BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, District Judge.
Before this Court is: (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Hudson City Savings Bank, M&T Bank ("Hudson") seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs Jay Lin and Irene Lin's, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated ("Plaintiffs") Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 21); and (2) a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Parker McCay, P.A. ("Parker McCay") (together with Hudson, "Defendants") pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 36.) Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to both Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 29 & 38) and Defendants each filed a Reply Brief to Plaintiffs' Oppositions to their respective Motions to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 30 & 41.) Having reviewed the submissions filed in connection with the motions and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause appearing, Hudson's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is
For the purposes of these Motions to Dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the Complaint as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Furthermore, the Court also considers any "document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint." In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)).
During the financial crises of 2008, Plaintiffs incurred a financial obligation in the form of a mortgage refinancing by Hudson. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.)
Plaintiffs contested the Foreclosure Action. (ECF No. 36-8, Ex. 6.) On April 22, 2013, after several years of litigation, Hudson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment before the Superior Court. (Id.; ECF No. 36-3, Ex. 1.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff Irene Lin filed a petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, which was subsequently converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. (ECF No. 36-3, Ex. 1.) The Foreclosure Action was then stayed pending dismissal of the bankruptcy or entry of an order granting relief from the bankruptcy stay. (ECF No. 36-4, Ex. 2.) Once Hudson received relief from the stay, it refiled its Motion for Summary Judgment before the Superior Court on October 28, 2016. (ECF No. 36-8, Ex. 6.)
On June 16, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate the Entry of Summary Judgment before the Superior Court. (ECF No. 36-10, Ex. 8.) On July 21, 2017, the Superior Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate, as well as two other motions filed by Plaintiffs, noting, inter alia: (1) Hudson sought only to foreclose on the May 23, 2007 Note and Mortgage; (2) Zucker Goldberg's 2015 Chapter 11 bankruptcy has "no bearing on the instant action;" (3) Plaintiff Irene Lin's bankruptcy did not preclude the Foreclosure Action; and (4) the substitution of counsel from Zucker Goldberg to Parker McCay was executed properly. (ECF No. 36-15, Ex. 13 at 7-8.) On July 28, 2017, the Superior Court entered final judgment in the Foreclosure Action. (ECF No. 36-19, Ex. 17.)
On July 28, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Irene Lin and Jay Lin v. Hudson City Savings Bank, M&T Bank, Parker McCay P.A., et al., 3:17-cv-05511 (the "First Federal Action"). Plaintiffs asserted only an FDCPA cause of action, but also filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction by Order to Show Cause. (No. 17-5511, ECF Nos. 1 & 12.) Following motion practice and oral argument before this Court on September 20, 2017 regarding Hudson's Motion to Dismiss, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating in pertinent part:
(No. 17-5511, ECF No. 42 at 31:6-32:18.)
On July 25, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal of this Court's dismissal of their case to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. (No. 17-5511, ECF No. 39.) On December 10, 2018, shortly after filing this action, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their appeal. (No. 17-5511, ECF No. 43.)
On October 29, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint (the "Complaint"), in which they sought class action certification, against Defendants asserting causes of action for: violations of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Count One); violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA") (Count Two); violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et seq. ("NJCFA") (Count Three); and unjust enrichment (Count Four). (ECF No. 1.)
On January 4, 2019, Hudson filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 21.) On February 1, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Hudson's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 29) and on February 12, 2019, Hudson filed a Reply Brief to Plaintiffs' Opposition to its Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30).
On January 25, 2019, Hudson filed a Motion for Sanctions seeking an order deeming Plaintiffs "vexatious litigants" and enjoining future filings. (ECF No. 27.) On February 15, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Hudson's Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 32) and on February 25, 2019, Hudson filed a Reply Brief to Plaintiffs' Opposition to its Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 34). On March 1, 2019, this Court entered an Order administratively terminating Hudson's Motion for Sanctions. (ECF No. 35.)
On March 6, 2019, Parker McCay filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) as well as a Motion for Sanctions pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k and to impose pre-filing requirements pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651. (ECF No. 36.) On March 22, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Cross-Motion for Sanctions against Parker McCay as well as an Opposition to Parker McCay's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 38.) On March 25, 2019, this Court issued an Order administratively terminating Parker McCay's Motion for Sanctions as well as Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Sanctions, while leaving active Parker McCay's Motion to Dismiss as well as Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto. (ECF No. 39.) On April 8, 2019, Parker McCay filed a Reply Brief to Plaintiffs' Opposition to its Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 41.)
"A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be either a facial or a factual attack." Davis, 824 F.3d at 346. A facial attack "challenges the subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the facts alleged in the complaint, and it requires the court to `consider the allegations of the complaint as true.'" Id. (citing Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)). A factual attack, on the other hand, "attacks the factual allegations underlying the complaint's assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer or `otherwise present[ing] competing facts.'" Id. (quoting Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014)). A "factual challenge allows a court [to] weigh and consider evidence outside the pleadings." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, when a factual challenge is made, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to [the] plaintiff's allegations." Id. (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). Rather, "the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist," and the court "is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Id.
The Third Circuit has "repeatedly cautioned against allowing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to be turned into an attack on the merits." Davis, 824 F.3d at 348-49 (collecting cases). "[D]ismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not appropriate merely because the legal theory alleged is probably false, but only because the right claimed is `so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.'" Id. at 350 (quoting Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1987)). "In this vein, when a case raises a disputed factual issue that goes both to the merits and jurisdiction, district courts must `demand less in the way of jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial stage.'" Id. (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 892 (holding that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) would be "unusual" when the facts necessary to succeed on the merits are at least in part the same as must be alleged or proven to withstand jurisdictional attacks)). These cases make clear that "dismissal via a Rule 12(b)(1) factual challenge to standing should be granted sparingly." Id.
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court is "required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). However, the plaintiff's "obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true, those "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged." Id. This "plausibility standard" requires the complaint allege "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," but it "is not akin to a probability requirement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Detailed factual allegations" are not required, but "more than an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation" must be pled; it must include "factual enhancements" and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not `show[n]'—`that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). However, courts are "not compelled to accept `unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,'" Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Schuylkill Energy Res. Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997)), nor "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286.
While, as a general rule, the court may not consider anything beyond the four corners of the complaint on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Third Circuit has held that "a court may consider certain narrowly defined types of material without converting the motion to dismiss [to one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56]." In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). Specifically, courts may consider any "document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint." In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426 (quoting Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), when alleging fraud, "a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake, although intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 249 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted); see also U.S. ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that a "plaintiff alleging fraud must . . . support its allegations with all of the essential factual background that would accompany the first paragraph of any newspaper story — that is, the who, what, when, where and how of the events at issue") (citations omitted). Accordingly, "a party must plead [its] claim with enough particularity to place defendants on notice of the `precise misconduct with which they are charged.'" United States ex rel. Petras v. Simparel, Inc., 857 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Defendants argue this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the Colorado River abstention doctrine, Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, and that notwithstanding these doctrines, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 21-1 at 9-24; ECF No. 36-1 at 14-30.)
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review and reverse state court judgments. In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3rd Cir. 2005). Rooker-Feldman serves to bar a claim when: (1) the federal claim was actually litigated in state court before the plaintiff filed the federal action or, (2) "if the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state adjudication, meaning that federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong." Id. The Third Circuit has held a federal claim is "inextricably intertwined" with an issue adjudicated by a state court when: "(1) the federal court must determine . . . the state court judgment was erroneously entered in order to grant the requested relief or, (2) the federal court must take an action that would negate the state court's judgment." In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 330 (3d Cir. 2004)). A finding that Rooker-Feldman bars a litigant's claims divests a District Court of subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
Significantly,
Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA AS, 521 F. App'x 49, 50-51 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010)). Where, on the other hand, the federal plaintiff presents "some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached," the doctrine does not apply. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005), quoted in Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547-48 (3d Cir. 2006). In such an instance, jurisdiction exists and the court should then consider "whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion." Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "is a narrow doctrine that applies only in limited circumstances." Shibles v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 17-2386, 2018 WL 1448670, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 23, 2018) (citations omitted); In re Philadelphia Entm't & Dev. Partners, 879 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2018) ("[F]ederal courts had been applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine too broadly and consequently it clarified that the doctrine is confined to `limited circumstances' where `state-court losers complain[] of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commend and invit[e] district court review and rejection of those judgments.") (citation omitted). The four requirements "must be met for the doctrine to apply." Gage, 521 F. App'x at 50-51.
Here, the four criteria necessary to invoke the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are satisfied. First, final judgment was entered in the Foreclosure Action against Plaintiffs on July 28, 2017. (ECF No. 36-19, Ex. 17.) Prior to the entry of final judgment in the Foreclosure Action, Plaintiffs argued unsuccessfully that the action should have been stayed due to Zucker Goldberg's bankruptcy and by operation of the automatic stay. (ECF No. 36-9, Ex. 7; ECF No. 36-10, Ex. 8; ECF No. 36-11, Ex. 9.) Second, Plaintiffs complain of injuries caused by the Foreclosure Action, as they specifically allege "Defendants continued to prosecute Plaintiff[s'] foreclosure case and caused damages and irreparable damages to Plaintiffs." (ECF No. 1 ¶ 15.) Third, the entry of final judgment in the Foreclosure Action and the orders denying Plaintiffs' other motions were all rendered prior to Plaintiffs' filing of this action. (ECF No. 36-3, Ex. 1.) Finally, Plaintiffs seek a determination from this Court that would necessarily find that the Superior Court erred with respect to the validity of the foreclosure proceedings, thereby requiring this Court to improperly undertake the role of reviewing and overruling orders from the Superior Court.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this Court from providing relief that would reverse the decisions, directly or indirectly invalidate the determinations, prevent the enforcement of the orders, or void the rulings, orders, or judgments issued by the Superior Court in the Foreclosure Action. See Jacobsen v. Citi Mortg. Inc., 715 F. App'x 222, 223 (3d Cir. 2018) (upholding dismissal of the claims brought in connection with a state foreclosure action as being barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine), pet. for reh's & reh'g en banc denied, No. 17-3267 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 2018). This is true even if Plaintiffs have asserted federal claims in the Federal Action. See Todd v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 685 F. App'x 103, 105-06 (3d Cir. 2017) (upholding dismissal of the claims that were brought in connection with a state foreclosure action pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, even though the plaintiff therein asserted claims under the FDCPA), pet. for reh'g & reh'g en banc denied, Nos. 16-1126 & 16-1255 (3d Cir. May 18, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 449 (2017).
In their opposition, Plaintiffs rely on Chung v. Shapiro & Denardo, LLC, No. 14-6899, 2015 WL 3746332 (D.N.J. June 15, 2015) in asserting that this Court may hear their FDCPA claim despite the Superior Court's entry of summary judgment in the Foreclosure Action. (ECF No. 29 at 4-5; ECF No. 38-1 at 5-6.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend the FDCPA is controlling where there is a conflict between state and federal law and that such a conflict exists between New Jersey state law and the FDCPA, which Plaintiffs assert offers "greater protections." (ECF No. 29 at 2-4; ECF No. 38-1 at 4-6.) Plaintiffs' argument is baseless. The decision in Chung does not address the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine whatsoever, but rather, with whether New Jersey's Fair Foreclosure Act conflicts with the FDCPA. Chung, 2015 WL 3746332, at *2-3. Chung concerned whether a debt collector's direct contact with a debtor despite his retention of counsel violated the FDCPA. Id. at *1. The plaintiff in Chung did not claim that his injuries were caused by a state court judgment nor did he invite the District Court to review or reject the judgment of the state court. Id. at *2-3. As such, Chung provides no support whatsoever to Plaintiffs' position. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter.
As this Court has determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests it of jurisdiction, it need not consider Defendants' arguments that this Court must abstain from hearing this matter pursuant to the Colorado River abstention doctrine.
Here, this action has the same parties as did the Foreclosure Action and identical underlying operative facts from which Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to relief. Plaintiffs merely craft different causes of action to seek relief from the disposition of their state case. Moreover, "exceptional circumstances," as defined in Colorado River, exist such that this Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction: exercising jurisdiction over this matter would create concurrent jurisdiction as well as the potential for contradicting rulings; any ruling from this Court in Plaintiffs' favor would implicate the validity of the state court's judgments; and the state court exercised jurisdiction over this matter far before the Complaint was filed before this Court. Accordingly, this Court abstains from asserting jurisdiction.
Similarly, the entire controversy doctrine and the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Plaintiffs' suit. New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine is "an extremely robust claim preclusion device that requires adversaries to join all possible claims stemming from an event or series of events in one suit." Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 836 F.3d 205, 228 n.130 (3d Cir. 2016). The doctrine
Opdycke v. Stout, 233 F. App'x 125, 129 (3d Cir. 2007) (marks and citations omitted); see also Ricketti v. Barry, 775 F.3d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 2015). "The purposes of the doctrine are threefold: (1) the need for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay." Ditrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 1995). The Third Circuit has ruled that "[a] federal court hearing a federal cause of action is bound by New Jersey's Entire Controversy Doctrine, an aspect of the substantive law of New Jersey, by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994)." Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Comm'r N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369, 400 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Rycoline Prods. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 887 (3d Cir. 1997)).
The entire controversy doctrine applies to foreclosure proceedings but encompasses only "germane" counterclaims. N.J. Ct. R. 4:64-5. New Jersey courts have held that the exact claims raised by Plaintiffs herein — FDCPA, NJCFA, and unjust enrichment — are indeed "germane" counterclaims that must be raised during a foreclosure action. See Coleman v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 446 F. App'x 469, 472 (3d Cir 2011); see also Murray v. Crystex Composites, LLC, 618 F.Supp.2d 352, 360 (D.N.J. 2009). Plaintiffs failed to assert these claims in the Foreclosure Action. Accordingly, the entire controversy doctrine bars Plaintiffs' suit.
The doctrine of "[r]es judicata, or claim preclusion, is a court-created rule that is designed to draw a line between the meritorious claim on the one hand and the vexatious, repetitious and needless claim on the other hand." Purtner v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 689-90 (3d Cir. 1985) (footnote and citation omitted). The doctrine "bars a party from initiating a second suit against the same adversary based on the same `cause of action' as the first suit." Duhaney v. Atty. Gen. of U.S., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). "A party seeking to invoke res judicata must establish three elements: `(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.'" Id. (quoting In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 225). "The doctrine of res judicata bars not only claims that were brought in a previous action, but also claims that could have been brought." In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 225 (citing Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 154, 169 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Here, res judicata bars Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants. Plaintiffs' claims arise from the same transactions and occurrences as the Foreclosure Action, and the issues raised in the Complaint both could have — and in some cases were — raised in the Foreclosure Action. (ECF No. 36-4, Ex. 2.) Moreover, it is indisputable that Plaintiffs and Hudson were parties to the Foreclosure Action and that a final judgment was entered therein. (ECF No. 36-3, Ex. 1.) Therefore, res judicata precludes Plaintiffs' claims.
Finally, Plaintiffs' claims are similarly precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel prevents a party from re-litigating an issue when:
Twp. of Middletown v. Simon, 937 A.2d 949, 954 (N.J. 2008). Here, Plaintiffs seek to re-litigate before this Court an identical issue for which a judgment on the merits was rendered in the Foreclosure Action. Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Plaintiffs' suit as well.
As this Court has determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs' claims, it need not analyze Defendants' arguments that Plaintiffs have failed to state claims for violations of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), violations of the FDCPA, violations of the NJCFA, and unjust enrichment. Similarly, this Court also need not consider Defendants' contentions that Plaintiffs' proposed class is invalid as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are
(No. 17-5511, ECF No. 37 at 3.)
