NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

HOLDRIDGE, J.

This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment, which the trial court determined the validity of a pre-marital contract finding that the fruits of the parties' separate property are classified as separate. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Julie Robert and Harry Robert, II were married on December 31, 2009. Ms. Robert filed a petition for divorce on March 15, 2013. Ms. Robert also filed a petition for declaratory judgment on January 23, 2014. In that pleading, Ms. Robert prayed for a judgment declaring that the fruits of Mr. Robert's separate property be characterized as community property and subject to partition between the parties. Ms. Robert acknowledged that she and her husband executed a valid pre-marital contract the day before their wedding. However, she alleged that the parties did not take the proper steps to reserve the fruits from Mr. Robert's separate property as his separate property according to the terms of their pre-marital contract. She specifically cited paragraph five of the pre-marital contract, which required the parties to "each execute a Declaration of Reservation of Fruits of Separate Property." Ms. Robert argued that neither party executed a valid declaration of reservation of fruits of separate property as required under paragraph five. Mr. Robert countered that the pre-marital contract itself sufficiently acted as a reservation of the fruits from the parties separate property.

After an evidentiary hearing on July 3, 2014, the trial court took this matter under advisement and subsequently issued its written reasons for judgment.1 The trial court signed a judgment in favor of Mr. Robert on October 2, 2014, holding that the pre-marital contract sufficiently complied with La. C.C. art. 2339 and that the fruits of Mr. Robert's separate property were classified as his separate property.2 Ms. Robert appeals this judgment, arguing that the trial court's interpretation of the pre-marital contract was erroneous.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court's determination about whether to issue a declaratory judgment is subject to the abuse of discretion standard; however, the judgment itself is still subject to the appropriate standard of review — questions of law are reviewed de novo and questions of fact are subject to the manifest error/clearly wrong standard of review. See Campbell v. Evangeline Par. Police Jury, 14-1301 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/6/15), 164 So.3d 408, 412, writ denied, 15-1067 (La. 9/11/15), 176 So.3d 1043. Questions of contractual interpretation are questions of law which are subject to a de novo standard of review. See Mitchell v. Patterson Ins. Co., 00-612 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/6/00), 774 So.2d 366, 368. Contracts have the force of law between the parties, and the courts are bound to interpret them according to the common intent of the parties. See La. C.C. arts. 1983 and 2045. If the words of the contract are clear, unambiguous, and lead to no absurd consequences, the court need not look beyond the contract language to determine the true intent of the parties. La. C.C. art. 2046. Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. La. C.C. art. 2050.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In her one assignment of error, Ms. Robert asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in denying her petition for declaratory judgment. She alleges that the pre-marital contract required both parties to each execute a separate declaration of reservation of fruits of separate property. However, Mr. Robert argues that despite a declaration never being perfected, the pre-marital contract itself acts as a reservation of the fruits and revenues of their separate property.

The Louisiana Civil Code allocates the fruits of a spouse's separate property to the community, unless the owner of the separate property has reserved the fruits as separate.3 La. C.C. art. 2339. Likewise, La. C.C. art. 2331 provides that "[a] matrimonial agreement may be executed by the spouses before or during marriage" and that "[i]t shall be made by authentic act or by an act under private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses."

This Court finds that the pre-marital contract executed by the parties complied with the formal requirements enumerated by La. C.C. art. 2339. The pre-marital contract was in authentic form, as it was executed before a notary public in the presence of two witnesses,4 it was recorded by the Clerk of Court in the proper Parishes of East Baton Rouge and Ascension, and a copy was provided to Ms. Robert.

Although the parties were living under a contractual regime of community property, spouses may decrease the assets of the community by agreeing that the fruits of separate property will remain separate. Two key provisions in the pre-marital contract specifically detailed that the fruits of their separate property were to remain separate. Paragraph two of the pre-marital contract states that "each of them does hereby reserve unto themselves individually the entire administration of their respective separate property, and the respective free enjoyment of the fruits and revenues from their separate property." Paragraph four states that "each of them, acting alone, shall have the right to use, enjoy and dispose of his or her separate property and any fruits or revenues from such separate property without the consent or concurrence of the other[.]" The detailed language in these two paragraphs clearly manifests that the nature of the pre-marital contract was to reserve the fruits of the separate property and specifies that the fruits would be for the parties separate use to enjoy and dispose of. After considering the specific language used in the pre-martial contract, this Court concludes that the trial court was correct in finding that the pre-marital contract reserved the fruits of each spouses separate property to that spouse for the spouse to use, enjoy, and dispose of.

Furthermore, the pre-marital contract reflects a clear intent of the parties to modify their matrimonial regime and to keep the fruits of their separate property as separate. Louisiana Civil Code article 2045 provides that the interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties. Here, the intent of the parties to make a reservation of fruits is clearly found in the language "right to use, enjoy and dispose of his or her separate property and any fruits and revenues from such separate property[.]"5 When legal prerequisites are followed in the execution of a pre-marital contract to clearly separate property, this constitutes evidence of an intent to make an asset separate rather than community. See Jenkins v. Leonard, 47,001 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/29/12), 87 So.3d 230, 234. Thus, the language used in the pre-marital contract is a sufficient reservations of the fruits.

After looking at the entire substance of the pre-marital contract, this Court agrees with the trial court, which determined that a reservation was effectively made by the parties when executing this pre-marital contract and that no additional declaration was required. The intent of the pre-marital contract was to limit the scope and applicability of the community property regime to the parties and their property. The provisions in the contract that maintain their separate property and the fruits from that property as separate in nature should be given effect to that end. See La. C.C. art. 2050. ("Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.").

Accordingly, the fruits of the separate property of the parties were reserved as separate and remain their separate property. The pre-marital contract perfected a reservation of separate property, as all parties consulted with counsel and had notice of the intent and effects of the agreement that they were entering into before signing the contract.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds that the pre-marital contract executed by the parties sufficiently complies with La. C.C. art. 2339. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court in favor of Harry Robert, II is affirmed. Costs of appeal are to be paid by Julie Robert.

AFFIRMED.