NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Diane Lauckhardt, individually and as administrator of the estate of her late husband, Douglas Lauckhardt (Mr. Lauckhardt), appeals from the no cause jury verdict returned in the medical malpractice case against defendant Janos Jeges, M.D., an emergency room (ER) physician. She also appeals from three orders1 entered during trial, which resulted in the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital — New Brunswick (the Hospital) and two emergency room nurses, defendants Irina Benenson, R.N. and Karen Gabor, R.N. Plaintiff principally contends that the trial court erred in excluding certain expert testimony. Following our review of the record and applicable law, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

I.

We begin by summarizing the most pertinent trial evidence. At 4:59 p.m. on May 27, 2008, emergency medical technicians (EMTs) arrived at a business in Middlesex, where Mr. Lauckhardt was employed as a maintenance machinist. Mr. Lauckhardt told EMT Tracy Coble he "fell from the ladder that he was standing on top of[,] working on the ceiling" and his chest hit the cement floor. The ladder was ten to twelve feet high. Mr. Lauckhardt complained of chest pain and had difficulty breathing, but remained conscious. EMT Coble measured Mr. Lauckhardt's blood pressure at 180/62, which she believed was abnormally high. She also heard diminished lung sounds on Mr. Lauckhardt's left side, suggesting possible internal bleeding or puncture wounds.2

Paramedics arrived within minutes of the EMTs, and administered oxygen and stabilized Mr. Lauckhardt, before rushing him by ambulance to the Hospital, a level-one trauma center. Paramedic (PM) Michelle Slattery accompanied Mr. Lauckhardt to the hospital, arriving at 5:21 p.m. She believed his signs indicated he was "in shock" with "internal injuries."

At the Hospital, the charge nurse directed that Mr. Lauckhardt remain in the hallway, stating that he "was probably not going to be a trauma." PM Slattery testified that, upon hearing this, she had a conversation with Nurse Benenson, the nurse assigned to Mr. Lauckhardt:

Before leaving, PM Slattery said she again asked Nurse Benenson to have someone come over to Mr. Lauckhardt, with Nurse Benenson responding, "I swear I will try to get somebody over here."

As part of plaintiff's case, portions of Nurse Benenson's deposition testimony were read to the jury. Nurse Benenson initially acknowledged having contact with emergency squad members upon Mr. Lauckhardt's arrival at the emergency room:

However, by the next page of her deposition Nurse Benenson stated that she did not remember speaking with any emergency personnel:

At 5:30 p.m., Nurse Benenson recorded Mr. Lauckhardt's vital signs, including his temperature, heart rate, respiratory rate, blood pressure, and oxygen saturation level. She said his blood pressure rate of 106/54 and his oxygen saturation level of 98% were within normal limits; his heart rate of 105 was slightly above the normal range of 60 to 100. Nurse Benenson administered fluid and morphine intravenously. As Mr. Lauckhardt's triage nurse, she assessed the severity of his injuries to determine whether they qualified as non-urgent, urgent, or emergent, and determined they were emergent.

At approximately 5:45 p.m., plaintiff arrived at the Hospital, along with her son, Douglas, Jr. Plaintiff kissed her husband, who felt "cool and damp" and appeared "sweaty."

At 5:50 p.m., Nurse Benenson examined Mr. Lauckhardt and made the following entry in his medical chart: "Diaphoretic, complaining of mid-sternal right-sided chest pain; hypoxemic,3 89 percent room air; connected to oxygen via non-rebreather mask."

At 5:55 p.m., Dr. Jeges, a board-certified ER physician, examined Mr. Lauckhardt, found no abnormal breathing, and concluded he was not a trauma patient. Nevertheless, his differential diagnosis included "intrathoracic injury." Dr. Jeges ordered a chest x-ray to rule out suspected chest injuries.

Mr. Lauckhardt's medical chart indicates that the chest x-ray was ordered at 7:25 p.m. STAT,4 approximately two hours after his arrival. At 7:30 p.m., Nurse Benenson's shift ended and Nurse Gabor took over. At approximately 7:50 p.m., Dr. Jeges read the chest x-ray without the assistance of a radiologist and found "no acute disease." After informing him of the x-ray results, Dr. Jeges asked Mr. Lauckhardt about his level of pain. According to Douglas, Jr., his father responded that he was "in a lot of pain still."

At 7:52 p.m., Dr. Jeges ordered a chest CT scan STAT based on Mr. Lauckhardt's continued complaints of pain and abnormal blood test results, including "sub-normal" red blood count, with abnormally low hemoglobin and hematocrit, and an abnormally high white blood count. Regarding Mr. Lauckhardt's chest x-ray, Dr. Jeges explained:

That's why I immediately ordered a CT scan.

At 8:40 p.m., Nurse Gabor noted in Mr. Lauckhardt's medical chart that his lungs were "clear" and his oxygen-saturation level was at "96 percent on 100-percent non-rebreather mask"; however, this note failed to indicate his blood pressure or heart rate. At her deposition, Nurse Gabor explained that she had documented Mr. Lauckhardt's vital signs on scrap paper (blood pressure of 120/78 and heart rate of 82), typical of her normal practice, and then recorded them on the chart the next day, after another nurse told her the vital signs were missing. However, the late entry did not indicate that it was entered the next day.

Dr. Jeges's shift ended at 9:00 p.m., at which time Dr. Robert Van Volkenburgh assumed responsibility for Mr. Lauckhardt's medical care.5 Dr. Jeges informed him that Mr. Lauckhardt was stable and waiting to be taken to the radiology department for a CT scan.

Mr. Lauckhardt never went for his CT scan. According to plaintiff, at about 9:30 p.m., her husband stood up, then laid back down, and "grabbed his chest," and his "eyes roll[ed] back." She hollered to Nurse Gabor, who was nearby at the nurses' station, "[S]omething's wrong with my husband." Dr. Van Volkenburgh and another doctor administered CPR and other emergency measures. During this time, plaintiff prayed with a chaplain near her husband's bed and heard "very loud" voices of two doctors saying: "[W]here is his CT scan? [H]e did have a CT scan, right? [W]hy didn't he have a CT scan?" Douglas, Jr. similarly recalled hearing a "heated conversation."

Mr. Lauckhardt was pronounced dead around 10:00 p.m. Defendants Jeges, Benenson, and Gabor all agreed that, had Mr. Lauckhardt been designated as a trauma patient, his CT scan would have been prioritized before non-trauma patients. Dr. Jeges also acknowledged that trauma patients generally receive higher priority regarding access to the operating room.

Plaintiff and her son testified that neither a nurse nor a doctor physically examined Mr. Lauckhardt or took his vital signs while they were at the hospital. About a month after Mr. Lauckhardt's death, PM Slattery sent plaintiff a sympathy card, and invited plaintiff to call her because "there were problems once we were at the hospital."

Plaintiff's theory in the case was that Mr. Lauckhardt should have been categorized as a trauma patient upon his arrival at the hospital because he was in shock. Plaintiff's causation expert, Mark Widmann, M.D., a board-certified thoracic surgeon, testified that Mr. Lauckhardt had "a high likelihood of survival" if he had been properly diagnosed with an aortic6 transection and surgically treated in a timely manner. Dr. Widmann opined that any one of four surgical procedures successfully performed by 9:15 p.m. would have provided Mr. Lauckhardt with an estimated survival rate between eighty and ninety percent.

Defendants disputed plaintiff's assertion that Mr. Lauckhardt received any substandard care or treatment. They also disputed the claim that Mr. Lauckhardt's condition was treatable. According to Dr. Ronald J. Simon, M.D., a board-certified general surgeon presented by Dr. Jeges, Mr. Lauckhardt simultaneously had two life-threatening injuries, a transected aorta and a tear in the hilum of his left lung. Dr. Simon opined that even if Mr. Lauckhardt's injuries had been immediately diagnosed upon his entry to the ER, he would not have survived the two major surgeries required to repair the damage because both injuries, by themselves, had a high mortality rate, and together were "not survivable."

Prior to trial, the parties all served Pretrial Information Exchanges pursuant to Rule 4:25-7(b). The rule requires attorneys to confer and exchange pretrial information including, "[a]ny in limine or trial motions intended to be made at the commencement of trial, with supporting memoranda." Pretrial Information Exchange, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix XXIII to R. 4:25-7(b) at 2736 (2015). Counsel for defendant Benenson identified three in limine motions and counsel for Nurse Gabor identified one. None of the motions indicated that either defendant nurse challenged the qualifications of James Bagnell, M.D., plaintiff's emergency medicine and nursing expert, to provide expert testimony as to the nursing care Mr. Lauckhardt received.7

Dr. Bagnell received his undergraduate and medical degrees from Georgetown University. In 1979, he began practicing medicine as an attending emergency physician at Atlantic City Medical Center (ACMC), and became board-certified in emergency medicine in 1986. While practicing at ACMC, he also served as chairman of emergency services and director of medical education.

As chairman of emergency services, Dr. Bagnell was "responsible for overseeing the care provided to the patients in ... [the] emergency department." He participated in the development of nursing care standards, as well as "clinical treatment protocols with a physician component and a nursing component." He also instructed the nursing staff regarding nursing care for trauma patients and participated in developing training modules for the nursing staff. As director of medical education, Dr. Bagnell instructed physicians on the diagnosis and treatment of traumatic chest injuries, and gave lectures to emergency department nurses on the triage process of evaluating patients.

In 1995, Dr. Bagnell "stepped down" from his administrative duties as chairman and director, and continued to practice as an emergency department physician. Starting in 2000, Dr. Bagnell practiced medicine in the emergency departments of three different hospitals, including ACMC, Kessler Memorial Hospital, and Southern Ocean County Hospital. At the time of trial, Dr. Bagnell was a full-time attending emergency physician at Atlantic Care Regional Medical Center (formerly known as ACMC), a level-two trauma facility.8 In addition, Dr. Bagnell stated that he previously testified twice in court on the standard of nursing care, once in Pennsylvania and once in New Jersey.

After Dr. Bagnell testified as to his qualifications, plaintiff's counsel offered him "as an expert in the field of emergency medicine and ... emergency nursing standard of care." Counsel for Nurses Benenson and Gabor did not object, with both stating they would reserve their questions regarding qualifications for cross-examination. The judge then stated that Dr. Bagnell "is qualified as an expert in the field of emergency medicine," without addressing Dr. Bagnell's qualification as an emergency nursing standard of care expert.

Dr. Bagnell testified that Mr. Lauckhardt should have been categorized as a trauma patient upon his arrival at the hospital because he was in "shock," meaning that his heart rate (105) divided by his systolic blood pressure (106) was 0.99, which was above the normal range of 0.5 to 0.7. Additional indicators that Mr. Lauckhardt needed immediate attention included his decreased blood pressure, elevated heart rate, low oxygen saturation level, physical appearance, and body temperature.

Dr. Bagnell explained that Dr. Jeges's improper initial assessment of Mr. Lauckhardt as stable evidenced an "anchoring bias," which impacted his subsequent treatment of Mr. Lauckhardt such that he did not appreciate his patient's "grossly abnormal" chest x-ray. In particular, the x-ray revealed that Mr. Lauckhardt likely had fluid in his right lower lung, an abnormally widened mediastinum "that [wa]s highly suspicious for an injury to one of his vital central structures," and a "slight deviation of the trachea to the right," indicating internal bleeding. Dr. Bagnell explained that, if Dr. Jeges had properly read the x-ray by 6:30 p.m., he could have immediately ordered a CT scan, which could have been completed by 7:00 p.m. and interpreted by 7:15 p.m., so that Mr. Lauckhardt would have been in the operating room by 7:30 p.m.

Dr. Bagnell also testified regarding deviations from the applicable nursing standard of care by Nurses Benenson and Gabor, including: (1) their failure to follow Dr. Jeges's order to monitor vital signs every two hours or more frequently (i.e., every fifteen minutes)9 because they were abnormal;10 (2) the failure of Nurse Benenson to expedite Dr. Jeges's order for a STAT chest x-ray; and (3) the failure of Nurse Gabor to ensure that the CT scan was performed.

After Dr. Bagnell substantially completed his testimony, Nurses Benenson and Gabor moved to bar his testimony as to the accepted standards of emergency nursing care. The judge granted the motions, under N.J.R.E. 702, based on his determination that Dr. Bagnell was "not qualified to render opinions as to the standards of care applicable to either" defendant nurse. The court did not strike Dr. Bagnell's testimony regarding the nursing care. Instead, he instructed the jury as follows:

The next day, after plaintiff rested, the judge granted the nurses' and the Hospital's motions for involuntary dismissal, under Rule 4:37-2(b). The judge then instructed the jury that "[t]he two nurses, Nurse Gabor and Nurse Benenson[,] are no longer parties to this lawsuit. You are not to speculate as to why." The trial continued to a conclusion solely against Dr. Jeges, with the jury returning a seven-to-two verdict in his favor on the issue of liability.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that Dr. Bagnell was qualified to render opinion testimony against the nurses and that the doctrines of laches and estoppel otherwise should have barred the untimely challenge to his qualifications. She further contends that the judge's ruling, and the resulting dismissal of the nurses and the Hospital from the case, irreparably prejudiced her case against Dr. Jeges. Plaintiff also argues that the trial judge improperly permitted defense counsel to cross-examine her about the workers' compensation benefits she received after her husband's death, and erred by precluding her from showing the jury a video depicting her husband's injuries.

II.

To prevail in a medical malpractice action, "ordinarily, a plaintiff must present expert testimony establishing (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that standard of care; and (3) that the deviation proximately caused the injury." Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such expert testimony "is permitted to `assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.R.E. 702). Further, an expert must be qualified to testify, meaning he or she must have the requisite "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education...." N.J.R.E. 702.

"The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015) (citation omitted). It is "within the sound discretion of the trial judge" to determine the qualifications or competency of an expert witness. State v. Pemberthy, 224 N.J.Super. 280, 301 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 633 (1988). "[W]e apply [a] deferential approach to a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony, reviewing it against an abuse of discretion standard." Townsend, supra, 221 N.J. at 53 (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The trial judge's determination will not be disturbed "`unless a clear abuse of discretion appears.'" State v. Chatman, 156 N.J.Super. 35, 40 (App. Div.) (quoting Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 411 (1960)), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 467 (1978). However, we accord no such discretion to a ruling that is "inconsistent with applicable law." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 4.7 on R. 2:10-2 (2015). We are required to disregard an error unless, after consideration, we find "it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result[.]" R. 2:10-2.

Generally, a court may admit expert testimony "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue...." N.J.R.E. 702. In addition, Rule 702 requires that "the witness ... have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony." Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 413 (1992) (citation omitted).

"The test of an expert witness's competency [to testify] in a malpractice action is whether he or she has sufficient knowledge of professional standards [applicable to the situation under investigation] to justify [his or her] expression of an opinion." Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 64-65 (1993) (citing Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 136 (1961)). "The weight of any such testimony, of course, is for the jury." Id. at 65.

Usually, a witness presented as an expert at trial should be licensed as a member of the defendant's profession. Sanzari, supra, 34 N.J. at 136. However, licensed or even unlicensed individuals involved in another profession can testify as an expert depending on "the claim involved, the specific allegations made, and the opinions that the expert proposes to offer at trial." Garden Howe Urban Renewal Assocs., L.L.C. v. HACBM Architects Eng'rs Planners, L.L.C., 439 N.J.Super. 446, 456 (App. Div. 2015). This can occur where there is an overlap between practices or disciplines. Any practitioner who is familiar with the situation in dispute and possesses "the requisite training and knowledge [can] express an opinion as an expert." Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 331-32 (1985). We have therefore recognized, in certain cases, "a doctor in one field would be qualified to render an opinion as to the performance of a doctor in another with respect to their common areas of practice." Wacht v. Farooqui, 312 N.J.Super. 184, 187-88 (App. Div. 1998); see also Cahill, supra, 99 N.J. at 331-34; Sanzari, supra, 34 N.J. at 136.

For example, the Court held where the controversy involved the review of x-rays and the diagnosis of physical conditions, a medical doctor was competent as an expert in a malpractice claim against a chiropractor because it recognized that a medical professional can provide an expert opinion where the professional has sufficient knowledge of the professional standard relevant to the situation under scrutiny. Cahill, supra, 99 N.J. at 334; see also Khan v. Singh, 200 N.J. 82, 101 (2009); Sanzari, supra, 34 N.J. at 136-37 (noting overlap between fields of medicine and dentistry). In Garden Howe, a professional negligence action against an architect, we reversed a trial court's determination that an engineer was not qualified to give expert opinions in areas where the two professions overlapped. Garden Howe, supra, 439 N.J. Super. at 457.

Moreover, an expert witness's conclusions can be based on his or her qualifications and personal experience, without citation to academic literature. State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 495 (2006) (allowing opinion testimony based on the expert's "education, training, and most importantly, her experience"); Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J.Super. 385, 403 (App. Div. 2002) ("Evidential support for an expert opinion is not limited to treatises or any type of documentary support, but may include what the witness has learned from personal experience."). "The requirements for expert qualifications are in the disjunctive. The requisite knowledge can be based on either knowledge, training or experience." Bellardini v. Krikorian, 222 N.J.Super. 457, 463 (App. Div. 1988).

A.

In ruling on the motion to bar Dr. Bagnell's testimony regarding nursing standards of care, the trial judge first determined that the New Jersey Medical Care Access and Responsibility and Patients First Act (Patients First Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-37 to-42, did not apply, determining that the statute only applies to doctors. He then set forth his reasons for concluding that Dr. Bagnell was not qualified to render expert opinion testimony against the nurses under N.J.R.E. 702. He first noted, "Nursing and medicine[,] although obviously related here [,] are distinct fields, distinct professions and each has a separate and distinct job." Based on this premise, the judge held that any testimony alleging deviations from the standard of care of an emergency room nurse would require "the expertise specifically ... of an emergency room nurse to know what an emergency room nurse does or [does not] do...." While acknowledging that "Dr. Bagnell is a pretty accomplished emergency room physician," the judge emphasized that he is "not an emergency room nurse and he really [cannot] view this through the eyes of an emergency room nurse...." Despite further acknowledging that "amongst other doctors and perhaps amongst other nurses, Dr. Bagnell's opinions may be very valid and informative," and describing Dr. Bagnell as "a very learned man" who "knows his stuff," the judge concluded that "he knows nothing about nursing."

Our review of the trial record does not support this conclusion. To the contrary, the record contains sufficient evidence that Dr. Bagnell has adequate knowledge of the standard of care applicable to nurses in an emergency room setting to allow him to provide expert testimony in this case. Dr. Bagnell established extensive qualifications that included working closely with ER nurses for almost thirty-five years. He has held administrative positions in which he promulgated standards for nurses to follow in hospitals where he has worked. His ability to render competent care to his patients requires him to know and understand the duties and responsibilities imposed upon emergency room nurses by the standard of care. We are satisfied that he possessed the specialized knowledge necessary to offer competent testimony about the standard of care applicable to defendants Benenson and Gabor.

Furthermore, "the weight to be given to the evidence of experts is within the competence of the fact-finder." LaBracio Family P'ship v. 1239 Roosevelt Ave., Inc., 340 N.J.Super. 155, 165 (App. Div. 2001). Therefore, the fact-finder is free to "accept some of the expert's testimony and reject the rest." State v. M.J.K., 369 N.J.Super. 532, 549 (App. Div.) (citation omitted), certif. granted, 181 N.J. 549 (2004), and appeal dismissed, 187 N.J. 74 (2005).

While we agree with the judge that N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) does not apply to Nurses Benenson or Gabor, because as registered ER nurses neither qualifies as specialists or subspecialists that are recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a), we conclude that the decision to bar the nursing testimony of Dr. Bagnell under N.J.R.E. 702 constituted a clear mistaken exercise of discretion, in light of "the claim involved, the specific allegations made, and the opinions that the expert proposes to offer at trial." Garden Howe, supra, 439 N.J. Super. at 456.

This case involved the standard of care required in treating a chest trauma patient undergoing evaluation in an ER, a situation that Dr. Bagnell has addressed on a regular basis as an ER physician. Dr. Bagnell's criticisms of the nurses were of a limited basis, namely inadequate monitoring and failure to expedite the patient's x-ray and CT scan, in light of his symptoms. In our view Dr. Bagnell's area of expertise encompassed standards of nursing practice in the ER setting, in comparable situations, on a regular basis.

We further note that Dr. Bagnell participated in the development of nursing care standards, as well as "clinical treatment protocols with a physician component and a nursing component," and instructed nursing staff regarding nursing care for the trauma patients. Most importantly, for over three decades his daily contact and interaction with ER nurses in the care of his own patients has provided him with ongoing personal experience to observe and know the standard practices applicable to ER nurses.

B.

Furthermore, we conclude that the doctrines of laches and estoppel barred the Hospital and defendant nurses from making an untimely challenge to Dr. Bagnell's qualifications. "Laches is an equitable doctrine that applies when a party sleeps on [his or] her rights to the harm or detriment of others." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 445 (2012) (citing Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417 (2012)). The doctrine may be "`invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party.'" Fox, supra, 210 N.J. at 418 (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 180-81 (2003)). "Laches may only be enforced when the delaying party had sufficient opportunity to assert the right in the proper forum and the prejudiced party acted in good faith believing that the right had been abandoned." Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 181 (citation omitted).

Equitable estoppel is a doctrine "`founded in the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed by law.'" Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 178 (quoting Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 354, cross-appeal dismissed, 162 N.J. 123 (1999)). "The doctrine is designed to prevent injustice by not permitting a party to repudiate a course of action on which another party has relied to his detriment." Ibid. (citing Mattia v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 35 N.J.Super. 503, 510 (App. Div. 1955)). Therefore, plaintiffs claiming that a defendant should be estopped from asserting a right must show that "defendant engaged in conduct, either intentionally or under circumstances that induced reliance, and that plaintiffs acted or changed their position to their detriment." Ibid. (citing Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 163 (1984)).

Rule 4:25-7(b) expressly requires the exchange of information regarding "[a]ny in limine or trial motions intended to be made at the commencement of trial, with supporting memoranda." Pressler & Verniero, supra, Appendix XXIII to R. 4:25-7(b) at 2736 (2015). Rule 4:25-7(b), incorporating Appendix XXIII, is intended to "eliminate the element of surprise at trial" that is created by in limine and trial motions served on an adversary and handed up to the court in the middle of trial. McKenney v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 359, 370 (2001). The rule further provides that "[f]ailure to exchange and submit all the information required by this rule may result in sanctions as determined by the trial judge." R. 4:25-7(b).

We discern no valid reason or justification for the failure of the Hospital and defendant nurses to comply with the clear mandate of Rule 4:25-7(b), which unfairly deprived the trial court and plaintiff's counsel of the opportunity to timely address this critical issue. Any challenge to Dr. Bagnell's qualifications should have been included in defendants' pretrial information exchange submissions and the issue addressed prior to opening statements. Because this issue was not timely raised, plaintiff proceeded to open to the jury and present trial testimony and evidence focusing, in significant part, on the alleged substandard care of defendant nurses, something plaintiff would not have done if defendant nurses had successfully raised this issue in a timely manner. Plaintiff obviously changed her position to her detriment. We therefore conclude that the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel barred the nursing defendants and the Hospital from asserting their late challenge to Dr. Bagnell's qualifications.

C.

Next, we must consider whether the trial court's decision to exclude Dr. Bagnell's expert testimony regarding the care provided by Nurses Benenson and Gabor was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result[.]" R. 2:10-2.

The proofs in this case do not overwhelmingly favor any party; hence, the improper exclusion of a significant portion of Dr. Bagnell's trial testimony could have been the deciding factor in favor of Dr. Jeges. The record contains substantial evidence from the emergency personnel that Nurse Benenson received potentially critical information regarding Mr. Lauckhardt's injuries and condition. The record also contains evidence that Mr. Lauckhardt's condition was not properly monitored. Because plaintiff's claims against Nurses Benenson and Gabor were dismissed at the end of plaintiff's case, the jury never heard testimony from either nurse, only limited portions of their deposition testimony. We conclude there was a high risk that the jury was improperly influenced by the trial court's exclusion of Dr. Bagnell's testimony describing the substandard care provided by Nurses Benenson and Gabor, and the consequent dismissal of the nurses and the Hospital from the case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we are convinced that this error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result[.]" R. 2:10-2. The exclusion of a significant portion of Dr. Bagnell's testimony, the day after the jury received it, clearly had the capacity to adversely impact the jury's assessment of Dr. Bagnell's opinions as to Dr. Jeges, and thus could readily have been outcome-determinative.11 As a result, we conclude a new trial is required.

D.

In light of our decision to reverse and remand for a new trial, we briefly address plaintiff's two remaining claims of trial error.

On direct examination, plaintiff's counsel asked plaintiff when Mr. Lauckhardt's income stopped, and she replied, "Right after I got that last week's pay." In fact, plaintiff continued to receive seventy percent of Mr. Lauckhardt's income after his death in the form of workers' compensation benefits. The court permitted limited cross-examination of plaintiff regarding her receipt of these benefits because it contradicted her testimony on direct examination and thus was relevant to her credibility. N.J.R.E. 607.

While we discern no mistaken exercise of discretion in the court's initial ruling, in light of the false impression created by plaintiff's testimony, we conclude that the court's instructions to the jury that followed did not fully address the concerns we set forth in Joy v. Barget, 215 N.J.Super. 268, 272 (App. Div. 1987). In particular, the court failed to instruct the jury "that there are mechanisms in workers' compensation law and in tort law which will be utilized by the court to prevent any double recovery." Ibid.

We expect that, upon retrial, plaintiff's counsel will avoid the line of questioning that allowed for the interjection of workers' compensation into the case. If workers' compensation benefits should again enter the case, the trial court shall "confront the problem directly and eliminate the inherent prejudice" by fully instructing the jury, consistent with Joy. Ibid.

Lastly, we address plaintiff's argument that the court erred by barring her use of a video depicting her husband's injuries at trial. Before trial, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to admit a video depicting Mr. Lauckhardt's injuries to be used during the testimony of Dr. Widmann. While the judge ruled that the video was substantively admissible, he denied the motion because plaintiff had not disclosed the video as an amendment to her answers to interrogatories, contrary to Rule 4:17-7. The judge noted that the case had four discovery end dates, and that the trial had been adjourned eight times. The record indicates no evidence that plaintiff timely amended her answers to interrogatories or served a certification of due diligence required by Rule 4:17-7. We are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion. See Smith v. Schalk, 360 N.J.Super. 337, 339, 345-46 (App. Div. 2003) (reversing admission of "certain medical information emerging on the eve of trial," where the plaintiff failed to file an application to amend interrogatory responses supported by affidavit of due diligence under Rule 4:17-7).

Because we conclude the trial court's decision to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Bagnell regarding the care provided by Nurses Benenson and Gabor constituted reversible error, the order dismissing plaintiff's complaint against the Hospital and defendant nurses is reversed and the verdict of no cause of action as to Dr. Jeges is vacated. We remand the matter for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.