NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

The Village of Loch Arbour (the Village) is an incorporated village and part of the Ocean Township School District (OTSD). In 1999, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 18A:8-1.1, (the Kiely Bill), which carved out an exception for the Village by capping the Village's school contribution to the OTSD at $300,000. Ocean Township (the Township) assumed the obligation for funding the balance of the school district.

In January 2008, the Legislature enacted the School Funding Reform Act of 2008 (SFRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -63, a comprehensive revision of the state's school funding formula to ensure that all districts were contributing an equitable share to the statewide school tax levy. In so doing, SFRA repealed certain legislative enactments related to the prior funding formula. Among the legislation specifically repealed was the Kiely Bill.

Upon the repeal of the Kiely Bill, the Village was subjected to higher school taxes and no longer received the benefit of a $300,000 cap. Consequently, in June 2009, the Village filed a complaint alleging the repeal of the Kiely Bill was unconstitutional and should be reinstated. Plaintiffs raised various constitutional claims, including an infringement of their equal protection rights, an impairment of their right to contract and a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.

The General Equity judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. We affirm and conclude, among other things, that the repeal of the Kiely Bill was not unconstitutional.

I.

These are the facts adduced from the record.

Plaintiffs are the Village and various village officials and village residents. In 1958, the Village was incorporated. Rather than being identified as a separate school district, by operation of law, N.J.S.A. 18:5-1.11, it was incorporated into the OTSD, in which it was situated prior to incorporation:

Further, the Village Act of 1989, N.J.S.A. 40A:63-8, provided that all villages "shall operate and transact all of its business according to the laws pertaining to the township form of government." Accordingly, during those years, there was an "apportionment of taxes for [the Village] and [the Township]" that was "based on their equalized valuations."

In 1996, Village officials allege that they entered into an agreement with the Township to ensure the Village retained an adequate and fair tax apportionment for school funding. Under this purported agreement, which does not appear in the record, the Village would provide "police services" to the Township, while the Township in return "would agree to the allocation of school costs . . . ." Village representatives further allege the agreement had been "immortalized" into a "Board of Trustees resolution" in December 1998, but apparently there is no record of such a resolution. The agreement was purported to expire on December 31, 1999.

In July 1999, six months before the alleged agreement's expiration, the Legislature enacted the Kiely Bill. The statute read, in part that:

The Kiely Bill created an exception for the Village given its unusual circumstances of being the only incorporated village in the State. The statute provided a "cap" on the Village's school appropriation at $300,000, while, according to the Commissioner of Education's (the Commissioner) assessment of its impact, "requiring all other Ocean Township residents to pick up any required tax increase to support [the Township's] public schools." Additionally, as the Commissioner noted, the cap placed the Village's school tax rate "well below the state average," allowing the Village to "contribute[] less than 1 percent of the [tax] levy" even though its "per pupil costs ha[d] been steadily increasing."

Consequently, the Kiely Bill had limited Village residents' tax obligation "disproportionately lower than that indicated by their ability to pay . . . ." According to the Commissioner's comparison of tax rates between the Village and Township, the Village consistently paid less than half of what the Township contributed in school taxes. For example, in the 2004-2005 school year, the Village paid $300,000 while Ocean Township contributed more than $43 million. For the years 2000 through 2008, a similar contrast existed between the amount contributed by the Village and that provided by the Township.

In January 2008, the Legislature revisited the state's school funding formula and began a comprehensive revision to equalize the amount contributed by all school districts. In so doing, after spending five years researching a plan to "develop an equitable and predictable way to distribute state aid that addresse[d] the deficiencies found in past [school funding] formulas," N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44(h), the Legislature enacted SFRA. Specifically, SFRA accounted for "changes in enrollment" and targeted communities with "at-risk students" to ensure that all school districts were contributing an "equitable" share. Accordingly, each district would only receive an equitable amount of aid derived directly from a calculation of its "property wealth and district income." N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-52(a).

A component of SFRA's objectives also included eradicating any remnants of the state's former methodology of calculating school funding apportionments. As a result, SFRA repealed the Kiely Bill along with several other statutes, including the Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act (CEIFA), that relied on a now-defunct funding method. See L. 2007, c. 260, § 84. Without the limitation of the Kiely Bill's cap, the Village was now required to pay $970,849.61 for the 2009-2010 school year, three times more than paid in the previous decade. The Township contributed more than $53 million for the same school year.

In April 2009, SFRA's enactment prompted Village residents to contact the Department of Education to determine how to manage the newly apportioned school tax rates for the fiscal year. In response, Lucille E. Davy, the then Commissioner, explained the Legislature's reasons for the repeal, citing the Village tax rate as "being well below the state average" and the unfair burden imposed on the Township to "pick up" the difference. However, the Commissioner acknowledged that such a tax increase would cause an "undue hardship" on Village residents, and promised that she would "support a phase-in of any change to the apportionment methodology, should the [L]egislature choose to address the issue."

No legislation was forthcoming, and on June 3, 2009, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants the Township, the Ocean Township Board of Education and the Monmouth County Board of Taxation. In their complaint, plaintiffs asserted the following claims: 1) the repeal promulgated by the SFRA was "unconstitutional" because the SFRA was "general legislation" that eradicated "special legislation"; 2) the Village's payment of school taxes should only be calculated according to the repealed Kiely Bill and that a preliminary injunction be issued to "prevent[]" defendants from implementing any policy pursuant to the new legislation; 3) the "approximately 447%" increase in school taxes in the Village was not envisioned by the SFRA's objectives; and 4) the repeal of the Kiely Bill, as applied to appellants Vincent and Ruth Cummings, constituted a violation of their "equal protection and due process" rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This latter claim was premised on the "per-pupil costs" being the "highest" in the State.

Plaintiffs also submitted a proposed order to show cause in the Chancery Division seeking a preliminary injunction, urging the court to "enjoin[], restrain[] and direct[]" defendants from "taking any action to implement the school taxes calculated in reliance on the repeal . . . ." In addition, plaintiff sought to

In denying the requested relief, Judge Thomas W. Cavanagh, Jr., first noted that the statute in question had "already been . . . found to pass constitutional muster." He concluded that plaintiffs had not demonstrated a "likelihood of success on the merits" as they failed to show that the "Kiely bill was . . . special legislation" given

The judge also rejected the notion that there was a "suspect class" involved and held that there was a "legitimate state interest" here "to create a fair and equitable funding formula to insure the districts have sufficient resources." In concluding that only "legislative acts that are clearly repugnant to the constitution" should be "invalidated," the trial judge denied injunctive relief.

Following an amendment to the complaint and the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment, the judge granted summary judgment to defendants and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. The judge concluded that the repeal of the Kiely Bill was not unconstitutional because it "reinstated the status quo" of the Village as being a "member of the Ocean Township School system"; the Village and Township operated as a consolidated school district; and that there was no suspect class involved to raise his equal protection analysis from the "rational basis" level of scrutiny. With respect to plaintiffs' contractual argument, the judge failed to find a contract that would support plaintiffs' claim and could not conclude that there was "an unconstitutional impairment to a contract when [there isn't] even . . . a contract." He continued,

Finally, Judge Cavanagh noted that plaintiffs had not chosen the appropriate forum for resolving their grievances pertaining to the repeal of the Kiely Bill, adding they should have gone to either "Trenton" or the "Commissioner of Education," as it was not proper for the trial court to usurp the "legislative function." This appeal followed.

On appeal, plaintiffs assert that the repeal of N.J.S.A. 18A:8-1.1 was unconstitutional because it was special legislation; plaintiffs' right of contract has been impaired by refusal to recognize an inter-municipal agreement between the Village and Township; the Village is not part of a consolidated school district and is not subject to the SFRA school funding allocation formula; the repeal of the Kiely Bill violates plaintiffs' equal protection rights; and the "catastrophic" tax increase constitutes a taking of property without due process.

II.

A.

We first address and dispose of the argument that SFRA was special legislation and violated the New Jersey Constitution.

Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution provides that "[n]o general law shall embrace any provision of a private, special or local character." General legislation, on the other hand, is law "that affects equally all of a group" and that "no one is excluded who should be included. . . ." Newark Superior Officers Ass'n v. City of Newark, 98 N.J. 212, 223 (1985). Statutes are generally "presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared void unless [they are] clearly repugnant to the Constitution." Id. at 222 (discouraging courts from acting as "super-[L]egislature[s]"). This "strong presumption in favor of constitutionality" should only be questioned with "judicial reluctance." Paul Kimball Hosp. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., 86 N.J. 429, 447 (1981). In proving that a statute is unconstitutional special legislation, the challenging party has the burden "to demonstrate clearly that it violates a constitutional provision." Officers Ass'n, supra, 98 N.J. at 222.

We engage in a three-part analysis to determine whether the challenged statute is unconstitutional special legislation. Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 300-01 (1977). First, we must "discern the purpose and object of the enactment," followed by an "appl[ication] to the factual situation presented." Ibid. Finally, we must "decide whether, as so applied, the resulting classification . . . rest[s] upon any rational or reasonable basis relevant to the purpose and object of the [A]ct." Id. at 301. Consequently, a statute will still be upheld even where its "impact, whether positive or negative, falls on a single person or entity" as long as a court "perceive[s] any rational basis . . . ." City of Jersey City v. Farmer, 329 N.J.Super. 27, 39 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 135 (2000).

Here, plaintiffs challenge to SFRA fails to meet the Vreeland test. First, as defendants correctly argue, the "purpose and object" of the SFRA is clear: to "develop an equitable and predictable way to distribute State aid" and to do so by "equaliz[ing] aid" from property wealth and district income calculations. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44(h); N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-52. Second, as applied to this "factual situation," the repealer does not "separate[] Loch Arbour from all of the municipalities in the state . . . ." Instead, as the trial judge noted, the repeal did not "create Loch Arbour into something else" but rather it "reinstated the status quo as to where it was, which was a member of the Ocean Township School system." The repeal mandated that all municipalities — including the one incorporated village — contribute to the tax levy in an "equitable and predictable way." Finally, with respect to the third prong, the court correctly found that it was a legitimate state interest to "insur[e] [that] adequate and proper fiscal resources are available to all students" through "an equitable statewide funding formula." That it stripped Loch Arbour of its privilege to a $300,000 cap on school taxes is of no moment in analyzing the constitutional argument.

To accept plaintiffs' argument would turn the specter of special legislation on its head. The Kiely Bill could be viewed as special legislation — applying to one municipality, statewide. To now suggest that a repeal of the Kiely Bill and other similar funding legislation in favor of legislation enacted to provide uniform application statewide is special legislation is imaginative but fanciful. We reject any suggestion that SFRA, and its repealer provisions, was special legislation.

Finally, plaintiffs' procedural arguments fail as well. Any procedural challenges to the newly adopted resolution must take place within one year of the statute's enactment before the Appellate Division. See N.J.S.A. 1:7-1. The procedural challenge was not lodged until six months after the expiration of the one year bar.

B.

We, likewise, conclude that the contract claim is without merit. Plaintiffs assert that the Kiely Bill formalized an agreement between the Township and the Village, and the repeal impaired this contract.

The Kiely Bill makes no reference to any contract, and nothing was produced by plaintiffs to establish the existence of any such contract. The judge, in his decision, appropriately noted that "I don't understand how, legally, a [L]egislature would be bound by an agreement that two municipal bodies made anyway."

Even if a contractual agreement existed between the Village and the Township, the Legislature was well within its rights to repeal it. For a legislative act to amount to an unconstitutional impairment of a contract, legislation: (1) must substantially impair a contractual relationship; (2) must lack a significant and legitimate public purpose; and (3) must be based upon unreasonable conditions and be unrelated to appropriate governmental objectives. Caponegro v. State Operated Sch. Dist., 330 N.J.Super. 148, 154 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 124 N.J. 32, 64 (1991)).

Here, the Legislature's enactment of the SFRA undoubtedly served a significant and legitimate public interest as it was designed to advance the objective that every school district in the state has the fiscal resources available to allow its students to meet the state's curriculum standards through the establishment of an equitable statewide funding formula. See N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44. The repealer at issue here is clearly related to these appropriate and legitimate purposes. It expressly repeals not only the Kiely Bill, but several other provisions formerly contained in Title 18A. Most important, the repealer provision repealed CEIFA, the previous state school funding statute, in its entirety. See L. 2007, c. 260, § 84. The express repeal of the Kiely Bill is related to the Legislature's appropriate objective of ensuring that adequate fiscal resources are available to students because 1) the terminology used in the Kiely Bill was directly related to calculations contained in CEIFA; and 2) it serves to treat all consolidated school districts in the state similarly. See N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44.

Since the repealer serves a significant and legitimate purpose and is directly related to the Legislature's appropriate objectives, it does not unconstitutionally impair any alleged contractual agreement between the Village and the Township.

C.

Plaintiffs also contend that the because the repealer will result in a 447 percent tax increase, this "constitutes a de facto taking of property" in that it would "burden[] the free alienation of property" and "destroy" the value of property in the Village.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution bars "private property [from] be[ing] taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. See also N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 20; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978). Such a taking may be accomplished in one of two ways:

However, courts have consistently narrowed the application of this constitutional provision to only certain instances of government interference with private property. See Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm'n, 125 N.J. 193, 210 (1991) (holding that the "[d]imunition of land value" and the "impairment of the marketability of land" do not constitute "takings"); City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 203 N.J. 464, 486 (2010) (noting that there is no government taking for property that claimants "never owned").

Plaintiffs' taking argument is without merit and requires little further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the following comments.

Plaintiffs contend that the repeal of the Kiely Bill and enactment of the SFRA constituted a "regulatory taking." Nothing in the repeal "deprives [Village residents] of all economically viable use of their land." Klumpp, supra, 202 N.J. at 405. Plaintiffs concede that their argument is based on a "predict[ion]" that property values will significantly depreciate due to the tax increase, which would inevitably come out of the pockets of Village residents. Proving an unconstitutional taking, however, requires far more than speculation. As we have noted, "[d]imunition of land value" and the "impairment of the marketability of land" do not constitute takings. Gardner, supra, 125 N.J. at 210. Nothing presented here suggests otherwise.

III.

In addition to the constitutional arguments, plaintiffs contend that if the SFRA had properly repealed the Kiely Bill, the Village is not a "consolidated district," and thereby should not be governed by the same statutory funding methodology as the Township. Moreover, plaintiffs argue that OTSD is technically a "regional district."

Even though we have serious doubts as to the validity of plaintiffs' arguments, we decline to address that issue on this appeal since even if there is a genuine issue as to the Commissioner's classification of the OCSD as a consolidated issue, primary jurisdiction for that determination rests not with us but with the Commissioner of Education.

"Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a `court declines original jurisdiction and refers to the appropriate body those issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body.'" Curzi v. Raub, 415 N.J.Super. 1, 20 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Borough of Haledon v. Borough of N. Haledon, 358 N.J.Super. 289, 301-02 (App. Div. 2003)). "In other words, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the case is properly before the court, but agency expertise is required to resolve the questions presented." Boldt v. Correspondence Mgmt., Inc., 320 N.J.Super. 74, 83 (App. Div. 1999). "When exhaustion of remedies is invoked, on the other hand, the court is saying the case ought to have been brought before the administrative agency in the first place." Id. at 84.

"Primary jurisdiction serves two purposes: `to allow an agency to apply its expertise to questions which require interpretation of its regulations,' and `to preserve uniformity in the interpretation and application of any agency's regulations.'" Curzi, supra, 415 N.J. Super. at 20 (quoting Haledon, supra, 358 N.J. Super. at 302).

"[D]eference is appropriate only if to deny the agency's power to resolve the issues in question would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme which vested the agency with the authority to regulate [the] industry or activity it oversees." Muise v. GPU, Inc., 332 N.J.Super. 140, 160 (App. Div. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).

Courts consider a four-prong test:

Further, "[w]hen a claim presents some issues that are within an agency's special expertise and others which are not, the proper course is for the court to refer the former to the agency, and then to apply the agency's findings or conclusions to its determination of the remaining issues." Muise, supra, 332 N.J. Super. at 161.

In addition to considering the issue of primary jurisdiction, we invoke the related basic principle requiring a litigant to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review.

Requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief is a tenet of administrative law and established in court rule. Garrow v. Elizabeth General Hosp. & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, 558-59 (1979); R. 2:2-3(a)(2).

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires individuals to pursue available administrative remedies before seeking relief in the courts. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke ("Abbott I"), 100 N.J. 269, 296 (1985); Garrow, supra, 79 N.J. at 559; Paterson Redevelopment Agency v. Schulman, 78 N.J. 378, 386-87, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900, 100 S.Ct. 210, 62 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1979); Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 136, 141 (1962).

The exhaustion requirement serves three primary purposes. It ensures that matters are initially heard by the body with expertise in the area. In addition, administrative exhaustion produces a full factual record facilitating proper review. Finally, administrative exhaustion conserves judicial resources because the agency decision may satisfy the parties. City of Atlantic City v. Laezza, 80 N.J. 255, 265 (1979); Triano v. Div. of State Lottery, 306 N.J.Super. 114, 121 (App. Div. 1997); see also Archway Programs, Inc. v. Pemberton Township Bd. of Educ., 352 N.J.Super. 420, 425 (App. Div. 2002) (internal quotation omitted) (noting that doctrines of primary jurisdiction and administrative remedy exhaustion both further "proper relationships between courts and regulatory agencies").

We have recognized the Department's "fundamental and indispensable jurisdiction" over controversies and disputes arising under the school laws. Theodore v. Dover Bd. of Educ., 183 N.J.Super. 407, 412-13 (App. Div. 1982) (quoting Hinfey v. Matawan Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 514, 525 (1978)). We have therefore held that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies requires parties to attempt resolution of such matters using the administrative process. Theodore, supra, 183 N.J. Super. at 414.

In determining whether to adhere to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, courts look to see whether factual development will aid in the resolution of the issue. If such a record facilitates the disposition of a legal question, a court will require a litigant to exhaust his or her administrative remedies. See, e.g., Abbott I, supra, 100 N.J. at 299; Paterson, supra, 78 N.J. at 387; Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 590-91 (1975).

While defendants maintain that no genuine dispute exists with regard to OTSD's classification as a consolidated district, the development of a factual record with an opportunity for the Commissioner to make an agency determination is both appropriate and necessary.

IV.

Lastly, we reject plaintiffs' argument that their equal protection rights were violated when they were deprived representation on the school board.

Plaintiffs first contend that the denial of the right to vote infringed upon the equal protection rights of the Village, through its Village Clerk, plaintiff Lorraine Carafa. As the trial judge noted, a municipality, "created by the state . . ., has no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator." Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40, 53 S.Ct. 431, 432, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 1020-21 (1933). Here, the Village as a municipality cannot bring this claim against its "creator," which in this case is the State.

Alternatively, however, plaintiffs claim that the "citizens" as taxpayers have standing to assert their equal protection rights, which they allege were violated by the denial of the right to vote.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that no state "shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, ¶ 1. In determining whether this Constitutional provision was violated,

The right to vote qualifies as a fundamental right and warrants a "strict scrutiny" analysis, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92, 99 (1972), which requires the State to show that such "exclusions [were] necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1000, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274, 281 (1972). This fundamental right is traditionally implicated when the "`one person, one vote' principle" has been infringed. English v. Bd. of Educ. of the Town of Boonton, 301 F.3d 69, 76 (3rd Cir. 2002) (quoting Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Mo, 397 U.S. 50, 56, 90 S.Ct. 791, 795, 25 L. Ed. 2d 45, 50-51 (1970)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148, 123 S.Ct. 852, 154 L. Ed. 2d 851 (2003). Under this principle, "`each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to participate in [an] election,'" which includes the right for "`equal numbers of voters [to] vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials.'" English, supra, 301 F.3d at 76 (quoting Hadley, supra, 397 U.S. at 56, 90 S. Ct. at 795, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 51) (continuing that the "deni[al] [of] an equal voice to each resident" triggers strict scrutiny). However, where the "challenged legislation" "does not infringe on the right to vote," a court will employ the rational basis standard, which calls for "the legislation [to be] rationally relate[d] to [a] legitimate state purpose[]." Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1999).

Here, plaintiffs argue that the Township has infringed upon their right to vote by denying plaintiffs the chance to "elect a representative to the School Board . . . ." In order to warrant a strict scrutiny analysis, plaintiffs must prove that they were actually prevented from voting in elections, a claim that is unsupported in the record.

N.J.S.A. 18A:8-1 defines the function of an "incorporated village" in that it "remain[s] a part of the district in which it is situated at the time of its incorporation" and is not a "separate local school district . . . ." N.J.S.A. 18A:8-1. As long as the Village's residents could participate in their district's elections, their right to vote is protected. The Village residents had every opportunity to "seek[] a position as a representative on the school board" given they could "vote in those elections and vote on every budget."

Here, the SFRA was "rationally related to a legitimate state interest" in that its "purpose . . . was to insure an equitable funding formula" for every district. Moreover, as the judge noted, it provided a guarantee that each district had enough "fiscal resources available" to ensure that students were able to meet the state's minimum competency standards. Finally, the SFRA had repealed several other bills — and not just the Kiely legislation — including the Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act (CEIFA), which "was the previous state school funding statute." Clearly, the Legislature did not depart from its objective to eradicate all vestiges of the former school funding methods if it repealed any legislation related to that formula. We agree with the trial judge that the SFRA was linked to a legitimate state purpose and, thereby, meets the rational basis standard.

Subsumed within their equal protection claim is another argument that because the Village will soon endure a "447%" tax increase rather than the standard four percent increase guaranteed by N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-38, their rights have been infringed. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-38(a)(1) provides, in part, that:

Plaintiffs assert that this statute provides other municipalities, such as the Township, the protection of a four percent spending cap while the Village would be subjected to a "monstrous tax increase" of 447 percent. Further, they argue that the increase would "constitute[] a `hardship,'" arguing that the district's budget is expected to rise less than four percent.

Plaintiffs' interpretation of this statute is incorrect. The statute specifically refers to a "school district," rather than the individual municipalities that comprise that district. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-38(a)(1). Accordingly, as long as the entire school district does not "adopt a budget . . . that exceeds. . . the tax levy growth limitation," then the statute is not violated. The statute refers to the amount raised by the district, or the total local contribution for a school district, not an individual municipal tax levy. See Abbott ex. rel. Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140, 242 (2009) (emphasis added) (stating that "[a] district may raise more than its required [Local Fair Share]").

In sum, we conclude that plaintiffs' arguments are without merit and the judge properly granted summary judgment.

Affirmed.