Order Denying Certificate of Appealability

JENNIFER A. DORSEY, District Judge.

In 2014, Gilberto Landeros pled guilty to illegally possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(j).1 I sentenced him to a prison term of 120 months after finding that he had prior convictions that qualified as "crimes of violence" under United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.2(a). In 2017, Landeros filed a motion to vacate his sentence, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States2 —which deemed unconstitutional part of the Armed Career Criminal Act's crime-of-violence definition—rendered his sentence under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines constitutionally infirm. But after Landeros filed his motion, the Supreme Court decided Beckles v. United States,3 which found the advisory guidelines still constitutional after Johnson, so I denied his motion to vacate because Beckles precluded the relief he sought.4

Landeros then moved to have his sentence reevaluated and asked me to appoint him counsel "in light of the change in law under Sessions v. Dimaya."5 I explained that Dimaya doesn't affect the constitutionality of his sentence and denied his motions.6 Landeros appeals that order.7 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to me "for the limited purpose of granting or denying a certificate of appealability."8

I decline to issue a certificate of appealability in this case. Landeros's challenge to the "crime of violence" definition in the advisory guidelines is foreclosed by Beckles. Landeros's reliance on Dimaya is misplaced. As I explained in my previous order, in Dimaya, the Supreme Court held that a portion of the Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA) crime-of-violence definition is unconstitutional.9 Landeros was not convicted or sentenced under the INA, so Dimaya has no impact on his sentence. I do not find that reasonable jurists would disagree.

Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.