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T.C. v. R.C., A-3712-13T3. (2015)

Court: Superior Court of New Jersey Number: innjco20150512251 Visitors: 6
Filed: May 12, 2015
Latest Update: May 12, 2015
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION PER CURIAM . Defendant R.C. appeals from a January 23, 2014 final restraining order (FRO) entered against him pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. R.C. and plaintiff T.C. were married in 2001 and had three children who were twelve, ten, and eight years old at the time of the FRO hearing. On January 20, 2014, defendant had been drinking
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

Defendant R.C. appeals from a January 23, 2014 final restraining order (FRO) entered against him pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

R.C. and plaintiff T.C. were married in 2001 and had three children who were twelve, ten, and eight years old at the time of the FRO hearing. On January 20, 2014, defendant had been drinking and began to argue with plaintiff. During the argument, defendant pushed his body against plaintiff, and grabbed her by the shoulders to prevent her from leaving the room. Plaintiff tried to get away and told defendant not to grab her. He responded that, as her husband, he had a right to grab her.

To get away from him, plaintiff went into the bathroom and locked the door, but defendant broke the lock and opened the door. Plaintiff then went down to the basement with defendant following and cursing at her.

After thirty or forty minutes of this, plaintiff, who was in her pajamas, changed and tried to leave the house. She went into the garage, got into her car, and locked the doors. When she refused to open the doors, defendant took a paint can and banged it against the car's windshield, leaving a mark. Plaintiff told defendant she was calling 9-1-1 and began to slowly back out of the garage. As plaintiff was attempting to leave, defendant got into his Range Rover and drove into the rear of plaintiff's car. Defendant then drove off before the police arrived.

Police took pictures of the damage to plaintiff's car and assisted her in obtaining a temporary restraining order. At a hearing on plaintiff's request for an FRO, plaintiff testified to other instances of domestic violence when defendant came home drunk and was physically abusive to her.

Defendant testified that the January 20, 2014 argument began when he asked plaintiff to do various chores around the house, including cleaning, arranging the bills, and purchasing food. He denied that he was intoxicated but admitted to having wine earlier that day. When plaintiff told him to get away from her, defendant claims he grabbed her to tell her that he loved her and wanted their marriage to work. Defendant denied running into plaintiff's car and claimed she backed into him.

Judge Louis S. Sceusi applied the two-pronged test established in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J.Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006), in determining whether to enter an FRO. First, the judge found that plaintiff had established the elements of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, by a preponderance of the evidence. Judge Sceusi noted that defendant admitted that he grabbed plaintiff, and concluded that his actions in grabbing and restraining plaintiff were intentional and constituted a course of alarming conduct sufficient to satisfy subsection (c) of the harassment statute. As to the conflict in whether defendant intentionally drove into plaintiff's car, or she backed into him, the judge credited plaintiff's version and found defendant's explanation "unlikely."

As to the second prong of Silver, whether an FRO is necessary to protect the victim, the judge noted that the altercations between the parties have escalated, there was a likelihood of recurrence, and plaintiff required the protection of an FRO.

On appeal, defendant presents three arguments:

POINT I THE FAMILY COURT'S RULING WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AS THE JUDGE'S FINDING OF HARASSMENT WAS NOT BASED ON ADEQUATE AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE. POINT II THE FAMILY COURT JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE INCORRECT MENTAL STANDARD TO THE HARASSMENT STATUTE AND FURTHER MADE NO DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE REQUISITE MENS REA WAS SATISFIED OR NOT. POINT III THE FAMILY COURT JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS A THREAT OF FUTURE HARM THAT REQUIRED THE ENTRY OF A FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER.

We find insufficient merit in any of these arguments to warrant discussion in a written opinion, Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and affirm on the basis of the thorough oral decision of Judge Sceusi. We add only the following brief comments.

Our review of a Family Part judge's findings is narrow, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998), and "we grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal conclusions based upon those findings." D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J.Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013).

During the hearing, Judge Sceusi had the opportunity to observe both parties as they testified and made credibility determinations, crediting the plaintiff's testimony over defendant's. The judge found that harassment occurred, that defendant was engaging in a course of alarming conduct, and that he did so intentionally. His credibility findings are entitled to our deference and find strong, if not compelling, support in the record.

Affirmed.

Source:  Leagle

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