany's Federal Office of Justice extradition office. The affidavit further indicates that the German government believed the need for the arrest was urgent because Gohir was scheduled to depart the United States to return to London on that day. The Court therefore finds that the request for provisional arrest was made directly between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, in satisfaction of Article 16. It is clear that at the time of the filing of the provisional arrest request, the Court had jurisdiction over this case. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., LP., 541 U.S. 567, 570-571 (2004) (Jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time the action is brought.). Accordingly, the Court finds it has subject matter jurisdiction.
Additionally, Gohir argues the absence of urgency justifying his provisional arrest because he was scheduled to return to London when he was arrested in Las Vegas on May 4, 2014. The complaint for provisional arrest indicated that Gohir would likely flee if he learned of the existence of the warrant for his arrest. See Compl. at ¶ 11. Prosecutor Passialis indicated that, on April 10, 2014, after the results of the investigations against Gohir were compiled by tax investigators, a tapped phone conversation of Gohir revealed that he was concerned, due to the detention of his co-actors who were directors of the various companies discussed herein, that he may have become the focus of the investigations. For this reason, Gohir discussed whether it might be better for him to "break away for some time." Prosecutor Passialis believed that may have meant fleeing to a country such as the United Arab Emirates, where Gohir is a resident of Dubai, and hiding out there because the United Arab Emirates has, so far, not extradited any individuals to Germany for a white collar crime. As a consequence, an arrest warrant was quickly requested by German authorities because the suspicion against Gohir had considerably increased, and there was probable cause to believe that he had committed the offenses, especially once Khan and Ijaz were convicted on April 15 and April 24, 2014, respectively. Based upon probable cause, the magistrate judge in Germany issued an arrest warrant on May 2, 2014. It is true, as argued by Gohir, that Gohir was returning to London on May 4, 2014 when he was arrested, but Gohir was not aware that the warrant had been issued. Had he been aware, he was certainly capable of immediately arranging travel to Dubai instead of London. Thus, the Court finds there was sufficient urgency to issue the provisional arrest warrant because it was reasonable to believe that Gohir might flee to Dubai in the near future.
Accordingly,
I, the undersigned Trial Attorney, being duly sworn, state on information and belief that the following is true and correct:
1. I, Marcus Busch, am a Trial Attorney with the United States Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, in Washington, D.C. I. have acted in this capacity since 2009. Previously, from 2005-2009, I was an Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas. Prior to my employment with the Department of Justice, I was in private practice in Texas from 1987-2005. Prior to private practice, I served as an Assistant District Attorney for Dallas County, Texas from 1982-1987.
2. I am the Department of Justice Trial Attorney assigned to extradition matters with the Federal Republic of Germany, and as such am familiar with U.S. — German extradition law and procedure. I am also familiar with the treaty documents in force and governing this extradition, specifically the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Extradition, U.S. ___ F.R.G., June 20,1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9785; the Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, U.S. ___ F.R.G., Oct. 21, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-6 (1987); and, the Second Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Extradition, U.S.-F.R.G., Apr. 18, 2006, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-14 (2006).
3. The treaty provides in Article 16 in the case of urgency for the provisional arrest and detention of alleged fugitives pending the submission of a faunal request for extradition and supporting documents. The treaty at Article 16 also provides for the direct communications between representatives of the central authorities with respect to such requests. Specifically for Germany, the Central Authority is its Ministry of Justice, as delegated to the Federal Office of Justice for extradition matters. For the United States, the Central Authority is the. Department of Justice, as delegated to the Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division. The Federal Office of Justice and the Office of International Affairs are direct counterparts and are in regular communication regarding extradition matters, principally by electronic mail.
4. In accordance with Article 16 of the treaty, on Sunday, May 4, 2014, the Central Authority of Germany requested that the United States provisionally arrest Mohammad Safdar Gohir ("Gohir") with a view towards his extradition. Specifically, on May 4, 2014, at 1:41 pm EDT (10:41 am PDT), the German Ministry of Justice through its Federal Office of Justice ("FOP), requested Gohir's provisional arrest to the United States Central Authority by electronic mail from Dr. Holger Karitzky to the Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division ("OIA"), to the attention of the undersigned. The request from Germany's Central Authority was urgent given that Gohir was scheduled to depart from Las Vegas McCarran International Airport on British Airways flight no. 2276 for London, England, at 3:25 pm PDT on May 4, 2014.
5. Just prior to the request by email for Gohir's provisional arrest, Dr. Kartizky, the head of the FOP s extradition office, and the undersigned, discussed the facts of the case, including the German arrest warrant and the extreme urgency of the matter. Dr. Karitzky's subsequent email included the documents discussed and necessary for provisional arrest, including: the German arrest warrant issued by the Local Court of Frankfurt, dated May 2, 2014; the English translation of the German arrest warrant; and, Germany's notice to international law enforcement authorities of the German arrest warrant for Gohir, also dated May 2, 2014. Additionally, earlier on Sunday, May 4, 2014, United States Secret Service Special Agent Matthew Westhoff, who is stationed in Germany as a Secret Service liaison, emailed to the undersigned a copy of the German arrest warrant and Gohir's passport obtained from German federal police officials.
6. Based on my experience, including my working relationship with Germany's FOJ on extradition matters since 2011, the use of the telephone and email on Sunday, May 4, 2014, to request provisional arrest was both sufficient and appropriate under Article 16 of the treaty. The submitted materials for the provisional arrest request included all of the prerequisite information required under Article 16 of the treaty. Critically, Germany had conveyed that a warrant of arrest existed for Gohir and that Germany intended to make a request for extradition. Moreover, Germany had provided the following information: the offenses for which extradition would be sought; the location where said offenses were committed; the description and nationality of the person sought; and, the factual basis in support of the offenses sufficient to justify an arrest warrant in the United States. Based upon this request and information, later on May 4, 2014, Assistant United States Attorney Roger Yang swore out a complaint at 11:57 am PDT (2:57 EDT) before United States Magistrate Judge Carl W. Hoffman who then issued a domestic arrest warrant for Gohir.
7. On the following day, Monday, May 5, 2014, the FOJ prepared a letter stating again that Germany wanted Gohir to be provisionally arrested. The letter contained the same request and substantive information that had been conveyed on an urgent basis the day before in the email and attachments from, and in the conversation with, Dr. Karitzky. To fully respond to Gohir's present motion, in addition to the recitation above, I telephoned Dr. Karitzky and he confirmed that his communication with me on May 4, 2014 was indeed an official request by the Republic of Germany for the provisional arrest of Gohir pursuant to Article 16 of the treaty. I have attached Dr. Karitzky's email confirming this statement to me as Exhibit 1 to this affidavit.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 26
Dear Marcus,
On behalf of the Federal Office of Justice I hereby confirm that my email dated 4 May 2014 was an official request for provisional arrest according to Article 16 of the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and Germany.
Best regards to Washington,
Holger
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Section 15 of the German VAT Act, Input Tax Deduction
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Section 18 of the German VAT Act, Taxation procedure