KEVIN McNULTY, District Judge.
This matter having come before the Court on the joint application of the United States, by Craig Carpenito, United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey (Sean M. Sherman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, appearing), and defendant Albert Davydov (Andrew Citron, Esq., appearing), for an order granting a continuance of proceedings in the above-captioned matter; and the defendant being aware that he has the right to have this matter brought to trial within 70 days of the date of his appearance before a judicial officer of this court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1); and the defendant having consented to such continuance and having waived such right; and for good cause shown,
IT IS THE FINDING OF THIS COURT that this action should be continued for the following reasons:
1. The failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel for the defendant and counsel for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation for trial, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
2. This case is an unusual or complex case within the meaning of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii), in light of the nature of the prosecution such that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within 70 days.
3. The discovery in the case is expected to be voluminous, consisting of, among other things, computer and electronic evidence; medical, financial and business records involving thousands of pages, and additional lime is necessary to ensure that, taking into account the exercise of diligence) defense counsel have sufficient time to review and inspect discovery and further investigate the charges in this matter.
4. As a result of the foregoing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (h)(7)(B)(iv), the ends of justice served by the granting of this continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
IT IS, therefore, on this
ORDERED that this action be, and hereby is, continued until March 31, 2020; and it is further
ORDERED that the period from the date of this order through March 31, 2020 be and it hereby is excluded in computing time under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.