UNPUBLISHED OPINION

CONNOLLY, Judge.

In this appeal from an order granting respondent's petition for expungement, appellant argues (1) the district court erred in granting respondent's request to expunge records held by the judicial branch; and (2) the district court does not have inherent authority to expunge criminal records and convictions from the executive branch. Because the district court erred in granting the expungement, we reverse.

FACTS

On November 21, 2003, respondent M.T.S. approached a paint booth at the Dakota County Technical College, where A.N.J. and J.B.S. were working. Respondent began to strike A.N.J. in the face with a hammer. Respondent also hit J.B.S. as J.B.S. attempted to intervene. Respondent was charged with one count of assault in the second degree and one count of assault in the fifth degree. Respondent pleaded guilty to felony assault in the second degree and was placed on probation for a period of seven years. In 2005 and 2006, respondent admitted to violating the terms of his probation, by being arrested for driving-under-the-influence. His probation was not revoked, but he received an intermediate jail consequence each time.

In August 2009, the district court granted respondent's request to travel to Alaska to attend college. Respondent was discharged from probation in April 2011. On August 9, 2011, respondent filed an expungement petition. In his petition, respondent stated that he was seeking expungement because his record is impeding his application for his Coast Guard Pilot's license. Respondent also indicated that he had rehabilitated himself by meeting his probation officer's expectations, obtaining a degree in wildlife ecology from Alaska Pacific University, pursuing a Master's degree in environmental science, seeking a pilot license with the Coast Guard, and working full-time for the Alaska Manufacturing Extension Partnership. Respondent also indicated that he had "quit the foolish ways of [his] youth" and was no longer drinking alcohol.

At the expungement hearing, respondent requested that the district court use its inherent authority to expunge his conviction from both the judicial and executive branches, claiming that his conviction would "confound [his] efforts" to get his Coast Guard's pilot license. Appellant, the State of Minnesota, argued that respondent had not been prejudiced by his conviction and that respondent poses a public safety risk. Without making any findings or explaining its legal conclusions, the district court granted respondent's motion for expungement and directed the Minnesota Attorney General, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), county court administrator, county sheriff, county attorney, prosecuting attorney, and city police department to seal their records relating to the arrest, charging indictment, or trial. The state appeals.

DECISION

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering expungement of respondent's judicial branch criminal records "because it made no findings with respect to the factors that it must use to weigh the advantages to Respondent against the disadvantages to the public."

Appellant is correct in arguing that the district court erred because it did not make any findings of fact to support the expungement. In expungement matters, the district court must make factual findings to support its exercise of discretion. See State v. H.A., 716 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. App. 2006).

In any event, based on the record, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to grant expungement in this case. We review a district court's decision to expunge under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2000). A district court may expunge criminal records in one of two ways: pursuant to Minnesota Statutes chapter 609A, or by exercising its inherent authority. State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn. 2008). Here, respondent sought expungement pursuant to the court's inherent authority. "[T]he judiciary's inherent authority governs that which is essential to the existence, dignity, and function of a court because it is a court." Id. at 275 (quotation omitted).

A district court may exercise its inherent authority to expunge criminal records located within the judicial branch in two situations: (1) to prevent a serious infringement of a petitioner's constitutional rights; or (2) if "expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the record and the burden on the court in issuing, enforcing, and monitoring an expungement order." Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d at 258 (quotation omitted); see also S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d at 274-76. Because respondent does not allege a violation of his constitutional rights, we analyze only the second rationale for expungement pursuant to a court's inherent authority.

A district court is to consider the following factors when determining whether the benefit of expungement to the petitioner is commensurate with the disadvantages to the public:

H.A., 716 N.W.2d at 364.

With regard to the first factor, respondent has not demonstrated any actual difficulty in securing employment. He presented no evidence that he has actually been denied employment based on his conviction. He merely speculated that he may have difficulty gaining employment in his desired profession based on his conviction. A petitioner may not justify expungement with speculative evidence. See Barlow v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 365 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1985). Moreover, "helping individuals achieve employment goals is not essential to the existence, dignity, and function of a court because it is a court." S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d at 277-78 (quotation omitted). Because respondent did not indicate a history of unsuccessful employment attempts, this factor does not weigh in favor of expungement.

The second factor requires that the court consider the nature and the seriousness of the offense. Here, respondent's offense was quite serious. He struck two individuals with a hammer, one of them in the face, and pleaded guilty to felony second-degree assault. Consequently, this factor also does not weigh in favor of expungement.

The third factor requires the court to consider a petitioner's potential risk to the public and compare it to the public's right to access the records. The public has a strong interest in maintaining public records relating to crimes, particularly crimes of violence. See Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d at 261 (noting that the public had a strong interest in maintaining the petitioner's "record of violence"). Weighed against the public's strong interest in the maintenance of criminal records, the seriousness of respondent's offense, combined with his two subsequent offenses and probation violations, do not support expungement.

The fourth factor considers any additional offenses or rehabilitative efforts since the offense. While respondent presented evidence that he has obtained his degree, works full-time, and has rehabilitated himself, we cannot ignore the fact that respondent committed two additional misdemeanor offenses while on probation for second-degree assault. These subsequent offenses weigh heavily against expungement. Additionally, respondent requested expungement just four months after the court discharged his probation. This amount of time is too short to truly demonstrate that respondent has rehabilitated himself, particularly when considering the violence of his initial offense and the additional two offenses committed while on probation.

Because the district court made no findings of fact and because the record does not demonstrate that the benefit of expungement to respondent is commensurate with the disadvantages to the public, the district court abused its discretion by granting expungement of respondent's records.

Reversed.