NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Louis D. Grochowski appeals from the June 25, 2013 order denying defendant's motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) after oral argument, without a plenary hearing. Judge Patrick J. Roma, the same judge who accepted defendant's guilty plea and sentenced defendant, wrote the opinion denying his PCR petition. We affirm substantially on the basis of Judge Roma's thorough written opinion.

Defendant was charged in two separate indictments with third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b), two counts of fourth-degree contempt of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) on the basis of conduct on two different dates, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b), and third-degree stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(c). He entered a guilty plea to third-degree stalking. He also waived his right to indictment and pled guilty to an accusation charging fourth-degree contempt of a DVRO. The remaining charges were dismissed and he was sentenced within the parameters of the plea agreement to an aggregate term of four years in prison and awarded 360 days of jail credit.

He filed a direct appeal challenging only the sentence and we affirmed by order. State v. Grochowski, No. A-1510-11 (App. Div. Apr. 17, 2012). Defendant thereafter filed a petition for PCR, arguing that he was entitled to PCR and an evidentiary hearing on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. On June 25, 2013, Judge Roma denied defendant's PCR petition finding that defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of plea counsel and also failed to show prejudice.

At the plea hearing, defendant answered in the affirmative all of the standard questions asked before the acceptance of a guilty plea. After answering that he was satisfied with the services of his attorney and wished to waive his right to a jury trial, defendant admitted that in March 2010, he communicated in writing to the victim of a DVRO, contrary to the provisions of that order. Defendant admitted that the written communications were "threatening" and "harassing" to the victim. After waiving his right to a presentment before a grand jury, he also admitted sending multiple letters to the same victim of the same DVRO at the end of 2010.

Defendant, who is now released from custody, raises the following issues in this appeal:

We first review the well-established principles guiding our PCR review. Defendant's petition arises from the application of Rule 3:22-2, which permits collateral attack of a conviction based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel within five years of the conviction. See R. 3:22-2(a); R. 3:22-12(a)(1); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-part Strickland test: (1) "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment," and (2) "the deficient performance [truly] prejudiced the defense." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI); Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 58 (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey).

There is a strong presumption that defense counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695. We must therefore engage in a "highly deferential" scrutiny of trial counsel with an eye to "avoid viewing the performance under the `distorting effects of hindsight.'" State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 318-19 (2005) (quoting State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 37 (1997)).

A PCR judge should only grant an evidentiary hearing "if a defendant has presented a prima facie claim in support of post-conviction relief." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992). To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must demonstrate "the reasonable likelihood of succeeding under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington." Id. at 463. A defendant "must do more than make bald assertions that he [or she] was denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999). "He [or she] must allege [specific] facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance." Ibid.

In cases brought by a defendant who has entered a guilty plea, the defendant satisfies the first Strickland prong if he or she can show that counsel's representation fell short of the prevailing norms of the legal community. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1482, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284, 294 (2010). The defendant proves the second component of Strickland by establishing "a reasonable probability that" the defendant "would not have pled guilty," but for the counsel's errors. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012) (quoting State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 138-39 (2009)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1454, 185 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2013).

We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Roma. Defendant cannot establish either Strickland prong.

Affirmed.