OPINION

MARK FALK, Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff John Mulroy filed this lawsuit in May 2012 in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, asserting claims under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a, et seq. and the New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.25, et seq. on behalf of himself and a putative class. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that his former employer, Defendant—National Water Main Cleaning Company of New Jersey ("NWMCC")—had failed to pay its employees for travel time to various jobsites and that the Company paid an incorrect prevailing wage rate to its employees in New Jersey. Defendant removed the case to this Court in June 2012. In March 2014, the parties entered into a Class Action Settlement, which provides for a maximum gross payment of $250,000, deposited into a segregated account for the benefit of the Class, in exchange for the release of all claims.

Presently before the Court is the parties' motion for Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement. [ECF No. 49.]1 The parties seek approval of: (1) the Class Action Settlement; (2) an attorneys' fee award in the amount of $100,000; and (3) an incentive award for the named Plaintiff in the amount of $10,000. A Fairness Hearing was held on October 23, 2014. Only one objection was received. [ECF No. 43.] For the reasons that follow, the Court approves the Settlement and grants Plaintiff's fee requests.

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND2

This is a class action case asserting claims under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and the New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act. The specific allegations are that Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, were not paid for travel time to various jobsites and that Defendant paid an incorrect prevailing wage to its New Jersey employees.

After nearly two years of litigation, the case settled on a class-wide basis in January 2014. The parties' settlement creates two identically defined subclasses—one for each of the Complaint's allegations:

(1) Current and former hourly, non-exempt field employees who performed work at jobsites in New Jersey between May 4, 2006 and January 31, 2014 (the "Prevailing Wage Settlement Class"); and

(2) Current and former hourly, non-exempt filed employees who performed work at jobsites in New Jersey between May 4, 2006 and January 31, 2014 (the "Hours Settlement Class").

(Preliminary Approval Order ¶ 3; ECF No. 41.)

The settlement consists of a $250,000 gross payment by Defendant; an attorneys' fee request of "up to $100,000"; and an incentive payment to Plaintiff Mulroy of $10,000. A motion for preliminary approval of the settlement was filed in March 2014.

On April 9, 2014, the Undersigned entered an Order preliminarily approving the settlement and providing notice to the class. [ECF No. 41.] Notice was provided to 151 "potential" class members. (See Memorandum of Law in Support of Joint Motion for Final Approval ("Br.") at 6.) One (1) objection was received, which was submitted by Class Member Daniel Conceicao. (Id.) At this point, 64 claim forms—representing 42% of the class and 41% of the available funds—have been received. (Id.)

On October 23, 2014, a Fairness Hearing was held. Mr. Conceicao, the lone objector, did not appear.

III. APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS

Under Rule 23, a court may only approve a class settlement after it has held a hearing and determined that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). The fairness of a class action settlement is most commonly evaluated by consideration of the factors found in Girsch v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975):

The Girsch factors are a guide and the absence of one or more does not automatically render the settlement unfair. See In re Am. Family Enter., 256 B.R. 377, 418 (D.N.J. 2000). Rather, the Court must look at all the circumstances of the case and determine whether the settlement is within the range of reasonableness. See In re AT&T Corp. Secs. Litig., 455 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2006). In addition, a district court should consider whether the settlement is proposed by experienced counsel who reached the agreed-upon terms through arms-length bargaining. See In re Warfain Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 535 (3d Cir. 2004).

Settlement of litigation is generally favored by courts, especially in the class action setting. "The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions and other complex cases where substantial judicial resources can be conserved by avoiding formal litigation." In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995); see also In re Warfain, 391 F.3d at 535 (noting the "overriding public interest in settling class action litigation"). At the same time, the district court functions as "a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members" by ensuring that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate." In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 785. In sum, the Court's evaluation of the settlement is guided by the Girsch factors, but the Court is "free to consider other relevant considerations and tacts involved in the settlement." Colon v. Passaic County, No. 08-4439, 2012 WL 1457764, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2012); see also Alves v. Ferguson, 01-789, 2012 WL 6043272, at *8-9 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2012), aff'd, 559 Fed. Appx. 151 (3d Cir. 2014).

IV. APPLICATION OF THE GIRSCH FACTORS

1. Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation

This factor is intended to "capture `the probable cost, in both time and money, of continued litigation.'" In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 812 (quoting Bryan v. PPG Indus., 494 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir. 1974)). Where the complexity, expense, and duration of litigation are significant, the Court will view this factor as favoring settlement. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F.Supp. 450, 536 (D.N.J. 1997) ("Prudential I").

If this action were to continue, the parties would expend considerable time and money pursuing their claims. Expert discovery and dispositive motions have not yet been scheduled. If the action survived dispositive motion practice, a complex final pretrial order would need to be entered. Numerous in limine motions raising important evidentiary and substantive disputes would be likely. This would be followed by a trial, which could take weeks and involve the presentation of substantial, disputed evidence. Moreover, Defendant represents that they would appeal any class action judgment that could be obtained, which could take additional years. (Br. 6.) By reaching a settlement now, the parties "avoid[] the costs and risks of . . . lengthy and complex" proceedings. Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010). Since continued litigation would be time-consuming and expensive, settlement makes eminent sense. This factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.

2. Reaction of the Class

The second Girsch factor evaluates whether members of the class generally support or object to the settlement. See In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 812. In order to properly evaluate the settlement, "the number and vociferousness of the objectors" must be examined. Id. Generally, "silence constitutes tacit consent to the settlement." Id.

Here, the parties retained Rust Consulting to provide notice to the class, and 151 Class Notices and Claims Forms were mailed. (Br. 6; see Declaration of Stacy Roe, ECF No. 49-2.) One objection was received. [ECF No. 43.] To date, 64 claim forms—representing 42% of the class and 41% of the available funds—have been received. (Id.)

(i) Objection from Daniel M. Conceicao

On June 2, 2014, the Court received a pro se submission from Class Member Daniel Conceicao labeled "Objection to Settlement Agreement." [ECF No. 43.]3 The objection, which is 3 pages of text and 9 pages of exhibits, is somewhat difficult to discern. It appears that Mr. Conceicao's objection is based on three arguments: (1) the allegation that the release is excessively broad and will result in the release of future claims; (2) the assertion that settlement fails to take into account certain wage-and-benefit related issues; and (3) the amount of the attorneys' fee sought and the incentive payment to Plaintiff Mulroy.

On October 15, 2014, the parties submitted a joint brief responding to the Objection, stating essentially that: (1) the Settlement Agreement bars claims only through its Effective Date, which is the standard practice, and that future claims are unaffected; (2) all pertinent wage and hour issues were investigated by counsel and are adequately addressed in settlement; and (3) the fee payments are reasonable. [ECF No. 50.]

The objection has no merit and is not a basis to reject the settlement. First, the objection to the breadth of the release is misguided. The objector seems to assert that "those employees that choose to do nothing should not have to be expected to be barred from any future claim a person may have for wages, hours, and claims," and that Defendant ""should only be released for hourly wages and not for giving up legal rights for any other legal claim any person may have from past, present or future if the company chooses not to pay any future benefits they will not be bound [sic] because of the release." (Objection at 2.) However, the Settlement Agreement does not effect the legal rights of future NWMCC employees. The Settlement Classes are defined to include only employees who worked for the company through January 31, 2014. In addition, the release provision of the Settlement Agreement encompasses only claims incurred on or before the Effective Date of the Agreement. See Settlement Agreement §§ 1(gg), 11(a). To the extent that Plaintiff's objection is that class members who do not opt-out of the settlement will be bound by the terms of Agreement, it plainly lacks merit; indeed, such a result is one of the primary functions of Rule 23 class actions. See, e.g., Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 183 (3d Cir. 2012).

Second, Mr. Conceicao appears to object on the grounds that wage and hour claims in this case were not adequately investigated. The Court sees no evidence of this at all. Plaintiffs are represented by experienced counsel. The case was settled only after discovery was ongoing and the parties had "interviewed witnesses and exchanged thousands of pages of job records, payroll and other financial information." (Br. at 4.) The Undersigned also personally oversaw settlement negotiations and was privy to counsel's familiarity with the facts and the law.4

Third, it appears Mr. Conceicao objects to "benefits issues" dealing with deductions from his pay for company health insurance in which he was apparently enrolled, which is common practice and does not bear on the fairness of the settlement.

In sum, the reaction of the class to the settlement has been overwhelmingly positive. The single objection received does not raise any meritorious concerns and is no basis to set aside the settlement. This factor weighs heavily in favor of approving the settlement.

3. Stage of the Proceedings and Amount of Discovery Completed

The third Girsh factor requires that the Court consider the "degree of case development that Class Counsel have accomplished prior to Settlement," including the type and amount of discovery already undertaken. In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 813. The Court considers whether the amount of discovery completed in the case has permitted "counsel [to have] an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case before negotiating." In re Schering-Plough /Merck Merger Litig., No. 09-1099, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29121 at *30 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2010). The discovery analyzed encompasses both formal and "informal" discovery, including discovery from parallel proceedings, companion cases and even third parties, such as experts or witnesses. Id.

This factor weighs heavily in favor of settlement. This is not a case that was settled shortly after it was filed with minimal investigation. This case is more than two years old. The discovery period was extensive, and the parties exchanged thousands of documents and litigated motions. Given the proceedings, this matter is appropriate for final settlement.

4. The Remaining Girsch Factors Support Final Approval5

The Girsch factors relating to the "risks" in this matter survey the "possible risks of litigation by balancing the likelihood of success . . . against the immediate benefits offered by settlement." Prudential II, 148 F.3d at 319. Where the risks of litigation are high, these factors weigh in favor of the settlement. See id. To properly weigh these considerations, the Court should rely to a certain extent on the estimation provided by class counsel, who is experienced with the intricacies of the underlying case. See Weber v. Gov't Empls. Ins. Co., 262 F.R.D. 431, 445 (D.N.J. 2009) (quoting Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 229 F.R.D. 105, 115 (E.D. Pa. 2005)).

Here, the risks include the genuine possibility that Plaintiff may not be successful in proving liability of Defendant at trial, that summary judgment could be granted in Defendant's favor, and/or that class certification could be denied or any certified class may be decertified before a trial. See In re Prudential Ins., 148 F.3d at 321; see also Alves, 2012 WL 6043272, at *19-22. Liability remains completely disputed, and there is no guarantee that Plaintiff would prevail. The settlement is a reasonable compromise that weighed these risks.

The Girsh factors relating to "reasonableness" collectively "evaluate whether the settlement represents a good value for a weak case or a poor value for a strong case." In re Warfarin Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d at 538. "These factors test two sides of the same coin: reasonableness in light of the best possible recovery and reasonableness in light of the risks the parties would face if the case went to trial." Id. Here, the $250,000 settlement after two years of litigation represents certainty and resolution for Plaintiffs, who otherwise would face an uncertain future regarding establishing liability and damages. The Court agrees that the settlement meets the requirements of a fair, reasonable settlement in light of the attendant risks.

V. THE ALLOCATION PLAN IS REASONABLE

The Court must also review the proposed plan of allocation of the Settlement to ensure that it is "fair and reasonable to all participants in the fund." Wals v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956, 964 (3d Cir. 1983). Generally, where a plan of allocation "reimburses class members based on the type and extent of their injuries" it will be found reasonable. In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 166, 184 (E.D. Pa. 2000). In the present action, the Plan of Allocation is set forth as:

(Br. 10.)

The parties' plan of allocation seeks to compensate the Class Members based on the extent of their injuries. This is fair and reasonable under Third Circuit precedent. In re Ikon Office, 194 F.R.D. at 184.6

VI. THE FEE REQUESTS ARE REASONABLE

Class counsel also seeks an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses in the amount of up to $100,000, or 40% of the total settlement amount. This is a common fund case in which fees and costs come directly out of the recovery to the class. See generally In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 256. The Court notes preliminarily—other than the one objection that has already been addressed—that it has not received a single objection pertaining to the proposed amount of fees. See Lenahan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2006 WL 2085282, at *19 (D.N.J. July 24, 2006) ("The lack of significant objections from the Class supports the reasonableness of the fee request.").

Courts in the Third Circuit employ the percentage-of-recovery method to award attorneys' fees in common fund cases. See In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 821 (citing Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 255 (1985)); see also Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 14.121 at 186 (2004). Indeed, it is the prevailing methodology used by courts in this Circuit for wage-and-hour cases. See, e.g., In re Janney Montgomery Scott, LLC, 2009 WL 2137224, at *14 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2009); Chemi v. Champion Mortg., No. 05-1238, 2009 WL 1470429, at *10 (D.N.J. May 26, 2009); Lenahan, 2006 WL 2085282, at *19. Under the percentage-of-recovery approach, the Court must determine whether the percentage of total recovery that the proposed award would allocate to attorneys fees is appropriate "based on the circumstances of the case." In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.2d at 256. The Court is primarily guided by seven factors identified by the Third Circuit:

Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also In re AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that courts should also consider any other factors that are "useful and relevant" under the facts of each case) (citations omitted). Each case is different, however, and in some circumstances one single factor may outweigh the rest. See In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Gunter, 223 F.3d at 195 n.1).

Only a brief review of the Gunter factors is required to confirm that the attorneys' fee sought is reasonable. Plaintiff's counsel—Ravi Sattiraju, Esq—has submitted a certification detailing how he investigated the matter pre-suit; performed extensive research into novel areas of Wage and Hour Law; filed the Complaint; argued motions; conducted discovery; and negotiated this settlement. (Certification of Ravi Sattiraju, Esq. ¶ 2.) All of this work was done at an hourly rate of $500.00, which is a reasonable amount for experienced employment counsel. (See Sattiraju Cert., ¶ 2(g).) In addition, no objection to the fees sought—beyond that already addressed herein—has been received. Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiffs' counsel diligently prosecuted this case and performed exemplary work on behalf of the Class Members for years. The Court observed the results of this expenditure of legal effort and concludes it was essential to achieving the settlement for Plaintiffs. For these reasons, the Court approves the parties' negotiated attorneys' fees.7

CONCLUSION

Based on all of the reasons set forth above, the parties' motion for joint approval of settlement [CM/ECF No. 49] is GRANTED. The Court hereby approves the parties Settlement Agreement and grants Class Counsel's request for up to $100,000 in attorneys' fees and grants the request for a $10,000 incentive award to Plaintiff Mulroy.

An appropriate Order will be entered.