Filed: Jan. 19, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 10-3610-pr Hubrecht v. Artus UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
Summary: 10-3610-pr Hubrecht v. Artus UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). ..
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10-3610-pr
Hubrecht v. Artus
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,
2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 19th day of January, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
12
13
14 LOUIS HUBRECHT,
15
16 Petitioner-Appellant,
17
18 -v.- 10-3610-pr
19
20 DALE ARTUS, Superintendent, Clinton
21 Correctional Facility Dannemore, New York,
22 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK STATE,
23
24 Respondents-Appellees.
25
26
27 FOR PETITIONER: STEPHANIE CARVLIN, New York, NY (Robert
28 C. Gottlieb, New York, NY, on the brief).
29
30 FOR RESPONDENTS: HILARY HASSLER, Assistant District
31 Attorney (Eleanor J. Ostrow, Assistant
32 District Attorney), for Cyrus R. Vance,
33 Jr., District Attorney for New York
34 County, New York, NY.
1
2 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
3 Southern District of New York (Holwell, J.).
4
5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
6 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
7 AFFIRMED.
8 Petitioner-Appellant Louis Hubrecht appeals from an
9 August 13, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court
10 for the Southern District of New York (Holwell, J.), denying
11 his petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to
12 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Hubrecht challenges his conviction of
13 Murder in the Second Degree, in violation of New York Penal
14 Law § 125.25[1], following a jury trial in New York Supreme
15 Court. Hubrecht contends that his constitutional rights to
16 a fair trial and to present a defense were violated on three
17 grounds: (1) the trial court failed to charge the jury with
18 a justification defense; (2) the trial court did not permit
19 Hubrecht to introduce documentary evidence to support a
20 justification defense; and (3) the trial court did not
21 permit Hubrecht to introduce his statements that he had shot
22 the victim in self-defense, while allowing the State to
23 introduce testimony that, according to Hubrecht, falsely
24 implied that he had made no statements to that effect. We
2
1 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
2 and procedural history of the case.
3 “We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny
4 a habeas petition de novo and its findings of fact for clear
5 error.” Hemstreet v. Greiner, 491 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir.
6 2007). This Court must resolve three questions in
7 evaluating a habeas corpus claim arising from a state
8 court’s refusal to give a requested justification charge:
9 “First, was [the defendant] entitled to a justification
10 charge? Second, if so, did the failure to give one result
11 in a denial of due process? Third, if so, did the state
12 court’s contrary conclusion constitute an unreasonable
13 application of clear Supreme Court law?” Jackson v.
14 Edwards,
404 F.3d 612, 621 (2d Cir. 2005).
15 This Court’s role “is not to interpret New York’s law
16 of justification, but to determine whether the evidence was
17 sufficient to warrant a justification charge under that
18 law.” Davis v. Strack,
270 F.3d 111, 124 n.4 (2d Cir.
19 2001). Under New York law, “[i]n order to be entitled to a
20 justification instruction, a defendant must show both that
21 he subjectively believed that deadly force was necessary
22 under the circumstances and that a reasonable person in his
3
1 situation would have held this belief.” Blazic v.
2 Henderson, 900 F.2d 534, 540 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing People
3 v. Goetz,
497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986)). Moreover, “[i]f a
4 defendant who is confronted with deadly physical force knows
5 he can retreat with complete safety but fails to do so, the
6 justification defense is lost.”
Jackson, 404 F.3d at 623
7 (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)).
8 A justification charge is warranted “if on any
9 reasonable view of the evidence, the fact finder might have
10 decided that defendant’s actions were justified.” People v.
11 Padgett, 456 N.E.2d 795,797 (N.Y. 1983). “In determining
12 whether the evidence warrants a justification charge, the
13 reviewing court must view the record in the light most
14 favorable to the defendant.”
Jackson, 404 F.3d at 622. But
15 the “court is not required to adopt an artificial or
16 irrational view of the evidence in deciding whether a
17 justification charge is warranted.”
Blazic, 900 F.2d at
18 540.
19 Having carefully reviewed the record in the light most
20 favorable to Hubrecht, we conclude that no reasonable view
21 of the evidence supported a justification charge for
22 substantially the same reasons stated by the district court
4
1 in its thorough and well-reasoned memorandum and order.
2 Accordingly, Hubrecht’s contention that the trial court’s
3 denial of his request for a justification charge violated
4 his rights to a fair trial and to present a defense is
5 without merit.
6 With respect to Hubrecht’s remaining claims, although a
7 defendant has the fundamental right to present evidence and
8 call witnesses in his own defense, see Chambers v.
9 Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), states are permitted
10 “to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary
11 rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and
12 reliability—even if the defendant would prefer to see that
13 evidence admitted,” Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683, 690
14 (1986). An erroneous evidentiary ruling does not rise to
15 the level of constitutional error unless “the omitted
16 evidence [evaluated in the context of the entire record]
17 creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.”
18 Jones v. Stinson,
229 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2000)
19 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20 We agree with the district court that the trial court’s
21 exclusion of the documents in the victim’s luggage cart was
22 not error, let alone error of a constitutional dimension,
5
1 because those documents were effectively irrelevant to
2 Hubrecht’s self-defense theory. At most, the documents
3 showed that the victim had a long-standing antagonistic
4 relationship with Hubrecht. But evidence of that non-
5 violent relationship did not suggest that she was the
6 initial aggressor on the morning of the shooting. The trial
7 court was within its discretion in excluding the documents
8 as cumulative of other admissible evidence that had already
9 established that the antagonistic relationship existed.
10 Finally, with respect to Hubrecht’s last claim, we
11 agree with the district court’s reasoning in concluding that
12 the manner in which the prosecutor examined three witnesses
13 did not falsely imply that Hubrecht had not stated to anyone
14 that he acted in self-defense. In addition, we note that it
15 was unlikely that the jury was left with the false
16 impression that Hubrecht never asserted self-defense on the
17 day of the shooting because defense counsel had elicited
18 testimony from several officers establishing that they
19 “heard something about self-defense” and knew that a hammer
20 was involved when they arrived at the scene of the shooting.
21 Because the prosecutor’s questions were not misleading,
22 there is no merit to Hubrecht’s argument that his hearsay
6
1 claims of self-defense to the 911 operator and the officers
2 at the precinct should have been admitted at trial to
3 correct any alleged false impression.
4 We have considered Hubrecht’s remaining arguments and
5 find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons,
6 the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
7
8 FOR THE COURT:
9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
10
11
7
