NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Jarrett Parker was indicted by an Essex County grand jury for first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2a(1) or (4) (count one), first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1b(1) (count two), and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a. Tried by a jury, defendant was found guilty of carjacking, but acquitted of kidnapping, the lesser-included offense of criminal restraint, and endangering the welfare of a child.

The trial judge sentenced defendant on the carjacking conviction to a term of twenty years imprisonment, with a seventeen-year period of parole ineligibility and five years of parole supervision upon release under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The sentence was to run concurrent with a sentence defendant was then serving on a parole violation from a Union County conviction. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

The relevant facts based on the trial testimony may be summarized as follows. On August 6, 2008, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Catrell Robinson drove to Union Avenue in Irvington to take his friend Sharon1 to a twenty-four-hour laundromat. When Robinson arrived at the residence, Sharon was waiting outside with her two-year-old baby, M.A., and her sixteen-year-old sister, S.C. Robinson started loading the laundry bags in the trunk, but when he ran out of room, he began to put the remaining bags in the back seat of the car. Sharon's daughter, M.A., was in the back seat at this time, but was not in a car seat.

As Robinson was loading the laundry bags into his car, he had a verbal encounter with a man on the street which escalated into a fight. Robinson got the better of the fight until he saw a group of men coming around the corner. He shook the man off his waist and started to run away. He stopped after just a brief run. A group of six or seven, apparent friends of defendant, knocked him to the ground and beat him to the point of unconsciousness.

Robinson did not know the individual who he initially fought with and was unable to identify him from a photo array at the police station. Nor could he identify defendant at trial. Robinson was not from the neighborhood where the incident took place and only knew Sharon and her sister.

Both Sharon and S.C. witnessed the events as they unfolded and recognized the man that Robinson was fighting with from seeing him around their neighborhood. Both identified that individual as defendant.

Sharon saw the men who ran down the street after Robinson and believed they were friends of defendant. When they started to "jump" Robinson, she "ran down to try to help him." When asked where defendant was at this time, Sharon indicated that "he was going back towards the car." She told S.C. to lock the door to the car, but saw defendant "pull" her out of the driver's door when she "had like one arm in, like one leg inside the car." From down the street, Sharon screamed that "[her] daughter was in the car." She heard S.C. screaming at defendant to let her get M.A. out of the car.

S.C.'s testimony differed in some respects from her sister's. According to S.C., she was "behind the driver's seat" trying to get her niece out when defendant "pushed" her out of the car.

According to both Sharon and S.C., defendant got into the car and "pulled off." The back seat passenger's side door was still open at this time. The car screeched off, went over the curb on the other side of the street, drove through a fence, and into a grassy field, and then crashed into a dirt mound where it stopped. Laundry bags were later found in the street. Robinson also saw someone drive off in his car, although he could not identify who that person was. When Robinson got to the car, Sharon's baby, M.A., was in the back seat.

Sharon, running after the car, saw defendant exit the car. She looked through the window and saw her daughter sitting on top of a laundry bag in the back seat on the passenger's side. M.A. was frightened by the event, but appeared to be uninjured. Sharon took her daughter by ambulance to be evaluated at a hospital emergency room. Following an examination, it was reported that M.A. was not injured.

Meanwhile, S.C. observed defendant "walking away from the car . . . as if he didn't do anything." After he walked past her, she proceeded towards the car to check on her niece and was told by her sister that M.A. appeared to be all right.

At trial, defendant testified on his own behalf. He admitted being on Union Avenue in Irvington around 11:00 p.m. on August 6, 2008. He testified that he was asking people whether they had seen his phone that he had misplaced, when he saw a "black male . . . with two girls" loading bags in a car. He recognized the two girls and knew that they lived in the 300 block of Union Avenue because he "hang[s] out there," but he did not know the man.

Defendant explained that an exchange of words took place, which escalated into a fight. They fought for about ten minutes by Robinson's car. At one point, Robinson took off because a group of about seven men approached him and he believed they were going to attack him. Defendant described what happened next:

Defendant denied going to and driving off in Robinson's car after leaving Robinson unconscious. He testified that he went to his friend Khalif's car and asked him to drive him home so he could clean up. Khalif dropped him off instead at the residence of Altrina Williams, the mother of defendant's child, because she lived close to Khalif's girlfriend, where he planned to go. Williams's residence in Hillside was approximately five blocks from the 300 block of Union Avenue in Irvington. Defendant remained at Williams's house for about half an hour before she drove him home to Newark.

Williams corroborated defendant's testimony that he came to her residence on the evening in question, some time between 11:00 p.m. and midnight. According to Williams, defendant "looked like he was involved in a fight." He had bruises on his face, and his polo shirt "looked stretched out." Williams indicated defendant stayed at her residence for about ten

On appeal, defendant raises the following issues for our consideration:

We are satisfied based on the briefs submitted in light of the record and applicable law that the issues raised in Points II and III are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only these brief comments.

The jury did not need recharging, as argued in Point II, on the mental state to establish the carjacking charge. Because of the omission of the word "knowingly" on the verdict sheet under kidnapping first and second-degree under count two, but included under the lesser-included offense of criminal restraint, the court responded to a jury question that "knowingly" was required to be proven under the other greater offenses on the same count. The jury expressed its satisfaction with the court's clarification. There is no indication that there was any rub-off effect on the carjacking offense under count one on the verdict sheet.

With regard to Point III, defendant never requested an instruction for theft of an automobile, as a lesser-included offense of carjacking. Even absent a request, the court could have canvassed the record and not found a basis to charge theft of an automobile. Defendant denied that he stole the car. Both sisters identified him as driving away in the car with defendant pulling S.C. out of the car. The only discrepancy in their testimony was whether it was from the driver's side as testified to by Sharon or the rear driver side as testified to by S.C. There were no grounds to charge theft of an automobile because there was no rational basis to acquit defendant of the greater charge of carjacking and convict him of the lesser offense. See State v. Garretson, 313 N.J.Super. 348, 353-54 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 428 (1998). Put another way, the lesser offense of theft of an automobile was not "clearly indicated" by the evidence. See State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004).

Turning to Point I, defendant contends that the prosecutor's references to prior use of aliases deprived him of a fair trial. Defendant asserts that his "alleged use of aliases had no relevance to the crimes charged and were introduced only to impugn [his] character."

Prior to defendant testifying, defense counsel requested that the prosecutor be prohibited from referring to defendant's aliases contained in two prior judgments of conviction. In response, the prosecutor maintained that defendant's use of aliases would "go towards his credibility or lack thereof." The trial judge ruled that the prosecutor would be permitted to refer to these aliases, reasoning as follows:

Each of the other names purportedly used by defendant were contained in the indictment for which he was on trial and another indictment on which he had been convicted that was to be used to attack his credibility as a prior conviction as permitted by State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 (1978).

Consistent with the court's ruling, the prosecutor questioned defendant on cross-examination about his prior use of other names.

The prosecutor again referenced defendant's use of other names during summation, arguing to the jury:

Defendant did not object to these summation comments.

"[I]t is well-settled that `the fact of alias names should be kept from the jury unless relevant for some purpose. . . .'" State v. Salaam, 225 N.J.Super. 66, 72 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 609 (1988) (citations omitted). "The principle objection to the use of an alias in a criminal proceeding is that an alias implies that the defendant belongs to the criminal class and thereby prejudices the jury." Id. at 73. Generally, in order for the "admission of irrelevant aliases into evidence" to be grounds for reversal, "some tangible form of prejudice" to the defendant must be demonstrated. Ibid.

We discern no violation of the principle espoused in Salaam that the use of aliases implies defendant belongs to a criminal class. No such implication was suggested by the reference to other names used by defendant. Indeed, no mention of the word "alias" was made by the prosecutor in either his cross-examination of defendant or in his closing argument. Furthermore, defendant explained that Jarrod Parks was an error in police transcription. He, however, admitted using his friend Dashon Price's name for his own benefit. Here, the focus was not so much on the use of the friend's name, but why defendant resorted to such use. The prosecutor was able to illustrate that defendant believed it served his purpose to do so. There was no impropriety in the way these other names were put before the jury to affect defendant's credibility. Nor do we discern any undue tangible evidence of prejudice. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing references to the other names appearing on indictments involving defendant.

In Point IV, defendant argues that the court's imposition of a twenty-year term of imprisonment was excessive for the atypical nature of the carjacking and overall constituted an abuse of discretion.

Defendant asserts that the carjacking was "relatively minor" because no bodily injury occurred and "the force used—a single push—was not significant." In addition, he maintains that "it is clear from the circumstances established by the State that [his] spontaneous act of taking off in Robinson's car was not motivated by an intent to steal but was an attempt to flee a street fight in which he was badly beaten."

To begin with, although no bodily injury occurred, defendant created a risk of bodily injury to both S.C. and M.A. by his actions. Furthermore, the trial record does not support his theory that he took Robinson's car in an attempt to flee the street fight. Rather, the testimony indicated that the group of men who chased and caught Robinson were friends of defendant. Indeed, defendant identified one of the men in the group as his friend Khalif and some others by first or street names. He did not have to flee from the fight because any threat was neutralized when defendant and the group of men punched and kicked Robinson unconscious.

The trial court's findings with respect to the aggravating and mitigating factors were based on competent credible evidence in the record. See State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180 (2009); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364 (1984). Defendant had five juvenile adjudications and this was his third indictable conviction as an adult. His criminal history supported aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3), the risk that defendant will commit another offense, aggravating factor six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(6), the extent of defendant's prior criminal record, and aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9), the need for deterring defendant and others from violating the law.

With respect to the mitigating factors advocated by defendant, his criminal history also supports the court's rejection of mitigating factor eight, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(8), that defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur. Defendant focuses too narrowly on the unique circumstances of the incident. As the evidence suggested, defendant was motivated by anger and retaliation, which are not unusual motives for criminal conduct and which could recur. In addition, the trial court's rejection of mitigating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(2), that defendant did not contemplate his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm was factually based. The evidence at trial indicated that defendant pushed or pulled a sixteen-year-old girl out of a car and sped off, eventually crashing. The fact that the jury did not find that defendant had knowledge of the two-year-old in the back seat did not insulate him from threatening serious harm. The manner in which he drove the stolen vehicle portended the risk of serious harm.

Although defendant was eligible for an extended term as a persistent offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3, the prosecutor did not file a motion in view of the fact that no gun was used in the carjacking. Nonetheless, the prosecutor argued for a twenty-five year sentence, noting that defendant's crimes were escalating in seriousness.

Our reviewing function is not whether we "would have reached a different conclusion on what an appropriate sentence should be; it is rather whether, on the basis of the evidence, no reasonable sentencing court could have imposed the sentence under review." State v. Ghertler, 114 N.J. 383, 388 (1989). A conscientious trial judge, as here, "need fear no second-guessing" when exercising discretion in accord with the principles set forth in the Code and as defined by case law. Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 365. Measured against the foregoing standards, we discern no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed.

The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.