NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth in the written decision of Judge Joseph C. Cassini, III.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated manslaughter, two counts of robbery and weapons offenses in February 2008. We affirmed his convictions and sentence in an unpublished opinion, State v. Caldwell, No. A-1541-08 (App. Div. Feb. 28), certif. denied, 207 N.J. 35 (2011), that sets forth the facts underlying these convictions. We note only the following salient facts to provide context for our analysis.

Defendant and a co-defendant, Zakiyah Jones, robbed the victim and her husband at gunpoint. After telling them, "Somebody's going to die tonight," defendant shot the victim in her head. Defendant and Jones were apprehended within ten minutes of the shooting a short distance away. Jones gave a full statement to police and led them to the location of the gun, which was determined to be the gun used in the killing. In addition, defendant was identified by an independent witness as being present at the scene.

Defendant filed his PCR petition in January 2012. In his supporting certification, he asserted he had a "deep desire to testify at trial and profess [his] innocence" but did not do so because his counsel explained it was unnecessary since he "would win the trial anyway," and because counsel "fail[ed] to properly and adequately prepare [him] for such testimony." He further asserted that his attorney "repeatedly tr[ied] to talk [him] out of" testifying. He stated: "[W]hen it was time for me to decide, when we talked about my election to testify or not to testify, counsel even admitted that he `wasn't prepared' for [defendant] testifying which weighed heavily on [his] decision not to testify." He felt he did not have any choice but to do what counsel told him to do and refrain from testifying at trial.

Defendant contended it was only through his testimony that he could have undermined the testimony of Jones and the independent witness. He provided no specifics as to how his testimony would undermine the testimony of the independent witness. As for Jones, defendant stated he could have underscored contradictions in her testimony regarding a friend she met on the night of the shooting.

Defendant also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with a blood spatter expert and potentially present such testimony at trial, and in failing to obtain forensic testing of defendant's clothing for traces of blood.

In support of his petition, defendant provided a notarized letter from his mother, Donna Hutchins, stating defendant asked to testify "but was refused by [his] attorney," and that his attorney explained:

Hutchins also provided a third-hand account of a statement that has dubious probative value. According to Hutchins, the sister-in-law of the victim stated her brother left with her children because, he said, "the police picked up the wrong person. . . . [and] the real person might come after them."

Defendant also submitted a certification from Baba Folarin, an investigator with the Public Defender's Office, who set forth her conclusions based upon her review of the evidence, discovery materials and visit to the apartment where the independent witness stated she observed defendant. She concluded the witness could not have made the observations that were included in her testimony.

Judge Cassini denied the petition and set forth his reasons in a fourteen-page written decision. In his appeal, defendant presents the following arguments:

Judge Cassini thoughtfully addressed each of these arguments in his written decision. After reviewing these arguments in light of the record and applicable principles of law, we conclude that none have merit. We further conclude that the arguments presented in subparagraphs B, C and D and the arguments raised by defendant in his supplemental pro se brief1 do not warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Cassini's decision and briefly address the contention that his counsel's ineffectiveness deprived defendant of his right to testify on his own behalf.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the two-prong test of establishing both that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient and he or she made errors that were so egregious that counsel was not functioning effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2) the defect in performance prejudiced defendant's rights to a fair trial such that there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 52 (1987).

Judge Cassini carefully reviewed the record regarding defendant's claim that he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify. He noted that the trial judge first asked if defendant was going to testify on February 1, 2008, and that counsel requested additional time to speak to defendant. Counsel again requested more time to discuss the matter with defendant on February 5, 2008 and, after a recess, advised the court defendant had elected not to testify. The trial judge addressed defendant directly:

Judge Cassini observed that defendant was clearly advised of his rights regarding the decision to testify or not. He noted the competence counsel demonstrated in representing defendant and the inconsistency in defendant's position that he lost faith in his attorney but felt compelled to follow his advice not to testify. He concluded defendant was not prevented from testifying.

Judge Cassini addressed the two prongs of the Strickland/Fritz test. In light of defendant's failure to show he was not prevented from exercising his right to testify, he failed to satisfy the first prong. Even more persuasive is the finding Judge Cassini made regarding the second prong:

We agree.

Affirmed.