NOEL L. HILLMAN, District Judge.
This matter is presently before the Court on a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") filed by Petitioner Clarence Wallace ("Petitioner") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 60-year sentence imposed by the State of New Jersey in 2000 for sexual assault and other related crimes. For the reasons stated below, the Court dismisses the Petition as untimely.
For the purpose of this opinion, the Court recites only relevant facts. Petitioner was convicted, in a jury trial, on September 6, 2000, in the Superior Court of New Jersey for multiple counts of sexual assault and other related crimes. (Dkt. #1, ¶¶ 1-7.) Petitioner was sentenced to 60 years imprisonment with a 27-year parole ineligibility.
In the Petition, Petitioner originally stated that he then filed for post-conviction relief ("PCR") on December 29, 2003.
On February 15, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant petition. In addition to claiming that the Petition was timely filed, Petitioner also alleges that he was prevented by the State from filing the Petition earlier. (Dkt. #1, ¶ 18.) Petitioner claims that:
Title 28, Section 2244 of the U.S. Code requires that "[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In most cases and in this particular case, the one-year period begins on "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review," 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), "including the 90-day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court."
However, "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In other words, while a valid state PCR review is pending, the one-year limitation is tolled. This tolling does
Here, Petitioner's one-year limitation period began 90 days after the Supreme Court of New Jersey declined to review of his conviction, which was on December 24, 2002. According to the Petition, Petitioner did not file a state PCR petition until December 29, 2003, a few days after Petitioner's § 2244 one-year limitation has passed. As such, the PCR review would not have resulted in any tolling of the one-year period, making the Petition untimely by more than eight years.
However, as noted, Petitioner claims in his reply brief that he actually filed the PCR review on November 20, 2003. Even if the Court considers that as the date on which a state PCR review was properly filed, at that time only 34 days remained on Petitioner's one-year limitation under § 2244. Petitioner concedes as much in his reply. (Dkt. #14, p 6.) Indeed, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey declined to review the PCR denial on November 18, 2010, tolling under § 2244(d)(2) ceased, and the period of limitation began to run again, which Petitioner also admits.
Even if the statutory time bar has passed, Petitioner may overcome that limitation if he can show a basis for equitable tolling.
Here, Petitioner raises no extraordinary circumstances deserving of equitable tolling. Although Petitioner claims that the State prevented timely filing of his § 2254 petition through psychotropic drugs and confinement, Petitioner provided no details of any such incidents, other than his conclusory allegations; in fact, Petitioner does not identify any specific drugs that were given to him or any specific dates during which he was denied access to the law library. Even though Petitioner claims that he was under the influence of drugs and had limited access to the law library the entire time he was incarcerated, he was sufficiently competent in filing (1) a direct appeal of his conviction, (2) a petition for review of his conviction with the Supreme Court of New Jersey, (3) a petition for PCR review with the Superior Court of New Jersey, (4) an appeal of the PCR denial, and (5) a petition for review of the PCR denial with the Supreme Court of New Jersey. "[M]ental incompetence is not a per se reason to toll a statute of limitations. Rather, the alleged mental incompetence must somehow have affected the petitioner's ability to file a timely habeas petition."
In fact, Petitioner's own assertions belie his incapacity claims. In the Petition, the Petitioner claims that he was under the impression that the deadline for filing his § 2254 petition was February 18, 2012. (Dkt. #1, ¶ 18.) The Petition was not actually filed until February 15, 2012, a mere three days before Petitioner's asserted due date, despite the fact that Petitioner's PCR petition was final when the Supreme Court of New Jersey declined review on November 18, 2010. In other words, Petitioner waited for more than a year, with full knowledge that he has completely exhausted all state remedies, before finally filing the Petition. This was not the action of someone who acted with due diligence but suffered, by some extraordinary circumstances beyond his control, mental and/or physical incapacities that prevented him from filing the Petition in a timely manner. Rather, Petitioner was keenly aware of the due date, albeit inaccurately, to file his § 2254 petition. The fact that Petitioner missed the actual deadline by some 420 days suggests that Petitioner simply made a mistake, not because he was prevented by some extraordinary circumstances from filing the Petition on time.
Based on the fact that Petitioner was able to make numerous filings over the years, even if the Court takes his allegations as true, at best they show that Petitioner suffered some mental and/or physical burden, but that did not prevent him from filing a timely petition. Indeed, even if Petitioner was under a strict time limit to access the law library, he had sufficient time to make multiple filings in state court. Accordingly, equitable tolling is not warranted.
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition is dismissed as untimely.