LAURIE SMITH CAMP, Senior District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Strike, ECF No. 7, filed by Defendant Terry Hughes Tree Service, Inc. (THTS). For the reasons stated below, the Motion will be granted.
Plaintiff Kayleen Harmel brought this action against THTS for age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623, the Nebraska Age Discrimination in Employment Act (NADEA); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1004; and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1114. Compl., ECF No. 1. In her request for relief, Harmel listed "[p]unitive damages for THTS's knowing violation of federal discrimination laws." Id. at Page ID 6. THTS filed the pending Motion to Strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) arguing Harmel's request for punitive damages should be stricken because such damages are not recoverable under the ADEA, the NADEA, or the NFEPA. Harmel did not respond to THTS's Motion.
Under Rule 12(f), "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "Judges enjoy liberal discretion to strike pleadings under Rule 12(f)." BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2007).
Because Harmel cannot recover punitive damages under Nebraska law, O'Brien v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 903 N.W.2d 432, 458 (Neb. 2017) (citing Neb. Const. art. VII, § 5), the Court must determine whether punitive damages are recoverable under the ADEA. If not, the Court will strike Harmel's request for punitive damages from the Complaint. See BJC Health Sys., 478 F.3d at 917.
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (emphasis in original). The Eighth Circuit has explained that § 626(b) "contains two tiers of liability. It awards compensatory damages when an employer violates the [ADEA] and liquidated damages when that violation is willful." Spencer v. Stuart Hall Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 1999). "Liquidated damages serve as a deterrent to willful violations of the [ADEA], and while there is an aspect to such damages that is punitive in nature, they are not the equivalent of punitive damages." Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 729 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted); see also Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., Inc., 110 F.3d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Wiehoff v. GTE Directories Corp., 61 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Liquidated damages amount to a punitive double recovery, `intended to deter willful conduct.'")). "Punitive damages are not recoverable under the ADEA." Williams, 964 F.2d at 729 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 621-34).
Based on the foregoing Eighth Circuit precedent, the Court finds that Harmel cannot recover punitive damages under the ADEA. Id. She may seek compensatory and liquidated damages, which are expressly provided for in § 626(b).
IT IS ORDERED: