FAITH S. HOCHBERG, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion of Defendant DSM ("Defendant") to Dismiss the Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs Ferenc K. Csabai, Curtis Landsberger, David P. Smith, Michael Scardigno, John D. Miles, Margaret T. Miles, Michael A. Miles, and Anna E. Dale (collectively "Plaintiffs"). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 78, this motion was decided on the papers and without oral argument.
This case represents the eighth lawsuit filed by one or more of the pro se Plaintiffs alleging that Defendant and its officers have fraudulently misrepresented almost every aspect of Martek Biosciences Corporation ("Martek")
Plaintiffs filed their fifty-one page, unnumbered, poorly organized Complaint on February 11, 2013. After a status conference held with Magistrate Judge Joseph A. Dickson, Plaintiffs were ordered to submit an Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on May 24, 2013, again arguing that Defendant fraudulently represented numerous aspects of Martek. Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on July 22, 2013. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition on August 5, 2013. Defendant filed a Reply on August 16, 2013.
In deciding a motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court is "required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the plaintiff's "obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. On a motion to dismiss, courts are "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Plaintiff's complaint is subject to the heightened pleading standard set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal:
556 U.S. 662, 678-679 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 750).
A private cause of action for federal securities fraud "may be brought not later than the earlier of . . . 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation[,] or . . . 5 years after such violation." See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). Although the substance of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is not entirely clear, it is apparent that almost every act alleged by Plaintiffs occurred prior to February 11, 2008, and thus is barred by the statute of limitations. To dispute this contention, Plaintiffs point to the fact that Martek merged into DSM in June 2012, and argue that "the fraud never stopped." To the extent that Plaintiffs allege acts occurring after February 11, 2008, these claims are dismissed for failure to plead fraud with particularity.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), "in alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." In order to meet this standard, a plaintiff "must plead or allege the date, time and place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject precision or some measure of substantiation into a fraud allegation." Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs do not provide adequate information regarding the alleged fraudulent acts committed by Defendant after February 11, 2008. Instead, Plaintiffs' rambling Amended Complaint is filled with copies of both newspaper articles and SEC filings, and contains numerous conclusory allegations such as the following:
Because these allegations, along with the rest of the Amended Complaint, fail to plead fraud with the particularity required by Rule 9(b), the Amended Complaint is dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted. An appropriate Order follows this Opinion.