OPINION

ROBERT B. KUGLER, District Judge.

Petitioner Carlos Torres, a federal prisoner currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution, Fort Dix, New Jersey, submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 Petitioner challenges a prison disciplinary finding that resulted in the loss of good conduct time. In particular, Petitioner asks that the prohibited act Code 108 violation be expunged. The named respondent is Donna Zickefoose, Warden at FCI Fort Dix.

In lieu of an answer, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which remains pending before this Court. For the following reasons, the motion will be denied. Respondent will be ordered to answer the petition.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner alleges that on April 15, 2009, he appeared before the Disciplinary Hearing Officer ("DHO") for a hearing stemming from his possession of a cell phone and charger at FCI Otisville. Petitioner argues that he did not have notice that the possession of a cell phone was increased to a 100 level prohibited act. Petitioner argues that such an increase violated the Administrative Procedures Act, that Code 108 should be void for vagueness, and that his Equal Protection rights were violated. Attached to Petitioner's complaint are various reports that show that Petitioner was charged with Code 316 (being in an unauthorized area) and 108 (possession of a hazardous tool). See Incident Report, docket entry 1-1, at p. 2 of 73. Petitioner cites Neagle v. Zickefoose, 09-2016 (NLH), for support for his request to have his Code 108 charge reduced to a Code 305. See Regional Administrative Remedy, docket entry 1-1, at p. 4 of 73.

Respondent argues that the case should be dismissed, because Petitioner's appeal of his DHO charge was untimely. On May 6, 2010, Petitioner filed his first appeal with the Regional Office. The appeal was rejected because the DHO report was not submitted. Petitioner attempted three more times to file an appeal, and each time, his appeal was rejected because he did not attach a copy of the DHO report. Neither the Petitioner nor Respondent have been able to locate a copy of the DHO report.

However, Respondent argues that because appeals of DHO decisions must be submitted to the Regional Director within twenty days, and Petitioner waited over a year, that the appeal was untimely. Further, Respondent contends that because Petitioner waited over a year to file his appeal, that he did not properly exhaust administrative remedies, and the petition must be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

United States Code Title 28, Section 2243 provides in relevant part:

The Court recognizes that a pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than more formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Thus, a pro se habeas petition should be construed liberally and with a measure of tolerance. See Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Attorney General, 878 F.2d 714, 721-22 (3d Cir. 1989). Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se in his application for habeas relief, the Court will accord his petition the liberal construction intended for pro se litigants.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 contains no statutory exhaustion requirement, a federal prisoner ordinarily may not bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the execution of his sentence, until he has exhausted all available administrative remedies.2 See, e.g., Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000); Arias v. United States Parole Comm'n, 648 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1981); Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.2d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 1973). The exhaustion doctrine promotes a number of goals:

Goldberg v. Beeler, 82 F.Supp.2d 302, 309 (D.N.J.1999), aff'd, 248 F.3d 1130 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 761 (3d Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where exhaustion would not promote these goals. See, e.g., Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (exhaustion not required where petitioner demonstrates futility); Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988) (exhaustion may be excused where it "would be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if the administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable harm"); Carling v. Peters, 2000 WL 1022959, *2 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (exhaustion not required where delay would subject petitioner to "irreparable injury").

Here, Respondent has presented nothing to this Court demonstrating that Petitioner's appeals were rejected as untimely. Rather, Respondent argues that:

See Respondent's Brief, docket entry 10-1, at p. 4 of 9. However, Respondent asks this Court to dismiss the petition as unexhausted based on Petitioner's failure to timely appeal the DHO's decision.

According to the Code of Federal Regulations, "[w]here the inmate demonstrates a valid reason for delay, an extension in filing time may be allowed." 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(b). It is unclear whether or not Petitioner would have been granted an extension. There is no record before this Court that demonstrates that his attempt to exhaust was deemed untimely. Rather, it appears that any attempt to exhaust his disciplinary charges would have been futile, as the disappearance of Petitioner's DHO report has prevented Petitioner's appeal from being considered.

Due to the lack of a sufficient record, this Court finds that Respondent's motion to dismiss must be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Respondent's motion will be denied. Respondent will be ordered to answer the petition.

An appropriate order follows.