ORDER

MALCOLM J. HOWARD, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the court on petitioner's motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, [DE #66], and motion for extension of time to file supplemental briefing, [DE #79].

BACKGROUND

On January 4, 2012, pursuant to a signed Memorandum of Plea Agreement, petitioner pled guilty to interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Counts One, Three, Five, and Seven) and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Two). Petitioner was sentenced by this court to a total term of imprisonment of 228 months on May 9, 2012. Petitioner did not appeal.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, [DE #47], which was dismissed. [DE #64]. Petitioner obtained permission from the Fourth Circuit to file a successive § 2255 motion. [DE #68]. On June 27, 2016, petitioner filed the instant motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, [DE #66], arguing that Hobbs Act Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, no longer qualifies as a crime of violence to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015).1

COURT'S DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court recently invalidated the residual clause of the crime of violence definition under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B). United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2323-24 (2019). The precise question remaining before the court is whether Hobbs Act Robbery is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). The Fourth Circuit has recently decided this issue. United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir. 2019) ("Accordingly, we conclude that Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence under the force clause of Section 924(c).") (citing United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102, 109 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Rivera, 847 F.3d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 2017); In re Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 2016)).

Therefore, in light of Mathis, defendant's claim is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner's motion, [DE #66], is DENIED. Petitioner's motion to extend time to file supplemental briefing, [DE #79], is DENIED AS MOOT. The clerk is directed to close this case.

A certificate of appealability shall not issue absent "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that an assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable and that any dispositive procedural ruling dismissing such claims is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). A reasonable jurist would not find this court's dismissal of Petitioner's § 2255 Motion debatable. Therefore, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED.