U.S. v. NEGUS, 8:14CR209. (2015)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20150319d13
Visitors: 6
Filed: Mar. 18, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 18, 2015
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on defendant Gregory Negus' unopposed motion to continue filing pretrial motions [32] which the court shall construe as a motion to continue trial. As the case is complex and involves thousands of pages of discovery, counsel needs additional time to investigate and prepare for trial. The defendant has complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [32] is granted,
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on defendant Gregory Negus' unopposed motion to continue filing pretrial motions [32] which the court shall construe as a motion to continue trial. As the case is complex and involves thousands of pages of discovery, counsel needs additional time to investigate and prepare for trial. The defendant has complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [32] is granted, a..
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ORDER
F.A. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on defendant Gregory Negus' unopposed motion to continue filing pretrial motions [32] which the court shall construe as a motion to continue trial. As the case is complex and involves thousands of pages of discovery, counsel needs additional time to investigate and prepare for trial. The defendant has complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [32] is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial, for both defendants now set for April 7, 2015 is continued to July 28, 2015.
2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and July 28, 2015, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel for the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
