OPINION & ORDER

FAITH S. HOCHBERG, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Gary and Alina Kotovets' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 31).1 The Court has considered the submission by the parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78; and

it appearing that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a motion for summary judgment will be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); and

it appearing, in other words, that "summary judgment may be granted only if there exists no genuine issue of material fact that would permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party," Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1988); and

it appearing that all facts and inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Peters v. Delaware River Port Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 (3d Cir. 1994); and

it appearing that the party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of production, Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; and

it appearing that this requires the moving party to establish either that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law, or to demonstrate that the non-moving party has not shown the requisite facts relating to an essential element of an issue for which it bears the burden, see id. at 322-23; and

it appearing on the face of the parties' submissions that they dispute a significant number of the facts averred by their adversaries2; and

it appearing that questions of material fact do exist with respect to the claims against Defendants, including, without limitation, whether the garage door malfunctioned, whether Defendants knew that it created a dangerous condition, and whether Plaintiff's own negligence contributed to his injury, making this matter unsuitable for summary judgment;

ACCORDINGLY, on this 3rd day of December, 2014, it is

ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 31) is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that this matter is referred to mediation with Pamela Nadel, Esq.; an order of referral to mediation will be sent forthwith, and the parties are ordered to contact Ms. Nadel immediately to arrange a starting date for the mediation no later than 60 days from the date of this opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.