ORDER

JAMES C. MAHAN, District Judge.

Presently before the court is defendant Saticoy Bay LLC Series 1547 Frisco Peak's ("Saticoy") motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 42). Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA") filed a response (ECF No. 46), to which Saticoy replied (ECF No. 48).

Also before the court is BANA's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 44). Saticoy filed a response (ECF No. 47), to which BANA replied (ECF No. 49).

I. Facts

This case involves a dispute over real property located at 1547 Frisco Peak Dr., # 215, Henderson, NV 89014 (the "property"). On October 23, 2009, Bess Bernard obtained a loan in the amount of $73,641.00 to purchase the property, which was secured by a deed of trust recorded on October 27, 2009. (ECF No. 1 at 4).

On December 6, 2012, defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc. ("NAS"), acting on behalf of defendant Desert Linn Condominiums (the "HOA"), recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due of $2,052.58. (ECF No. 1 at 4). On March 27, 2013, NAS recorded a notice of default and election to sell to satisfy the delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due of $3,339.32. (ECF No. 1 at 4).

On May 20, 2013, BANA requested a ledger from the HOA/NAS identifying the superpriority amount allegedly owed to the HOA. (ECF No. 1 at 5). The HOA/NAS allegedly refused to provide a ledger. (ECF No. 1 at 5). BANA calculated the superpriority amount to be $1,170.00 and tendered that amount to NAS on June 13, 2013, which NAS allegedly refused. (ECF No. 1 at 6).

On October 22, 2013, NAS recorded a notice of trustee's sale, stating an amount due of $5,536.20.1 (ECF No. 42-5). On November 15, 2013, Saticoy purchased the property at the foreclosure sale for $11,200.00. (ECF No. 1 at 6). A trustee's deed upon sale in favor of Saticoy was recorded on November 22, 2013. (ECF No. 1 at 6).

The deed of trust was assigned to BANA via an assignment of deed of trust recorded on December 30, 2015. (ECF No. 1 at 4).

On March 18, 2016, BANA filed the underlying complaint, alleging four causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against NAS and the HOA; (3) wrongful foreclosure against NAS and the HOA; and (4) injunctive relief against Saticoy. (ECF No. 1).

On April 8, 2016, Saticoy filed an answer and counterclaim against BANA for quiet title and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 9).

In the instant motions, Saticoy and BANA move for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 42, 44). The court will address each as it sees fit.

II. Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

For purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.

In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy its initial burden. "When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case." C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

By contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).

If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987).

In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

At summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The evidence of the nonmovant is "to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249-50.

III. Discussion

As an initial matter, the court dismisses, without prejudice, claims (2) through (4) of BANA's complaint. Claims (2) and (3) are dismissed without prejudice for failure to mediate pursuant to NRS 38.330. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 38.330(1); McKnight Family, L.L.P. v. Adept Mgmt., 310 P.3d 555 (Nev. 2013). Count (4) is dismissed without prejudice because the court follows the well-settled rule in that a claim for "injunctive relief" standing alone is not a cause of action. See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig., 490 F.Supp.2d 1091, 1130 (D. Nev. 2007); Tillman v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No. 2:12-CV-346 JCM RJJ, 2012 WL 1279939, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2012) (finding that "injunctive relief is a remedy, not an independent cause of action"); Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 702 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ("A request for injunctive relief by itself does not state a cause of action.").

A. Motions for Summary Judgment2

Under Nevada law, "[a]n action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the purpose of determining such adverse claim." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.010. "A plea to quiet title does not require any particular elements, but each party must plead and prove his or her own claim to the property in question and a plaintiff's right to relief therefore depends on superiority of title." Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, for plaintiff to succeed on its quiet title action, it needs to show that its claim to the property is superior to all others. See also Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 918 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1996) ("In a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to prove good title in himself.").

1. Deed Recitals3

Section 116.3116(1) of the Nevada Revised Statutes gives an HOA a lien on its homeowners' residences for unpaid assessments and fines; moreover, NRS 116.3116(2) gives priority to that HOA lien over all other liens and encumbrances with limited exceptions—such as "[a] first security interest on the unit recorded before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2)(b).

The statute then carves out a partial exception to subparagraph (2)(b)'s exception for first security interests. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2). In SFR Investment Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, the Nevada Supreme Court provided the following explanation:

334 P.3d 408, 411 (Nev. 2014) ("SFR Investments").

Chapter 116 of the Nevada Revised Statutes permits an HOA to enforce its superpriority lien by nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Id. at 415. Thus, "NRS 116.3116(2) provides an HOA a true superpriority lien, proper foreclosure of which will extinguish a first deed of trust." Id. at 419; see also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31162(1) (providing that "the association may foreclose its lien by sale" upon compliance with the statutory notice and timing rules).

Subsection (1) of NRS 116.31166 provides that the recitals in a deed made pursuant to NRS 116.31164 of the following are conclusive proof of the matters recited:

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31166(1)(a)-(c).4 "The `conclusive' recitals concern default, notice, and publication of the [notice of sale], all statutory prerequisites to a valid HOA lien foreclosure sale as stated in NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31164, the sections that immediately precede and give context to NRS 116.31166." Shadow Wood Homeowners Assoc. v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp., Inc., 366 P.3d 1105 (Nev. 2016) ("Shadow Wood"). Nevertheless, courts retain the equitable authority to consider quiet title actions when a HOA's foreclosure deed contains statutorily conclusive recitals. See id. at 1112.

Here, Saticoy has provided the recorded trustee's deed upon sale, the recorded notice of delinquent assessment, the recorded notice of default and election to sell, and the recorded notice of trustee's sale. (ECF No. 42). Pursuant to NRS 116.31166, these recitals in the recorded foreclosure deed are conclusive to the extent that they implicate compliance with NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31164, which provide the statutory prerequisites of a valid foreclosure. See id. at 1112 ("[T]he recitals made conclusive by operation of NRS 116.31166 implicate compliance only with the statutory prerequisites to foreclosure."). Therefore, pursuant to NRS 116.31166 and the recorded foreclosure deed, the foreclosure sale is valid to the extent that it complied with NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31164.

Importantly, while NRS 116.3116 accords certain deed recitals conclusive effect—e.g., default, notice, and publication of the notice of sale—it does not conclusively, as a matter of law, entitle Saticoy to success on its quiet title claim. See Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 1112 (rejecting contention that NRS 116.31166 defeats, as a matter of law, actions to quiet title). Thus, the question remains whether BANA has demonstrated sufficient grounds to justify setting aside the foreclosure sale. See id. "When sitting in equity . . . courts must consider the entirety of the circumstances that bear upon the equities. This includes considering the status and actions of all parties involved, including whether an innocent party may be harmed by granting the desired relief." Id.

1. Rejected Tender

BANA argues that its tender of its computation of the superpriority amount extinguished the HOA's superpriority lien prior to the foreclosure sale. (ECF No. 44 at 4-8). BANA thus maintains that Saticoy took title to the property subject to BANA's deed of trust. (ECF No. 44 at 4-8).

The court disagrees. BANA did not tender the amount sent forth in the notice of default, which stated an amount due of $3,339.32. Rather, BANA tendered a lesser amount, the amount it calculated to be sufficient—specifically, $1,170.00.

Under NRS 116.31166(1), the holder of a first deed of trust may pay off the superpriority portion of an HOA lien to prevent the foreclosure sale from extinguishing that security interest. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31166(1); see also SFR Investments, 334 P.3d at 414 ("But as a junior lienholder, U.S. Bank could have paid off the SHHOA lien to avert loss of its security . . . ."); see also, e.g., 7912 Limbwood Ct. Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., 979 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1149 (D. Nev. 2013) ("If junior lienholders want to avoid this result, they readily can preserve their security interests by buying out the senior lienholder's interest." (citing Carillo v. Valley Bank of Nev., 734 P.2d 724, 725 (Nev. 1987); Keever v. Nicholas Beers Co., 611 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Nev. 1980))).

The superpriority lien portion, however, consists of "the last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and maintenance and nuisance-abatement charges," while the subpriority piece consists of "all other HOA fees or assessments." SFR Investments, 334 P.3d at 411 (emphasis added); see also 7912 Limbwood Ct. Trust, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 1150 ("The superpriority lien consists only of unpaid assessments and certain charges specifically identified in § 116.31162.").

BANA merely presumed, without adequate support, that the amount set forth in the notice of default included more than the superpriority lien portion and that a lesser amount based on BANA's own calculations would be sufficient to preserve its interest in the property. See generally, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 107.080 (allowing trustee's sale under a deed of trust only when a subordinate interest has failed to make good the deficiency in performance or payment for 35 days); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430 (barring judicially ordered foreclosure sale if the deficiency is made good at least 5 days prior to sale).

The notice of default recorded March 27, 2013, set forth an amount due of $3,339.32. (ECF No. 1 at 4). Rather than tendering the $3,339.32 due so as to preserve its interest in the property and then later seeking a refund of any difference, BANA elected to pay a lesser amount ($1,170.00) based on its unwarranted assumption that the amount stated in the notice included more than what was due. See SFR Investments, 334 P.3d at 418 (noting that the deed of trust holder can pay the entire lien amount and then sue for a refund). Had BANA paid the amount set forth in the notice of default ($3,339.32), the HOA's interest would have been subordinate to the first deed of trust. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31166(1).

After failing to use the legal remedies available to BANA to prevent the property from being sold to a third party—for example, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and filling a lis pendens on the property (see Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 14.010, 40.060)— BANA now seeks to profit from its own failure to follow the rules set forth in the statutes. See generally, e.g., Barkley's Appeal. Bentley's Estate, 2 Monag. 274, 277 (Pa. 1888) ("In the case before us, we can see no way of giving the petitioner the equitable relief she asks without doing great injustice to other innocent parties who would not have been in a position to be injured by such a decree as she asks if she had applied for relief at an earlier day."); Nussbaumer v. Superior Court in & for Yuma Cty., 489 P.2d 843, 846 (Ariz. 1971) ("Where the complaining party has access to all the facts surrounding the questioned transaction and merely makes a mistake as to the legal consequences of his act, equity should normally not interfere, especially where the rights of third parties might be prejudiced thereby.").

In presuming that an "offer" to pay constitutes a "tender" of payment, BANA cites to Stone Hollow Ave. Trust v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Ass'n, 382 P.3d 911 (Nev. 2016), for the proposition that an offer to pay the superpriority amount prior to the foreclosure sale preserves the lender's deed of trust. (ECF No. 44 at 4-8).

The Stone Hollow court, however, made no such holding. To the contrary, the Stone Hollow court held that "[w]hen rejection of a tender is unjustified, the tender is effective to discharge the lien." 382 P.3d at 911. BANA has not set forth any evidence as to a tender in a sufficient amount.

Based on the foregoing, BANA has failed to sufficiently establish that it tendered a sufficient amount prior to the foreclosure sale so as to render Saticoy's title subject to BANA's deed of trust.

2. Due Process

BANA argues that the HOA lien statute is facially unconstitutional because it does not mandate notice to deed of trust beneficiaries. (ECF No. 44 at 8-12). BANA further contends that any factual issues concerning actual notice is irrelevant pursuant to Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 832 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Bourne Valley"). (ECF No. 44 at 8-12).

The Ninth Circuit held that NRS 116.3116's "opt-in" notice scheme, which required a HOA to alert a mortgage lender that it intended to foreclose only if the lender had affirmatively requested notice, facially violated mortgage lenders' constitutional due process rights. Bourne Valley, 832 F.3d at 1157-58. The facially unconstitutional provision, as identified in Bourne Valley, exists in NRS 116.31163(2). See id. at 1158. At issue is the "opt-in" provision that unconstitutionally shifts the notice burden to holders of the property interest at risk. See id.

To state a procedural due process claim, a claimant must allege "(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections." Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998).

BANA has failed to show that it was entitled to any notice as it was not assigned the deed of trust until after the foreclosure sale took place. Specifically, the foreclosure sale occurred on November 15, 2013, and the deed of trust was assigned to BANA via assignment of deed of trust recorded on December 30, 2015. Accordingly, BANA's due process argument fails as a matter of law.

3. Supremacy Clause

BANA argues that the HOA lien statute cannot interfere with the federal mortgage insurance program or extinguish mortgage interests insured by the FHA. (ECF No. 44 at 12-18).

The single-family mortgage insurance program allows FHA to insure private loans, expanding the availability of mortgages to low-income individuals wishing to purchase homes. See Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Sky Meadow Ass'n, 117 F.Supp.2d 970, 980-81 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing program); W Wash. & Sandhill Homeowners Ass'n v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:13-cv-01845-GMN-GWF, 2014 WL 4798565, at *1 n.2 (D. Nev. Sept. 25, 2014) (same). If a borrower under this program defaults, the lender may foreclose on the property, convey title to HUD, and submit an insurance claim. 24 C.F.R. § 203.355. HUD's property disposition program generates funds to finance the program. See 24 C.F.R. § 291.1.

Allowing an HOA foreclosure to wipe out a first deed of trust on a federally-insured property thus interferes with the purposes of the FHA insurance program. Specifically, it hinders HUD's ability to recoup funds from insured properties. As this court previously stated in SaticoyBayLLC, Series 7342 Tanglewood Park v. SRMOF II 2012-1 Trust, the court reads the foregoing precedent to indicate that a homeowners' association foreclosure sale under NRS 116.3116 may not extinguish a federally-insured loan. No. 2:13-CV-1199 JCM (VCF), 2015 WL 1990076, at *4 (D. Nev. Apr. 30, 2015).

However, the instant case is distinguishable from these cases in that, here, FHA is not a named party. Neither the complaint nor the counterclaim seeks to quiet title against FHA. Thus, this argument provides no support for BANA as the outcome of the instant case has no bearing on FHA's ability to quiet title.

4. Retroactivity

BANA contends that SFR Investments should not be applied retroactively to extinguish the first deed of trust. (ECF No. 44 at 18-19).

The Nevada Supreme Court has since applied the SFR Investments holding in numerous cases that challenged pre-SFR Investments foreclosure sales. See, e.g., Centeno v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 64998, 2016 WL 3486378, at *2 (Nev. June 23, 2016); LN Mgmt. LLC Series 8301 Boseck 228 v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 64495, 2016 WL 1109295, at *1 (Nev. Mar. 18, 2016) (reversing 2013 dismissal of quiet-title action that concluded contrary to SFR Investments, reasoning that "the district court's decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of the controlling law"); Mackensie Family, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 65696, 2016 WL 315326, at *1 (Nev. Jan. 22, 2016) (reversing and remanding because "[t]he district court's conclusion of law contradicts our holding in SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank"). Thus, SFR Investments applies to this case.

IV. Conclusion

In light of the aforementioned, the court finds that BANA has failed to raise a genuine dispute so as to preclude summary judgment in favor of Saticoy on its quiet title claim. Nor has BANA established that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor against Saticoy, the HOA, or NAS. BANA did not tender the amount provided in the notice of default, as statute and the notice itself instructed, and did not meet its burden to show that no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the proper amount of the HOA's lien or constitutionally sufficient notice.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Saticoy's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 42) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED consistent with the foregoing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BANA's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 44) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case.