NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendants Patrick Mazzucca (Patrick) and Elizabeth A. Connor-Mazzucca (Elizabeth) appeal from the final judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of plaintiff Two River Community

Bank. They challenge the mortgage loan and the foreclosure. Their arguments were properly rejected in an extensive opinion by Judge Thomas W. Cavanaugh, Jr. We affirm.

I.

We first summarize the facts found at trial. Defendants owned and lived in a house in Little Silver. On June 10, 2007, they entered into an agreement to purchase a house in Rumson for $1,950,000. They listed the Little Silver property for sale.

Patrick, who like his brother Joseph Mazzucca (Joseph) owned 50% of Globe Petroleum (Globe), had an existing business relationship with plaintiff and its executive vice president, Alan Turner. Patrick contacted Turner to secure financing for the purchase of the Rumson house.

On June 22, 2007, plaintiff sent defendants a commitment letter offering a "$1,950,000 Purchase Money Bridge Loan." The loan would mature twelve months after the September 2007 closing. The security for the loan would be a second mortgage on the Little Silver property and a first mortgage on the Rumson property. Defendants accepted plaintiff's offer by correcting, initialing, and signing the commitment letter.

At the closing on September 6, 2007, defendants entered into the $1,950,000 loan transaction with plaintiff. Defendants' attorney Michael I. Halfacre explained to them the bridge loan and the relevant documents. Defendants signed the promissory note, the mortgages on the Little Silver and Rumson properties, and other documents. Turner and Halfacre observed defendants signing the documents, and Halfacre notarized their signatures. Defendants used the $1,950,000 to purchase the Rumson property.

The promissory note required monthly interest-only payments, and payment of the entire principal amount at the one-year maturity date. Defendants paid the monthly amounts. In February 2008, plaintiff reduced the interest rate.

In September 2008, because the Little Silver property had not sold by the one-year maturity date of the bridge loan, plaintiff extended the bridge loan for another year, and reduced the interest rate again. In September 2009, because the Little Silver property still had not sold, plaintiff extended the bridge loan for another eighteen months, and again reduced the interest rate. Defendants signed the accompanying disclosure forms, and did not raise any issues with the loan.

In September 2010, defendants stopped making the monthly payments, and defaulted. In January 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint in mortgage foreclosure. Defendants filed an answer, with affirmative defenses and a multi-count counterclaim, which they later amended.

At trial, plaintiff presented the testimony of Halfacre, Turner, plaintiff's officer Peter Johnson, and Patrick's brother Joseph. For the defense, Patrick testified plaintiff led him to believe he was getting a thirty-year mortgage. He asserted he did not find out until closing that it was a bridge loan. However, defendants' answer, which Patrick verified, admitted "[t]he loan defendant was seeking contemplated the sale of defendant's Little Silver property." Moreover, in litigation with Joseph, Patrick had certified:

Patrick also testified neither he nor Elizabeth signed any of the signed documents presented at trial, including the agreement of sale, commitment letter, promissory note, mortgages, HUD-1 form, loan disclosure forms, loan modification agreements, and interest rate reduction documents. He claimed he signed other such documents, but had no copy of the documents he signed. Defendants' handwriting expert testified only that defendants did not sign the promissory notes and modification agreements. The expert reached that conclusion based on a single exemplar allegedly from each defendant, which she did not see defendants sign. The expert never even contacted Elizabeth. Elizabeth did not testify or participate in the trial.

After hearing testimony and argument for eight days, examining almost a hundred exhibits, and reviewing the parties' written submissions, Judge Cavanagh issued a sixty-six-page oral opinion. The judge found "preposterous" Patrick's claim not to have signed any of the documents, which was contradicted both by the testimony of Turner and defendants' own attorney, and by the documents from the attorney's file, which were a "perfect match" for the documents from plaintiff's file. The judge rejected the testimony of defendants' handwriting expert, which was contrary to the expert's own standards for handwriting comparison.

Regarding the nature of the loan, Judge Cavanagh found "the story offered by Mr. Mazzucca is patently at odds with every document and the testimony of every other witness, including his former lawyer." The judge found Patrick's testimony was "just not believable." The judge instead credited Turner and Halfacre, and Patrick's certification and verified answer. The judge found everyone understood that this was a bridge loan, that defendants were to sell the Little Silver property and use the proceeds from their equity in the Little Silver property to pay down the $1,950,000 note, and that plaintiff would then receive a thirty-year mortgage on the Rumson property.

Judge Cavanagh similarly credited the testimony of Joseph and Johnson that plaintiff did not interfere with defendants' ability to pay the bridge loan in its dealings with Globe. The judge discredited Patrick and found no credible evidence to support any of defendants' affirmative defenses or counterclaim, which depended on "the story Mr. Mazzucca has concocted."

Judge Cavanagh's November 15, 2012 order struck defendants' answer and affirmative defenses, dismissed their counterclaim with prejudice, and referred the matter to the Office of Foreclosure as an uncontested matter. On June 4, 2013, the judge entered a final judgment in foreclosure for $2,289,649.71, and a writ of execution for both properties.

II.

Defendants appeal. They contend that in making the loan, plaintiff: committed fraud in the factum, fraud in the inducement, and fraud by bait and switch; induced with false representations; failed to make disclosures required by the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601 to 1693r; violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to-20; engaged in tortious interference and bad faith; perpetrated fraud by concealing and failing to give notice that the loan was rescindable under TILA; knew the loan was impaired from the beginning; and breached an agreement to give them a conventional fixed-rate loan. Defendants also argue that, after the loan was issued, plaintiff: created a scheme of loan renewals to avoid rescission; actively interfered with their ability to pay so they would default; disguised the assignment of the loan using an alleged loan participation; and failed to join the assignee as a necessary party.

We must hew to our "deferential standard" of review. D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013). "`Final determinations made by the trial court sitting in a non-jury case are subject to a limited and well-established scope of review.'" Ibid. "`[F]indings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011). "To the extent that the trial court's decision constitutes a legal determination, we review it de novo." D'Agostino, supra, 216 N.J. at 182. However, "we do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974).

Applying this standard of review, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in Judge Cavanagh's comprehensive oral opinion. We add the following.

We uphold Judge Cavanagh's findings that plaintiff's witnesses were credible, and that Patrick and his handwriting expert were not credible. "`Appellate courts should defer to trial courts' credibility findings that are influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.'" State v. Kuropchak, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op. at 16) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Moreover, the evidence before us supports the judge's conclusion that Patrick's testimony about the transaction and his signatures was "ridiculous." Additionally, the judge could draw an adverse inference from the fact that Elizabeth did not testify. See generally Washington v. Perez, 219 N.J. 338, 352-59 (2014).

Judge Cavanagh's credibility determinations are dispositive of almost all of defendants' claims, including fraud, misrepresentation, non-disclosure, breach, bad faith, interference with repayment, impairment, assignment, and violation of the CFA. Moreover, defendants plainly failed to meet "the clear and convincing standard [which] applies in common law fraud actions." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 174 (2006); see Stoecker v. Echevarria, 408 N.J.Super. 597, 617 (App. Div. 2009). Further, plaintiff may "not be charged with tortious interference with its own contract." Vosough v. Kierce, 437 N.J.Super. 218, 233-34 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 218 (2015).

III.

Defendants' rescission claims require further discussion. Defendants claim they had a right to rescission of the bridge loan under TILA. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635; 12 C.F.R. § 226.23.1 Plaintiff argued § 1635 did not apply because this was "a residential mortgage transaction as defined in section 103(w) [15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(w)]." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(e)(1). A "residential mortgage transaction" is "a transaction in which a mortgage . . . is created or retained against the consumer's dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(w) (2007)2; see 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24).

We have ruled that "the exemption in 15 U.S.C.A. 1602(w) and 12 C.F.R. 226.2(a)(24) for a `residential mortgage transaction' . . . does not exempt temporary bridge loan financing." Summit Trust Co. v. Chichester, 233 N.J.Super. 417, 425 (App. Div. 1989). In Chichester, as here, the bridge loan was "to enable [the borrowers] to close on the new house pending the anticipated sale of their old house," and was secured by two mortgages, "one on defendants' old house and the other on the new house." Id. at 421, 424. The borrowers intended to pay back the three-month bridge loan when the old house sold, and had received a firm mortgage commitment for permanent financing on the new house from another lender. Id. at 420, 424-26.

Plaintiff argued, and the trial court agreed, that Chichester was distinguishable because here the parties anticipated that the proceeds of the sale of the old house would pay back only some of the one-year bridge loan, and that the same lender would then provide permanent fixed-interest financing for the remainder of the cost of the new house. Whether that is sufficient to distinguish Chichester is unclear. As in Chichester, the parties did not intend the bridge loan would be the permanent financing for the new house, but assumed it would be temporary and replaced by a thirty-year mortgage loan after the sale of the old house. See id. at 425-26.

In any event, as in Chichester, the bridge loan here was also secured "by a mortgage on the old house which would no longer be the defendant's dwelling or principal dwelling." Id. at 424. Such a loan implicated pertinent regulatory commentary:

Chichester held that "[c]learly, the mortgage taken by [plaintiff] in the old house falls squarely within this provision and is subject to the right of rescission." Id. at 425.

The version of this official commentary which existed at the time of plaintiff's loan was even more clear:

Thus, under the official commentary and Chichester, plaintiff should have given notice of the right of rescission.

Nonetheless, as the trial court correctly decided, any right of rescission of the 2007 loan lapsed because defendants failed to raise it within three years. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(f) provides that the "obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction. . ., notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms required under this section or any other disclosures required under this part [15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1631-51] have not been delivered to the obligor." The United States Supreme Court has held that TILA "permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year period of § 1635(f) has run." Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 419, 118 S.Ct. 1408, 1413, 140 L. Ed. 2d 566, 574 (1998).

Moreover, there was no right to rescind the 2008 and 2009 loan modifications because each was "a refinancing or consolidation (with no new advances) of the principal balance then due . . . of an existing extension of credit by the same creditor secured by an interest in the same property." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(e)(2).

Thus, defendants' rescission claims, like their other claims, ultimately fail. The trial court properly struck defendants' answer and counterclaim and entered a final judgment of foreclosure.

Affirmed.