NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

The City of North Wildwood (City) appeals from Chancery Division orders of July 31 and December 2, 2013, declaring tax sale certificates the City issued void ab initio, and ordering it to provide a full accounting of all monies paid by or on behalf of respondents Royal Tax Lien Services, L.L.C. (Royal), Beach Creek Marina, Inc. (Beach Creek), Marina Bay Towers Urban Renewal, L.P. (MBT), and Marina Bay Towers Urban Renewal II, L.P. (MBTII). The City claims that the court misapplied the Condominium Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8B-1 to-38, to grant an unlawful and unconstitutional tax exemption; the property in question was not tax-exempt; the court lacked jurisdiction; the motion judge made erroneous findings of fact; and the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes certain relief ordered by the judge. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

In October 1988, Beach Creek acquired Blocks 152 and 153, consisting of thirty-three separate parcels of property identified on the City's tax map.1 On March 19, 1996, the City designated Block 152 as an area in need of redevelopment pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (LRHL), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to-49.

The City's redevelopment plan provided for the razing of an abandoned factory on the property and, in its place, the construction of a seven-story complex with 143 units of low-income, senior citizen rental housing and a 4,200 square-foot commercial space on the ground floor. Beach Creek would retain ownership of the lots, but enter into a long-term lease of the land with the project developer, MBT,2 a non-profit entity formed to operate the subsidized senior housing portion of the building.

On May 7, 1996, the City passed Ordinance 1231, which adopted the redevelopment plan and indicated that the mayor and council had "determined that the senior citizens housing [project] was the best means of constructing, financing and operating housing which meets the needs of the senior citizens of North Wildwood who reside in the City on a year round basis." The ordinance designated MBT as the "redevelopment entity" under the LRHL and provided that a master deed would be filed in accordance with the Condominium Act. It also authorized a tax exemption under New Jersey's Long Term Tax Exemption Law (LTTEL), N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 to-22, and a tax-abatement financial agreement between the City and MBT regarding the senior housing development plan.

On August 15, 1996, Beach Creek and MBT entered into a ninety-nine-year lease (ground lease) of approximately 1.25 acres within Block 152 and a portion of Block 153 for the project. On September 17, 1997, the City and MBT executed a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) agreement for the development project. Under the 1997 PILOT agreement, the City acknowledged that the MBT senior housing project "shall be exempt from taxation on all improvements in accordance with the Law." In consideration for the abatement of taxation, MBT agreed to pay the City an annual service charge (ASC) of 7% of the annual gross revenue actually collected as rent from the tenants. The 1997 PILOT agreement provided that it terminated if the project was not completed by December 31, 1998.

Based on the project's tax-exempt status, MBT applied to the New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency (NJHMFA) in 1997 and received a $14.1 million allocation, a $1.8 million first mortgage commitment, and a $1.47 million grant from the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs.

Construction began in late 1998. On October 5, 1999, the parties executed a master deed and MBT assigned its interest in the ground lease, along with other easements and rights-of-way on Beach Creek's property, to the Marina Bay Towers Condominium Association (MBTCA). The master deed described the ground lease as covering 1.24 acres in Block 152 and a small part of Block 153, and designated it as a common element of the condominium.

After significant delays, a temporary certificate of occupancy was issued for sixteen units on December 31, 2000, and the project was deemed "placed in service" for tax credit purposes. A final certificate of occupancy was obtained on December 27, 2001. The delays, however, caused significant financial setbacks, such that the original financing plan was no longer viable. As a result, the City entered into new development and financing plans with MBT in 2002.

In June 2002, the City consolidated Blocks 152 and 153 into a single block designated Block 152, with three subdivisions for the taxable commercial unit in the condominium, the tax-exempt residential unit in the condominium, and the taxable land. The City incorporated the newly consolidated Block 152 into a new development plan as an "area in need of rehabilitation" under the Urban Enterprise Zone (UEZ) Act, N.J.S.A. 52:27H-1 to-97. The new zone development plan was adopted by the City through Ordinance 1417.

In light of the new development plan, the City adopted Resolution 169-02 on August 18, 2002, approving another PILOT agreement with MBT to restructure the project's tax credit equity financing. The 2002 PILOT agreement reaffirmed that the City "resolved to exempt Marina Bay from real property taxes . . . [and] agreed that in lieu of property taxes [the City] shall impose upon Marina Bay an annual service charge" for municipal services. Specifically, the agreement provided that "the senior citizen portion of the Marina Bay Project shall be exempt from taxation on all improvements," but that the commercial portion of the project and the fee simple interest in the land upon which the Marina Bay Project is constructed would not be exempt from taxation.

On December 20, 2002, MBT and Beach Creek entered into a deed of easement and restrictive covenant in return for low-income housing tax credits, agreeing that Block 152 would be used only for low-income senior housing for forty-five years.

On May 21, 2005, the City adopted Ordinance 1474 designating the Essex County Improvement Authority (ECIA) as the redevelopment entity for the project. ECIA then adopted a resolution authorizing the issuance of $7,400,000 in multifamily housing revenue bonds. On August 16, 2005, MBT contracted to sell the project to MBTII and assigned its title, rights, and interests in the project to MBTII, including the 2002 PILOT agreement. On the same day, the City consented to the assignment and assumption.

On August 18, 2005, PAC Capital L.L.C. (PAC) purchased the ECIA bonds, which were secured by a mortgage and security agreement between MBTII and MBTCA, as mortgagors, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMorgan), as mortgagee.

In 2006, the City increased the tax assessment of the taxable area of consolidated Block 152 from $1.5 million to $14.6 million. Beach Creek appealed in tax court.3 On November 11, 2006, the City filed a tax lien against the property for Beach Creek's failure to pay the 2006 property taxes (Beach Creek tax lien). In January 2007, the City sold the lien for $114,752 to respondent Royal.

In 2007 and 2008, MBTII and the City disagreed over whether sewer charges were subsumed within or levied in addition to the ASC under the 2002 PILOT agreement. The City had not previously billed for sewer charges and MBTII maintains that sewer charges were included in the ASC. Apparently, this issue remains unresolved and is the subject of separate litigation. In December 2008, the City sold a second tax lien for $92,719 to Royal for MBTII's failure to pay the 2007 and 2008 sewer charges plus interest under the 2002 PILOT agreement (MBTII tax lien).

Royal filed a complaint in the Chancery Division seeking to foreclose the Beach Creek tax lien (Beach Creek Tax Lien Action, Docket No. F-56520-09). Only the City and Beach Creek entered appearances; default was entered against the other parties, including PAC and MBTII. In an order entered February 3, 2011, the motion judge found Beach Creek's responsive pleading "non-contesting," and referred the matter to the Office of Foreclosure.

In 2011, Royal filed a complaint to foreclose the MBTII tax lien (MBTII Tax Lien Action, Docket No. F-10203-11). In August 2012, PAC moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to have both tax sale certificates declared void ab initio.

In an order entered on December 7, 2012, the motion judge consolidated the two matters, vacated the prior defaults entered against PAC and MBTII, and denied PAC's partial summary judgment motion without prejudice. Thereafter, PAC filed an answer and MBTII filed an answer and counterclaim. On May 3, 2013, PAC and MBTII filed another motion for summary judgment seeking to void the tax lien certificates. The same day, Royal moved for partial summary judgment and sought a refund from the City for the MBTII tax lien.

On July 31, 2013, the judge granted partial summary judgment to PAC, Beach Creek, and MBTII, and declared the MBTII tax lien void. The judge directed further proceedings to determine whether the Beach Creek tax lien was partially or totally void.

The City moved for reconsideration and, after hearing additional argument, the judge denied the motion but reserved decision on the validity of the Beach Creek tax lien. After hearing further argument on that issue, the judge issued a final order on November 15, 2013, declaring both the MBTII and Beach Creek tax liens void and ordering the City to refund Royal the monies paid on the liens. The order was amended on December 2, 2013, modifying only the time frame for certain payments.

The City appeals and raises the following points:

No cross-appeals have been filed by respondents on the discrete aspects of the rulings that were not favorable to their interests.

II.

A.

As a threshold matter, we reject respondents' claim that because the City appeals only from the court's December 2, 2013 amended final order setting the parties' remedies, and not the July 31, 2013 order initially granting partial summary judgment, the issues on appeal are not properly before this court. All orders prior to November 15, 2013 were expressly interlocutory, stating that "this order and any subsequent order as to [the MBTII Tax Lien Action] shall not constitute a final judgment until the remaining issues in [the Beach Creek Tax Lien Action] are resolved." Although the November 15, 2013 order states that it is a final judgment, it was amended by the December 2, 2013 order. Appellants properly appealed the amended final order pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a)(1). See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2 on R. 2:2-3 (2015); Vitanza v. James, 397 N.J.Super. 516, 518 (App. Div. 2008).

Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo, Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014), and we employ the same standard as trial courts in determining whether summary judgment is proper. Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 584 (2012).

Summary judgment is proper if, after drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, "no genuine issue as to any material fact" exists. R. 4:46-2(c). "An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact." Ibid.

B.

The City first argues that the judge erroneously applied the Condominium Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 46:8B-1 to-38, and challenges his finding that all of consolidated Block 152 is tax-exempt as a "common element" of the senior housing condominium.

"Condominium property" is defined by the Act as "land covered by the master deed, whether or not contiguous and all improvements thereon, all owned either in fee simple or under lease, and all easements, rights and appurtenances belonging thereto or intended for the benefit thereof." N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3(i). A main goal of the Act is to recognize each condominium unit within the condominium property as a separate parcel of land so that owners may treat their units in the same manner as any other type of real property. Troy Village Realty Co. v. Springfield Twp. of Union Cnty., 191 N.J.Super. 559, 563 (App. Div. 1983) (citing N.J.S.A. 46:8B-4), certif. denied, 96 N.J. 302 (1984). Under the Act, therefore, "[a]ll property taxes . . . shall be separately assessed against and collected on each unit as a single parcel, and not on the condominium property as a whole." N.J.S.A. 46:8B-19. Likewise, "no lien shall arise or be effective against the condominium property as a whole. . . . [L]iens or encumbrances shall arise or be created only against each unit. . . ." N.J.S.A. 46:8B-20(a).

Appurtenant to the fee simple interest held in individual units, New Jersey condominium owners have a proportionate and indivisible interest in the "common elements" of a condominium. N.J.S.A. 46:8B-6. "Common elements" means:

Importantly, "common elements" of the "condominium property" are not subject to separate assessment and taxation, because the term "unit" is statutorily defined to include the proportionate undivided interest in the common elements. City of Atl. City v. Warwick Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 334 N.J.Super. 258, 259 n.1 (App. Div. 2000) (citing N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3(o)).

Here, the master deed provides for two "units": the residential unit and the commercial unit. There is no dispute that the City may separately assess and tax the commercial unit.4 As to the land under the residential unit, the master deed provides that the "Residential Unit does not include any land upon which any improvements are constructed." Likewise, the 2002 PILOT agreement states that "[t]he fee simple interest in the land upon which the Marina Bay Project is constructed shall not be exempt from taxation." These provisions are contrary to the Act for the following reasons.

First, the ground lease between Beach Creek and MBT was assigned to the master deed as a "common element." Because the statutory definition of "condominium property" includes land conferred by lease, the 1.24 acres of land leased by Beach Creek to MBT is a tax-exempt common element of the property. N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3(i).

Second, the redevelopment "Project" is defined as the "entire parcel of real property . . . described in Exhibit A to be dedicated to the Condominium, including all structures thereon." (Emphasis added). Because Exhibit A describes the same 1.24 acres of land comprising pre-consolidated Block 152 and a part of former Block 153, the 1.24 acres are a tax-exempt common element of the condominium.

Third, the master deed expressly defines the condominium's common elements as: "[1] All of [MBTII's] rights under the Ground Lease and [2] all portions of the Project not located within any unit." (Emphasis added). Because the "Project" includes the "entire parcel of real estate" dedicated to the condominium—and the phrase "including all structures thereon" directly implies that the "parcel" otherwise refers to the land underneath those structures—it is abundantly clear that the 1.24 acres described in Exhibit A to the master deed is a tax-exempt common element of the condominium.

As such, the 2002 PILOT provision permitting taxation of the land separately from the senior housing unit, and the definition of "Residential Unit" as excluding that land, are void as contrary to the Act. N.J.S.A. 46:8B-7 ("Any agreement contrary to the provisions of [the Condominium Act] shall be void."). The judge correctly ruled that the Act prohibits separate taxation of the 1.24 acres that constitute a common element of the condominium project.5

As to the remainder of consolidated Block 152, further proceedings are necessary to determine the extent of its taxability. First, it remains unclear how many acres constitute the remainder of consolidated Block 152 because the record contains numerous discrepancies. Tax duplicates variously indicate that the taxable portion of consolidated Block 152 is 3.286 and 3.925 acres. Tax maps provide figures ranging from 2.94 to 5.04 acres for the consolidated block. The City argued before the motion judge that the consolidated property was 4.0185 acres.

Second, respondents assert that the land beyond the 1.24 acres is a tax-exempt common element of the condominium because Beach Creek conveyed its easements and rights-of-way as well as the 1.24 acres. Because the deed of easement is not in the record before us, and the trial court did not sufficiently discuss the easement's impact on the taxability of the land, we cannot rely on this assertion to determine the tax exempt status of the land beyond the 1.24 acres.

Third, although the judge's analysis of the 1.24 acres constituting a tax-exempt common element of the property under the ground lease was thorough, the analysis is unclear with respect to the remainder of consolidated Block 152. The court did not adequately explain how the tax exemption conferred by the ground lease for the condominium extended to the remainder of Beach Creek's land, which is currently used for commercial purposes. The court also did not address whether the tax exemption granted in the 2002 PILOT agreement can be made to cover the remaining land owned by Beach Creek by Beach Creek's subsequent grant of an easement to MBTII. Further, the court did not address whether the City's consolidation of Blocks 152 and 153 and its subdivision into taxable and tax-exempt portions affects the taxable status of the remaining land. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 54:4-54; Farmingdale Realty Co. v. Borough of Farmingdale, 55 N.J. 103, 110-11 (1969). Absent these clarifications, we cannot say that the factual issues above are not genuine and material.

The 2002 PILOT agreement granted a tax-exemption only to MBT, and only regarding MBT's senior citizen condominium project. The ground lease entered in 1996 and master deed entered in 1999 specifically identify the project's property as the 1.24 acre portion upon which the condominium was constructed. Although the City subsequently combined Blocks 152 and 153 in 2002, we are not able to conclude on the record before us that it intended to extend the condominium's tax exemption beyond the 1.24 acres to land owned and used for commercial purposes by Beach Creek. Given the confusion on whether there is any basis for such an extension, and the conflicting accounts of the remaining acreage of consolidated Block 152, we reverse the summary judgment as to land other than the 1.24 acres, and remand for further proceedings. We affirm, however, that portion of the judgment exempting the 1.24 acres from separate assessment and taxation.

C.

The City next argues that the judge erred in holding that the County Improvement Authorities Law (CIAL), N.J.S.A. 40:37A-44 to-135, renders the entire property tax exempt and immune from sale in connection with a tax lien. We agree with the judge that the CIAL renders the 1.24 acres tax exempt.

The purpose of the CIAL is to allow counties to acquire and develop land that may be in danger of becoming a blighted area. N.J.S.A. 40:37A-47.1. In furtherance of this purpose, the CIAL provides that "[a]ll properties of an authority . . . and all public facilities, whether or not owned by the authority . . . shall be exempt from all taxes and special assessments of the State or any subdivision thereof." N.J.S.A. 40:37A-85.

The City claims that the property here is not "propert[y] of an authority," and thus cannot satisfy N.J.S.A. 40:37A-85.6 However, the judge's conclusion that the 1.24 acres satisfies the statute as a public facility finds ample support in the record. A "public facility" is defined as "any lands, structures, franchises, equipment, or other property or facilities acquired, constructed, owned, financed, or leased by the authority . . . to accomplish any of the purposes . . . authorized by [N.J.S.A. 40:37A-54.]" N.J.S.A. 40:37A-45(p) (emphasis added). Three of the eleven enumerated purposes in section 54 are relevant:

Here, the ECIA issued $7.4 million in multifamily housing revenue bonds "to finance [the] redevelopment project." The bonds are secured by MBTCA's leasehold estate; the fee simple interest of MBTII in the building structures and improvements; and all rents, issues, and profits arising or issuing from those improvements. Indeed, N.J.S.A. 40:37A-54(j) is specifically referenced in ECIA's resolution as the legal authority for its bond issuance.

Moreover, Judge Batten expressly found that sections (i) and (j) "accurately and entirely characterize ECIA's involvement in the project here at issue. . . . It is beyond dispute that the ECIA advanced these purposes through its authorized bond issuance." We agree that N.J.S.A. 40:37A-85 renders the 1.24 acres of the redevelopment project immune from levy and sale for non-payment of taxes. However, for the reasons set forth above, it is unclear whether the remaining portion of the Beach Creek property is land financed by the authority as part of the redevelopment area. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment as to that remaining land and remand for further proceedings.

D.

The City next argues that the judge erred in applying the 2003 amendment to the LTTEL retroactively to the parties' 2002 PILOT agreement. We disagree. The section in question states:

The second sentence, which explicitly includes a limited tax exemption for land, was part of a 2003 amendment to the statute. L. 2003, c. 125, § 11. The Legislature made clear that the "act shall take effect immediately and shall govern tax appeals filed for the 2003 tax year and thereafter." L. 2003, c. 125, § 16. The amendment was signed into law on July 9, 2003. N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12.

Generally, statutes should apply prospectively. James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552, 563 (2014). There is a two-part test for determining whether a statute should be given retroactive effect: (1) whether the Legislature intended to give the statute a retroactive application, and (2) whether a retroactive application would interfere with a vested constitutional right or result in manifest injustice. Ibid.

There are three circumstances in which a statute will be given retroactive effect: "(1) when the Legislature expresses its intent that the law apply retroactively, either expressly or implicitly; (2) when an amendment is curative; or (3) when the expectations of the parties so warrant." Ibid.

Once it is determined that a statute can apply retroactively, the inquiry then shifts to whether there is a manifest injustice to the party adversely affected by the retroactive application. Id. at 565. Typically, courts look to whether there was reliance on the existing law such that the change would result in unfairness or inequity. In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996).

As a preliminary matter, N.J.S.A. 54:4-23 makes clear that all real property shall be assessed on October 1 in each year. For 2003 tax appeals, the assessment date would be October 1, 2002. In addition, the filing deadline for a 2003 tax appeal would have been April 1, 2003. N.J.S.A. 54:3-21(a). Given the assessment date and filing deadline, the Legislature must have intended for the amendment to apply to preexisting projects that were assessable on October 1, 2002, which would include the property at issue in this appeal. As the judge explained,

We find no error in the judge's determination that the 2003 amendment to the LTTEL applies to the parties' 2002 PILOT agreement. Thus, we affirm the court's holding that the 2003 amendment to the LTTEL applies to the 1.24 acres. However, for the reasons set forth above, we reverse summary judgment as to the remainder of Beach Creek's land and remand for further proceedings.

E.

Conceding that the judge had jurisdiction over the MBTII tax lien, the City argues that he lacked jurisdiction to determine the taxability of the Beach Creek property with respect to the Beach Creek tax lien because N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 confers exclusive jurisdiction of this matter to the Tax Court. We find the City's argument unpersuasive.

"[A] taxpayer feeling aggrieved by the assessed valuation of the taxpayer's property" may appeal to the Tax Court. N.J.S.A. 54:3-21(a). The issue here, however, is not related to the assessed valuation of the property, but rather focuses on Royal's right to foreclose its lien on the property for nonpayment of taxes. Therefore, N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 is inapplicable.

The judge instead, properly relied on N.J.S.A. 54:5-100 in determining that the trial court had jurisdiction. N.J.S.A. 54:5-100 states:

Here, Royal sought to foreclose on the MBTII and Beach Creek tax liens through tax sale certificates it acquired from the City. Because this is an action to foreclose defendants' right to redeem lands from two tax liens, and because the validity of those liens was challenged, this case falls squarely within the purview of N.J.S.A. 54:5-100. Thus, the judge had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the tax liens on both properties.

F.

The City next challenges two factual findings by the judge: that there was a financial agreement in place since the project's inception, and that the City consolidated the tax lots within Blocks 152 and 153 in 2002. We disagree with the City's first contention, but agree that a remand is appropriate as to the second.

In support of an order for summary judgment, a judge must detail the findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 1:7-4(a); R. 4:46-2(c). Generally, "[f]indings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Those findings are not to be disturbed unless they are manifestly unsupported by the evidence. Ibid.

The City first argues that the judge erred in finding that the project has been subject to a financial agreement since its inception. It claims that there was no basis for any tax exemptions prior to the 2002 PILOT agreement because the 1997 PILOT agreement terminated by its own terms in 1998. We find this argument unpersuasive.

The City implemented the 1997 PILOT agreement in Ordinance 1231 as part of a redevelopment plan in compliance with the LRHL and LTTEL. The LTTEL requires that a financial agreement be in place to take advantage of the tax exemptions. N.J.S.A. 40A:20-9. The City then adopted the 2002 PILOT agreement as part of its 2002 refinancing plan. It is not disputed that the parties intended that the project be subject to the LTTEL from the beginning. Thus, we find nothing erroneous about Judge Batten's conclusion that the project was subject to a financial agreement since its inception.

The City also argues that the judge erroneously found that the entire property was consolidated into one block and lot in 2002. The record shows that Blocks 152 and 153 were consolidated in June 2002. The lots within the consolidated block were not consolidated until 2006. The City argues that this factual finding extends the tax exemption to the remainder of consolidated Block 152. As we are remanding for further clarification on the taxability of the remainder of consolidated Block 152, we decline to address this issue further.

G.

The City next argues that the judgment results in an unconstitutional tax exemption to Beach Creek. Because only former Block 152 was designated as blighted, the City claims that a tax exemption cannot constitutionally be extended to former Block 153.

Under N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1, tax exemptions are permitted for the redevelopment of blighted areas. Before designating an area as blighted, the LRHL requires an investigation into the area, notice, and a hearing on adopting a redevelopment plan. N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5 to-6.

The record is clear that a part of former Block 153 was included in the redevelopment project from its inception. First, the 1995 Zoning Board of Adjustment Resolution No. 95-11-1 approved the redevelopment project "between 5th and 7th Avenue and New York Avenue extending west to Beach Creek, also known as Block 152 and 153 on the Official Tax Map of the City of North Wildwood[.]" Ordinance 1231 expressly incorporated the 1995 Zoning Board Resolution by reference.

Second, the City unified Blocks 152 and 153 in its 2002 redevelopment plan and determined that it was an "area in need of rehabilitation" under the UEZ Act. That plan was approved by the New Jersey UEZ Authority and adopted by the City through Ordinance 1417.

The judge did not conclude that Block 153 was tax exempt. Rather, he recognized that part of former Block 153 encompassed property within the 1.24 acres that was exempt from taxation such that no levy or sale of the property was permissible. Because we are remanding for further clarification on what portion of the remainder of consolidated Block 152 is tax exempt, we decline to hold that there exists an unconstitutional tax exemption to Beach Creek.

H.

Finally, the City argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the award of any refunds or credits because of the decision in a prior Law Division case, Marina Bay Towers Urban Renewal, L.P. v. City of N. Wildwood, No. L-759-08 (Law Div. Nov. 7, 2012).

The doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to foreclose relitigation of an issue when

The judge rejected the City's collateral estoppel argument:

We are satisfied that the motion judge's decision that collateral estoppel was not applicable is fully supported by the record.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.