NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

This case involves disciplinary charges against a police officer, Steven Jones, who appeals from a July 23, 2010 final decision of the Civil Service Commission (the Commission) adopting the findings of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that Jones engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer and violated department rules. City of Millville Police Department (MPD) cross-appeals from the Commission's imposition of a ninety-day suspension as reduced by the ALJ from a six-month suspension. We affirm on all issues.

The charges that MPD filed are based on Jones' participation in fraudulent reimbursement claims for meals consumed during out-of-state police training seminars and his untruthful statements during an internal affairs investigation into the matter.

From October 3 to 6, 2005, Jones attended a seminar for which he later sought reimbursement for meal expenses. He provided receipts to Sherry Trout, an administrative secretary, in accordance with MPD's reimbursement policy.1 Ten of the receipts were identical in appearance except for numbering, and none included details regarding the restaurants or meals. Trout prepared a voucher and signed Jones' name at the direction of the police chief, who along with the director of public safety approved the voucher. Jones then received a check for his expenses.

From June 26 to 30, 2006, Jones attended another seminar and sought reimbursement for meal expenses. Jones again submitted receipts, two of which were identical in form and "strikingly similar to those previously submitted in October 2005." Again, Trout prepared a voucher and signed Jones' name at the direction of the police chief, and again the chief and director of public safety approved the voucher and Jones received a check.

From September 25 to 28, 2006, Jones attended a third seminar and sought reimbursement for meals in accordance with MPD's policy. He submitted various receipts that were identical in form and close in number. Trout prepared a voucher and signed Jones' name, and the chief approved the reimbursement.

On March 19, 2008, MPD served Jones with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action, alleging: misconduct, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147; conduct unbecoming a police officer; incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1); conduct unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6); and other sufficient cause, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(11), including violations of the MPD's rules and regulations.

On November 28, 2007, Frank Nolan, an investigator with the Cumberland County Prosecutor's Office, interviewed Jones regarding the receipts he submitted for reimbursement, and other nonrelated matters. Thereafter, Jones also discussed the investigation with Nolan and the Prosecutor's Office in a telephone call. On March 13, 2008, Frank Guaracini, III, interviewed Jones as part of an internal affairs investigation into the MPD regarding submission of illegitimate receipts for reimbursement for expenses incurred at seminars.

On July 9, 2008, a departmental hearing was held. MPD met its burden of proof concerning the statutory charges, and Jones received a six-month suspension commencing March 18, 2008 and ending September 19, 2008. MPD agreed to merge the common law charges. Jones appealed to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).

Administrative Law Judge William Todd Miller conducted a hearing on two days. MPD called two witnesses: Trout and Nolan. On October 22, 2009, Trout admitted that she was not aware of any facts indicating that Jones incurred the claimed expenses. She testified that based on her experience processing vouchers for reimbursement, the expenses Jones claimed were typically expected. Trout agreed that the expenses were consistent with other receipts she received and with MPD's reimbursement policy.

At the close of MPD's case, Jones moved to dismiss the disciplinary charges pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, which sets a forty-five day statute of limitations for bringing disciplinary charges on certain grounds. On March 9, 2010, the ALJ denied the motion and issued a written opinion finding no violation of the statute. On April 21, 2010, the proceeding continued with Jones calling his sole witness, Edward Zadroga, a police officer with the MPD. Jones did not testify.

On May 28, 2010, the ALJ issued an initial decision, sustaining the charge of conduct unbecoming an officer, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6), and the charge of other sufficient causes including violations of the MPD's rules and regulations, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(11). The ALJ dismissed all other charges and reduced the six-month suspension to ninety days.

The ALJ observed that Nolan had analyzed the receipts and vouchers that Jones had submitted:

Further, the ALJ observed that Jones gave contradictory statements to investigators:

The ALJ found that Jones attended the police seminars, incurred reasonable meal expenses that were within the allowable ranges for reimbursable expenses under the MPD policy, and submitted those reimbursement claims in the form of receipts purchased from a supply store such as Staples. Then, the judge elaborated:

Thus, the ALJ found that Jones untruthfully told investigators that the receipts came from restaurants, instead of explaining that they were purchased from a supply store. Also, the ALJ found the testimony of Trout and Nolan to be "reliable and trustworthy," and he further noted that they had been sequestered and that their testimony was based on official records.

After addressing the applicable law, the ALJ pointed out that although the form of the submitted receipts could have easily been explained, and the amounts claimed for reimbursement were nominal, Jones had been untruthful to the investigators when the receipts were questioned. The ALJ observed that the MPD reimbursement policy did not specify any particular form of receipt, and that if Jones had "admitted that he used store bought receipts, in lieu of official receipts, no discipline should have followed." The ALJ concluded that it was the untruthfulness to investigators that constituted conduct unbecoming a police officer and violations of the MPD Rules and Regulations. Jones appealed to the Commission.

The Commission considered the record, conducted an independent evaluation, and on July 23, 2010, accepted and adopted the factual findings and legal conclusions of the ALJ.3 Thereafter, Jones appealed and MPD cross-appealed.

On appeal, Jones argues that the ALJ's credibility findings are erroneous, and that the ALJ erred by denying his motion to dismiss. MPD contends that the Commission erred by imposing a ninety-day suspension, rather than six months.

This court only disturbs a final agency determination if it was arbitrary and capricious, meaning "willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of circumstances." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 201 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). A "determination predicated on unsupported findings is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action." In re Boardwalk Regency Corp., 180 N.J.Super. 324, 334 (App. Div. 1981), modified on other grounds 90 N.J. 361, appeal dismissed sub nom. Perlman v. Att'y Gen. of N.J., 459 U.S. 181, 103 S.Ct. 562, 74 L. Ed. 2d 927 (1982).

Where the Legislature has "`delegated a great amount of discretion to the administrative experts, deference must be accorded to the administrative agency's expertise and experience in its domain.'" In re The Harborage, 300 N.J.Super. 363, 379 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Riverside Gen. Hosp. v. N.J. Hosp. Rate Setting Comm'n, 98 N.J. 458, 469 (1985)). Thus, there is a strong presumption of the agency's reasonableness, and the challenger carries the burden. In re Holy Name Hosp., 301 N.J.Super. 282, 295 (App. Div. 1997).

We reject Jones' contention that the ALJ made inappropriate findings of credibility, and conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to sustain disciplinary charges.

The ALJ specifically found that Jones failed to tell the truth to investigators. Jones offers no reason on appeal to disturb the judge's finding that Nolan and Trout were "reliable and trustworthy." The judge found, "Nolan's analysis was convincing and reliable that Jones was using stock receipts." Jones chose not to testify, leaving Nolan unrefuted. The ALJ concluded that Jones' failure to maintain the high standards expected of police officers constituted conduct unbecoming a public employee and that, by that same conduct, Jones violated the rules and regulations of the MPD. We agree, as substantial and credible evidence in the record supports these findings and conclusions.

Next, Jones contends that the disciplinary charges against him were untimely because "all of the information (not just the `sufficient' information) was available to the appointing authority well before the [45-]day time period requirement." (emphasis original). We disagree.

The 45-day rule under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 offers "a simple and uncomplicated procedural mechanism for the handling of administrative charges against a police officer." Grubb v. Borough of Hightstown, 331 N.J.Super. 398, 405 (App. Div. 2000). In relevant part, the statute provides:

Accordingly, charges "must be filed 45 days after the date on which the department obtains `sufficient information' to file the complaint." Grubb, supra, 331 N.J. Super. at 405.

The 45-day rule is not unlimited. When a police department seeks to sanction an officer for misconduct, as opposed to violation of a specific internal rule or regulation, the 45-day rule does not apply. McElwee v. Borough of Fieldsboro, 400 N.J.Super. 388, 394 (App. Div. 2008).

Here, the ALJ correctly found that the 45-day rule did not apply to the charge of conduct unbecoming an officer. Thus, Jones' timing argument could potentially only apply to violations of the MPD's rules and regulations. However, this argument is unpersuasive.

We have stated that "where there is a concurrent investigation of the officer for a violation of the criminal laws of the state . . . the 45-day limit begins on the day after the disposition of the criminal investigation." Grubb, supra, 331 N.J. Super. at 405. Here, MPD was notified that the criminal investigation concluded on February 15, 2008, and served Jones with disciplinary charges on March 19, 2008. Thus, the judge correctly found that charges were brought within the 45-day time period and denied Jones' motion to dismiss.

Finally, MPD urges us to reverse the ALJ's reduction of Jones' suspension from six months to ninety days. It argues that a police officer who undermines an internal investigation should not receive a reduced penalty. We disagree.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that a police officer "`represents law and order to the citizenry and must present an image of personal integrity and dependability in order to have the respect of the public.'" Carter v. Twp. of Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474, 485-86 (2007) (quoting Twp. of Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J.Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965), certif. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966)). However, the Court has "cautioned [that] courts should take care not to substitute their own views of whether a particular penalty is correct for those of the body charged with making that decision." Ibid. Thus, a reviewing court will modify a sanction

We ask only whether the sanction was "so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." Id. at 354 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Carter, supra, 191 N.J. at 483, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division's decision that removal of a police officer for sleeping on duty was excessive. The Court held that the Appellate Division had erred in "rejecting the well-reasoned analysis of the Board, considering the principle of progressive discipline to be an absolute mandate of law[,] and regarding [the police officer's] prior disciplinary history as insufficient." Id. at 486. The Court recognized that the "proposed sanction [need not] be based on the severity of the current infraction alone," and that an employee's past record "`may be resorted to for guidance in determining the appropriate penalty for the current specific offense.'" Id. at 483-84 (quoting Town of W.N.Y. v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500, 522-23 (1962)). Thus, the Court concluded that the ALJ was not arbitrary or capricious in concluding that

Here, the ALJ assessed Jones' disciplinary history, found "one prior major disciplinary action for twelve days and a few minor matters," but also found that Jones had several noteworthy commendations. The judge considered the public trust, that truthfulness is vital to law enforcement, and concluded that the six-month suspension should be reduced because "(1) several of the charges are being dismissed, (2) Jones has a minor disciplinary history, and (3) there were no proofs that Jones padded his expenses or was paid more than he was entitled." This result is neither shocking to one's sense of fairness nor disproportionate to the findings.

Considering the record as a whole, we conclude there is sufficient credible evidence to support the Commissioner's decision, Harborage, supra, 300 N.J. Super. at 378 (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 92-93 (1973)), and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the ALJ as adopted by the Commission.

Affirmed.